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Thesis Summary 
Chapters 1 and 2 deal with the relationship between the Church in Wales and its clergy; the 
way in which ministerial working arrangements might be interpreted by the secular courts 
and the civil law consequences which would flow from this interpretation.  The study begins 
with an analysis of the relationship in the general context of employment law.  From this 
examination it emerges that civil law does not adopt a single, universal definition of 
employment status, but categorizes working agreements differently for different purposes.  
Consequently, the discussion moves on to look at how the working arrangements of Church 
in Wales clergy would be construed in relation to vicarious liability in tort, concluding that 
vicarious liability would almost certainly attach to torts committed in the course of 
performing ministerial duties. 
Having established that the church will be vicariously liable, Chapters 3 and 4 go on to 
consider the scope of the potential liability in connection with trespass and negligence 
respectively.  The common theme which emerges from these chapters, is the difficulty of 
defining the boundaries of ministerial duties, given the breadth of activities which these 
duties can encompass, and the underlying Anglican belief that Holy Orders confer not just a 
set of tasks but a permanent state of being. 
The conclusion in chapter 5 proposes dealing with this challenge by analysing the clerical 
role for the purposes of tort in relation to the professional tasks, expertise and undertakings 
set out in the Clergy Terms of Service.  This analysis can be separated from the theological 
understanding adopted by the church in the context of doctrine, and gives a workable 
framework for establishing the scope of tortious liability.  This approach is then tested and 
illustrated with a series of case studies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Two separate and ongoing developments make the present moment an apt time to consider 
the civil liability of clergy and its implications for the Church in Wales.   First, the gradual 
evolution of secular employment law relating to ministers of religion,
1
 accompanied by 
changes which the Church in Wales has introduced,
2
 has seen a shift in both the 
construction and understanding of the working arrangements of clergy and their legal 
relationship with the church.   Secondly, there have been a number of recent cases on 
vicarious liability in the context of religious organisations.
3
   
The combined impact of these parallel changes has reshaped the landscape of tortious 
liability and the church.  The bonds of mutual obligation between Anglican clergy and the 
church within which they operate are no longer expressed solely, or even primarily, in the 
sphere of ecclesiastical law and office holding as was once thought to be the case
4
.  Now 
courts recognise that the secular law of contract,
5
 and various branches of labour law,
6
 have 
a role in enforcing and policing the relationship between ministers and religious 
                                                           
1
 Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission (respondents) [2005] UKHL 73; New Testament Church 
of God v Stewart [2008] IRLR 134; Macdonald v Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland [2010] All ER (D) 265 
(Mar); JGE v Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocese [2012] EWCA Civ 938 etc 
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organisations.  Furthermore, the law of tort also acknowledges these ties, and is prepared 
where appropriate to impose vicarious liability on the strength of them.
7
 
This study examines some of the implications of this, focusing particularly on the specific 
case of the Church in Wales.  Whilst there is some engaging secondary literature on the 
employment status of clergy, and this considered in the course of the discussion, there has 
been surprisingly little academic examination of the issues relating to Anglican clergy and 
tortious liability.  What does exist tends to focus on the arena of vicarious liability, and 
leaves wider issues largely untouched.  This study attempts to explore some of the hitherto 
neglected territory in relation to clergy and tort. 
It begins in Chapter 1 with an examination of the current position of clergy in the context of 
secular employment law, arguing that the case for treating ministers of religion as a special 
category of worker entirely distinct from those employed in secular activities has been 
overstated in both case law and academic commentary. 
It considers the progressive shifts in judicial thinking on the intention to create legal 
relations in the context of ministers of religion and their working arrangements, particularly 
the possible emergence and certain extinction of a presumption against such an intention. 
It then sets out the current position of fact finding tribunals considering the matter without 
any presumption, but examining the legal and factual context of each case, and considering 
it on its merits.  It is submitted that this not in reality an innovative move, but a return to 
the methodology adopted by judges in the leading historic cases.  As is the case for workers 
in the secular sphere, ministers of religion may or may not be employees, depending upon 
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the terms of their working agreement, and also the purposes for which they are attempting 
to establish employment status. 
The analysis then considers the human rights implications of state courts applying secular 
labour law in a religious context, particularly in relation to the Article 9 right to freedom of 
conscience, belief and religion.
8
  It concludes that despite theoretical concerns being raised 
in recent judicial pronouncements, the probability of Article 9 presenting serious obstacles 
to these developments is small.   In contexts in which labour law was likely to be applied to a 
minister of religion, it is likely that either: i) the specific situation rule could be invoked; or ii) 
that the conduct of the religious community demonstrated an intention to create legal 
relations, and such conduct was incompatible with the assertion that legal relations with 
ministers infringed the religious doctrines of the community. 
Consequently, the overall conclusion of Chapter 1 is that the position of religious ministers 
(including Church in Wales clergy) is in reality much the same as that of other individuals 
with complicated working arrangements and systems of supervision.   In addition to which, 
recent decisions indicate that the UK courts have firmly rejected a one size fits all approach 
to employment status.  An individual may be deemed an employee for some legal purposes 
and not for others, and this situation is especially likely in the context of non-standard 
working arrangements.  Workers like clergy who have complex patterns of work and 
accountability are especially likely to be classified differently for different legal purposes. 
This finding leads on naturally to the examination in Chapter 2 of the specific issue of 
vicarious liability and Church in Wales clergy.  The discussion considers the recent 
development of the law of vicarious liability in general, with particular regard to the UK 
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courts partial adoption of the Canadian concept of enterprise risk.  It concludes that whilst 
the appellate courts in Britain continue to refer to risk in analysing vicarious liability, they do 
not systematically look at the factors which may generate or enhance such risk, in a way 
comparable to that seen in the Canadian case law.  It is suggested that this is regrettable, as 
the Canadian approach would provide greater clarity, and would be entirely in keeping with 
historic UK case law on the issue.
9
 
It is noted however, that whatever approach is taken to risk, the questions accompanying it 
are inevitably tied to the questions of scope of duties of care discussed in relation to 
negligence.  What are clergy tasked with doing, what are clergy publically held out as doing 
and what are the risks inherent in them doing it?  The question of enterprise risk cannot be 
considered in isolation from the question of clergy duties.  Hence the outcome of cases will 
always be fact specific. 
Nevertheless, having acknowledged that the current state of the general law of vicarious 
liability means that the outcome of individual cases will often be uncertain, it is concluded 
that the relationship between Church in Wales clergy and the church is such that in at least 
some circumstances vicarious liability will ensue.  The most persuasive element of the 
argument for this comes from recent case law on Roman Catholic clergy.
10
    The courts 
were prepared to treat Roman Catholic priests as being in a position akin to employment for 
the purposes of vicarious liability.   
Given that the Church in Wales has now adopted the Clergy Terms of Service,
11
 working 
arrangements consciously modelled on those found in the secular world, the relationship 
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between the church and its ministers and even closer to that of employment than is the 
case in the Roman Catholic sphere.   It would be difficult to conceive of a convincing 
argument for treating Roman Catholic priests as quasi-employees for the purposes of 
vicarious liability, but categorise Anglican priests differently for the same purpose, when 
their relationship with the church which they serve is far more closely akin to secular 
employment. 
Having thus established that vicarious liability will ensue for the tortious activities of Church 
in Wales clergy, at least in some circumstances, Chapters 3 and 4 go on to examine torts 
which might be committed in the course of ministerial activity.  Chapter 3 considers trespass 
to the person, and focuses on two main contexts: firstly in relation to pastoral care and 
relationships; and secondly in relation to liturgical actions, particularly the administration of 
baptism.   
Chapter 4 goes on the look at negligence.  It ultimately observes that clergy, like all other 
legal persons, will be liable for causing harm to third parties, if the necessary elements of 
the tort of negligence (duty of care, causation, remoteness) can be established.   However, 
when considering whether the clergy have any special duty to actively promote and 
safeguard the welfare of others, it reaches a more reassuring conclusion from the 
perspective of exposure to civil liability.  Properly read and understood, the Maga case 
demonstrates that clergy (including Church in Wales clergy) are not subject to any special 
duty to take steps to protect third parties from harm.  Such duties generally only arise if 
they are well-established in law by virtue of a relationship of responsibility and control (e.g 
parent and child, prison and prisoner etc), or if they are assumed by the defendant. 
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The Church in Wales as an institution does not hold out its clergy as having any technical 
skills or expertise which would give third parties reason to believe that its priests are more 
capable than anyone else of safeguarding interests protected by the tort of negligence (i.e. 
physical and mental health and integrity, property and economic interest).  Whilst they may 
claim to have expertise in spiritual and liturgical matters, spiritual harm is not a species of 
damage recognised in tort.   
Neither does the Church in Wales make promises that its clergy will provide a measurable 
standard or frequency of pastoral attention, allowing third parties to rely on such promises 
to their detriment. 
Therefore, the only duties of care which individual clergy are likely to assume are those 
arising out of specific factual contexts in which they find themselves, putting them in the 
same position as the general population, and subject to the general law. 
But Chapters 3 and 4 still leave some fundamental questions unanswered, which are 
addressed more fully in the conclusion set out in Chapter 5.  The preceding chapters 
revealed a common and consistent theme: namely, that determining the scope of 
ministerial duties is deeply problematic, but also an unavoidable necessity in establishing 
the potential and limits of civil liability for the wider church.   
Chapter 5 starts from the position that the Church in Wales will be liable for the actions of 
its priests, deacons and bishops when they are functioning as bishops, priests, and deacons 
therefore furthering its organisational aims.  It then acknowledges the challenge which this 
poses in light of the doctrinal context.  The Anglican theology of Holy Orders does not allow 
for individuals who are ordained to divide their time into sacred and secular moments; 
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priesthood is about being rather than doing, and being is a constant state.  Therefore in 
some sense Anglican clergy can never be said to be acting in a purely personal and private 
capacity.   
Taken at face value this situation would leave courts with a stark choice between:  
i) finding that the church is liable for the torts of its clergy in all circumstances; 
ii) finding that the church is never liable for the torts of its clergy; and  
iii) finding that they church is liable for the torts of its clergy in some circumstances 
but not others, and drawing arbitrary distinctions between cases. 
However, none of these possibilities is palatable or wholly satisfactory.  The first would be 
placing an extremely heavy burden on the church.  Yet the second option is no more 
acceptable; it would simply give rise to an opposite and equal injustice.  In objective terms 
there is no reason why the Church in Wales should be granted complete immunity, or why 
potential claimants should suffer the accompanying hardship of being denied any remedy 
for injury and harm suffered. 
But the third option raises a different set of problems for both courts and parties to claims.  
It is not in the interests of justice for the process of litigation to function in an arbitrary or 
unpredictable fashion.  Neither is it easy for parties to establish appropriate pre-trial 
settlements when they do not have a clear legal framework within which to conduct 
negotiations.  It is impossible to bargain in the shadow of the law unless there is reasonable 
clarity about where the law is to be found. 
 Therefore, an alternative approach to the situation is required.  Chapter 5 proposes such an 
alternative.  Namely, that if courts consider clerical ministry in terms of professional tasks, 
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expertise and undertakings as set out in the Clergy Terms of Service,  rather than in terms of 
the all-encompassing priestly role.   
This involves asking: 
i) What specific tasks are Church in Wales clergy required by the CTS to perform in 
the relevant context?  
ii) What professional expertise, in terms of skills and training, are Church in Wales 
clergy held out as bringing to the given situation? 
iii) What undertakings have been made by the Church in Wales or individual clergy 
in this situation?  Did any third parties reasonably rely on these undertakings to 
their detriment? 
On this basis, it is possible to draw meaningful and helpful distinctions.  Consequently 
adopting this approach, courts would be able to distinguish cases in a way which was logical 
and justifiable.  Inevitably borderline cases will always arise and certain grey areas will 
always remain, but at least consistent principles can be applied to the chaotic problems 
generated by human life and litigation. 
It is argued that is approach is consistent and compatible with the way in which both 
employment and tort law operate.  In the context of labour law, courts have for sometime 
been prepared to adopt a flexible and even creative approach.  The same individual may be 
an employee for some legislative purposes but not for others, and contractual intent to 
create legal relations may be found to exist for some aspects of a working relationship but 
not for others.  In the complex world of contemporary employment claims, a simple, 
monochrome approach has long since given way to something more toned and nuanced.  If 
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courts are capable of making distinctions in this arena, then they should be equally of 
capable of doing so in relation to the law of tort. 
Chapter 5 then concludes with three case studies which demonstrate how the Clergy Terms 
of Service may be used to provide guidance on the tasks and expertise required of Church in 
Wales clergy, and the types of undertakings given in respect of their service.  This guidance 
can then be applied to provide a framework for considering the kinds of claims and liability 
which may arise in the contemporary United Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CHURCH IN WALES AND ITS CLERGY 
IN THE CONTEXT OF SECULAR EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter examines how secular employment law would be likely to construe the 
relationship between the Church in Wales and its clergy.  In order to do this it considers 
firstly how secular employment law deals with ministers of religion in general, and then 
analyses this position in the particular context of the Church in Wales. 
1) The case for treating ministers of religion as a special category of worker entirely 
distinct from those employed in secular activities has been overstated in both case 
law and academic commentary. 
 
2) The presumption against an intention to create legal relations in cases of ministers of 
religion which began to emerge in EAT decisions, and was identified by some 
commentators, never in fact existed in the law as articulated by the higher courts. 
 
3) The current position of examining the legal and factual context of each case, and 
considering it on its merits, is not a new departure but a reaffirmation of the 
approach taken in the leading historic cases.  In common with other workers 
ministers of religion may or may not be employees, depending upon the terms of 
their working agreement, and the purposes for which they are attempting to 
establish employment status. 
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4) The potential human rights issued raised by conferring employment status on 
ministers of religion have been overstated in recent obiter judicial pronouncements.  
In most instances finding an intention to create legal relations would not breach the 
Article 9 rights of the religious community or organisation for which they worked.  In 
the majority of cases it could be shown that either: i) the specific situation rule 
applied; or ii) the conduct of the religious community demonstrated an intention to 
create legal relations, and such conduct was incompatible with the assertion that 
legal relations with ministers infringed the religious doctrines of the community. 
 
5) The position of religious ministers is therefore in many respects no different from 
that of other people whose working pattern and context is complicated.   
Furthermore recent decisions suggest that in such circumstances, the courts are 
moving away from a monochrome understanding of employment status.  An 
individual may be deemed an employee for some legal purposes and not for others. 
 
1.2 Determining employment status - the secular law position 
Both judges,
12
 and commentators,
13
 acknowledge that the determination of employment 
status remains a complex area, generating pitfalls for the unwary and an abundance of 
litigation.    As Lord Hoffman noted in Carmichael v National Power, it is an issue which 
requires tribunals to negotiate the subtle interplay between questions of fact and questions 
of law, particularly when establishing the terms of the working agreement between parties 
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in dispute.
14
  Because the content and circumstances of such agreements are key to the 
question of employment status, and are also almost infinitely variable, it is not always easy 
to find helpful guidance within the plethora of case-law.
15
 
 
Furthermore, in addition to untangling the terms of the agreement negotiated by the 
parties, courts must also assess which of the many legislative provisions regulating the 
employment sphere are relevant in any given case.
16
  An individual’s employment status and 
working arrangements may qualify him or her for rights or protection under some statutory 
provisions but not others.  It is entirely possible for an individual to be an employee for the 
purpose of one piece of legislation, whilst failing to meet the criteria for employment status 
set out in another. 
 
The recent case of Jivraj v Haswani illustrates the current complexity and difficulties very 
well.
 17
   The Court of Appeal was prepared to find that the Employment Equality (Religion 
and Belief) Regulations
18
 covered ‘employment’ in the broadest sense, and construed this to 
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mean the personal provision of services under any form of contract, whilst the Supreme 
Court took a far more restrictive view when construing the ambit of the protection.    
 
The facts were as follows: the parties had entered into a joint venture agreement for 
investing in real estate.  One of the terms of this agreement dealt with appointing 
arbitrators in the event of any dispute, and stated that all arbitrators were to be respected, 
office-holding members of the Ismaili community.  Ismailism is a branch of Shia Islam, and 
the term therefore clearly stipulated that the appointee be drawn from a specific religious 
group.  However, when the need to appoint arbitrators arose, one side appointed Sir 
Anthony Colman, who did not satisfy this requirement.   They argued that the Employment 
Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations had rendered the contractual term requiring 
membership of that community void.  The judge at first instance rejected this argument, 
finding that the regulations only applied where there was a relationship of employment and 
there was none in this case.   
 
He found that although the relationship between an arbitrator and the parties to a dispute 
could potentially be classified as contractual, the contract in place could not be an 
employment contract.
19
  The arbitrator has no client but acts independently and impartially, 
the parties may not give instructions about the manner in which the work is to be carried 
out or the outcome which is to be achieved.  The closest analogy to the role of arbitrator is 
that of judge;
20
 in the general context of employment, judges, magistrates and the 
chairpersons of tribunals are not employed but office holders.
21
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The Court of Appeal took a radically different approach, and found that the Employment 
Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations did apply to Mr Colman, even though they 
acknowledged that he was effectively acting as an independent contractor providing a 
professional service. The court made an analogy between appointing an arbitrator and 
instructing a solicitor or consulting a doctor.
22
  The arbitrator almost certainly could not 
have established employee status for the purposes of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
23
   
Section 230 of the Act defines employee as: 
 
‘an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, 
worked under) a contract of employment.’ 
 
Any tribunal applying a conventional test
24
 for establishing a contract of employment, such 
as the one framed by Mackenna J in Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) v Minister of 
Pensions and National Insurance,would have found that the arbitrator failed to satisfy its 
requirements.
25
  The criteria laid out by Mackenna J are: 1) mutuality of obligation; 2) 
remuneration; 3) a commitment to provide personal service; 4) control by the employer; 
and 5) the absence of any contractual terms incompatible with a contract of employment.  
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The arbitrator would have fallen down on all of these points save, possibly, the commitment 
to provide personal service.    
 
However, the arbitrator’s inability to assert rights flowing from section 230 of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996
26
 had no bearing on his status for the purposes of the 
Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations 2003 in the view of the Court of 
Appeal.   The court found that his working arrangements were indeed covered by the 
regulations in question.  The Regulations were made to give effect to Council Directive (EC) 
2008/78, and the scope of that directive was an important consideration for the Court of 
Appeal:
27
  
 
‘The recitals to the Directive and the structure and language of art 3(1) as a whole indicate 
that it is concerned with discrimination affecting access to the means of economic activity, 
whether through employment, self-employment or some other basis of occupation’.28 
 
In light of the breadth of the Directive, the Court of Appeal held that it was appropriate to 
adopt a broad definition of employment for the purpose of interpreting the Employment 
Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations.  They also noted that there was European case 
law which determined that for some purposes arbitrators were deemed to be providing 
services.
29
 Furthermore, they found that as the function of arbitrators was to determine the 
dispute in accordance with English law, there was no genuine occupational requirement 
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which justified stipulating that all arbitrators be drawn from the Ismaili community.   
Consequently the contractual term did indeed fall foul of the Regulations. 
 
When the Supreme Court came to examine the case however, the judgement of the Court 
of Appeal was overturned.
30
  In interpreting the regulations, the Supreme Court found it 
essential to consider in detail the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
31
  
Particular importance was attached to the Allonby case.32  In Allonby the court considered 
an equal pay claim made by a lecturer who was dismissed but then reengaged by the 
defendant college, ostensibly as a self-employed subcontractor sourced from an agency.
33
    
 
In that case the Supreme Court noted that the ECJ had drawn a clear distinction between 
workers and independent suppliers for services for the purposes of Article 141 (1) of the EC 
treaty.
34
  The authors of the Treaty did not intend the term ‘worker’ in that article to include 
individuals providing services who were not in a ‘subordinate relationship’ with the recipient 
of those services.
35
  Following Allonby the definition of worker contained with the Equal Pay 
Act s.1(6) must be construed to exclude those who are genuinely self employed; and the 
nearly identical definition in s83(2) of Equality Act (the domestic legislation within which the 
regulations were enacted) must logically be interpreted in the same fashion.
36
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Therefore, because an arbitrator is in no sense in a subordinate relationship with the parties 
in dispute his or her working arrangements will not be covered by the European directive or 
the provisions of the Equality Act.
37
  The Supreme Court found that it was not necessary to 
speculate about the position in factual contexts outside of arbitration;
38
 but were 
nevertheless unable to resist the temptation to immediately do so.   Lord Clarke expressed 
extreme doubt that a person engaging a plumber to do a one off job would be subject to the 
whole gamut of antidiscrimination legislation.
39
  However, it was emphasised that ultimately 
whether the regulations applied to a plumber, doctor or other worker would always depend 
upon the facts of the case in relation to Allonby, bearing in mind that this decision requires 
something more than the obligation to do work personally cited by the Court of Appeal in 
Jivraj.40  
 
Academic commentators have taken different views on the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
in Jivraj.  McCrudden analyses the decision in terms of opposing normative justifications, 
and offers an explanation for the requirement of subordination on this basis.
41
  He poses the 
question as to whether employment discrimination law should properly be regarded as a 
subset of employment law, or as a subset of discrimination law.   If it belongs to the world of 
employment law, then the requirement of subordination imposed by the Supreme Court 
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makes sense, as the original rationale of employment law was based upon the inherent 
inequality of the parties. Furthermore McCrudden sees the decision as a move away from 
the human rights or dignitarian model of working relations and labour law, championed by 
Freeland and Kountoris, as an alternative to the traditional employment, subordination 
model.
42
  Effectively the Supreme Court placed employment discrimination law within the 
realm of employment law rather than discrimination law in making application of the 
legislation contingent upon subordination, thus demonstrating a preference for an 
employment as opposed to a human rights based approach. 
 
However Freeland and Kountoris offer a very different analysis in reply.
43
  They argue that in 
confining the scope of the regulations to subordinate working relationships, the Supreme 
Court are effectively limiting their scope to employment in the conventional sense, as 
subordination is the ‘defining attribute’ of employment relationships.44   
 
The difficulty with this interpretation is, in their view, that it renders meaningless the final 
category of working relationship set out in the legislation; namely ‘employment personally 
to do work’.  If only contracts involving a subordinate relationship qualify as employment 
personally to do work and attract anti-discrimination protection, then only contracts of 
employment or apprenticeship would come within the scope of the provision.  Thus the 
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words ‘employment personally to do work’ add nothing to the previously listed categories, 
i.e. contracts of employment or apprenticeship.
45
 
  
Since the 1970s equality legislation has referred to ‘employment under a contract of 
employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work’.46  Freeland 
and Kountoris argue that there is every reason to believe that the inclusion of this third 
category or worker was a serious and deliberate attempt to extend the scope of protection 
beyond contracts of employment or apprenticeship.    Therefore, individuals such as an 
arbitrator, who are clearly not employed in a subordinate relationship pursuant to a 
contract of employment or apprenticeship, may nevertheless be covered by the statutory 
protection. 
 
Furthermore Freeland and Kountoris propose that not only did the Supreme Court adopt a 
misguided approach to both European and domestic legislation, their analysis of case law 
was also questionable.   Although they do not concede that the Supreme Court arrived at 
the correct understanding of the ECJ concept of ‘worker’ as it emerged from Allonby and 
subsequent case law, Freeland and Kountoris argue that Allonby is in any event not directly 
on point in relation to religious discrimination.
47
    Directive 2000/78
48
 which related to the 
Jivraj v Hashwani litigation applies to ‘employment or occupation’ whereas Article 141 
which related to equal pay deals with ‘workers’ and their employers. 
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 Ibid: ‘The notion of ‘employment under a contract personally to do work’ where the contract is not a contract 
of employment or apprenticeship is thereby emptied of all content; the legislator has on that view simply 
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 Ibid 61. 
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The Supreme Court found that the protection afforded by Directive 2000/78 extended to 
self employment or training only in relation to the opportunity to qualify for or set up in 
such a field.   It did not prevent customers choosing to discriminate between independent 
businesses or service providers.  Freeland and Kountoris accepted that the unique role of an 
arbitrator might be seen to have complicated the picture, but cited barristers as example of 
the difficulties posed by the wider implications of the approach taken by the Supreme 
Court.
49
  Prospective barristers would be protected from discrimination when applying for 
academic and vocational courses or a seat in chambers, but not when it came to obtaining 
work and remuneration from instructing solicitors or clients, a position which was neither 
logical nor satisfactory.
50
 
 
It must be acknowledged that Freeland and Kountoris make a persuasive case in relation to 
the flaws in the reasoning by the Supreme Court.  It is difficult to find a convincing 
alternative understanding of the purpose of the formula ‘other contracts to do work 
personally’ if it is not interpreted as extending the reach of the provision beyond ‘contracts 
of employment or apprenticeship’.  Furthermore, it does seem challenging to justify 
protecting individuals like barristers and plumbers from discrimination in access to training 
and setting up, but not from discrimination in actually obtaining work and remuneration. 
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 Ibid 62. 
50
 Ibid 63: ‘Article 3(1)(a) applies to the barrister’s access to professional qualification and training, and, we 
would suggest, to selection for tenancy in chambers, since that is clearly integral to ‘setting up’ as a barrister-
but would apparently not apply to any criteria which the client or instructing solicitor might impose upon the 
selection of counsel for briefing in a particular case or matter.  One is forced to ask whether it is not positively 
ironical, having (quite rightly in our view) protected the would-be barrister from discrimination while he or she 
makes an enormous personal investment in qualifying for and obtaining a seat in chambers, then to leave him 
or her to face possibly discriminatory selection criteria when he or she seeks to realise that investment by 
obtaining actual engagements for work’. 
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But it is also clear that Freeland is correct to observe that the view of the Supreme Court is 
indicative of the current state and indeed direction of UK law.  For present purposes the 
Jivraj litigation demonstrates the complexity of the contemporary position with regard to 
employment status, and how the sands are continually shifting.   The radically different 
conclusions and approaches of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court show how 
difficult it can be to predict the outcome of cases in novel factual contexts.  Like arbitrators, 
clergy often have working arrangements with no obvious or easy analogies in other fields. 
 
The differing decisions of the appellate courts in Jivraj and the deliberations involved also 
illustrate how critical it is to establish clearly the purpose for which an individual’s 
employment status is to be construed.  There is no universal definition of ‘employment’ 
within either European or domestic law. Everything turns upon the context in which the 
question is being posed.  
 
Other recent cases confirm this broader picture.  In Autoclenz v Belcher51 the Supreme Court 
considered the position of car valeters in relation to holiday pay.  The question arose as to 
whether they were ‘workers’ for the purposes of the Employment Rights Act, the National 
Minimum Wage Regulations and the Working Time Regulations.
52
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 Autoclenz Limited v Belcher and others [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] IRLR 820. 
52
 The term ‘worker’ is defined in s. 230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, reg. 2 of the Working Time 
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The valeters were ostensibly self-employed, and a number of terms within their written 
agreements supported this conclusion.  For instance the valeters were not obliged to 
provide services on any particular occasion, and the company was not obliged to engage 
them.
53
  However the Supreme Court endorsed the approach of the lower courts in 
considering the circumstances as a whole.  An employment tribunal should seek to 
determine the reality of the relationship and obligations between the parties; written 
agreements are not the only factor in this and may contain clauses which do not reflect the 
genuine position.
54
 
 
A similar approach was taken in the subsequent case of Quashie v Stringfellows 
Resturants.55 Here the EAT looked beyond the written statement of terms, which 
unambiguously defined the working relationship provision of services by a self employed 
individual.
56
  Considering the totality and reality of the situation, the EAT found that the 
claimant was an employee for the purposes of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and 
therefore able to bring a claim for unfair dismissal.  Although this finding was reversed by 
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 Quashie v Stringfellows Restaurants Ltd [2012] IRLR 536. 
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the Court of Appeal, the underlying approach of assessing the facts and drawing an overall 
conclusion was firmly endorsed.
57
 
 
The claimant was a lap-dancer in the defendant’s club.  She was not paid directly or in a 
conventional way by the club, but received vouchers (referred to as Heavenly Money) from 
customers in return for dancing services.
58
  If a customer did not have enough Heavenly 
Money and paid in sterling, the claimant was required to go and exchange it for Heavenly 
Money as soon as the dance was over.  The absence of an orthodox and narrowly defined 
work/wage bargain was not sufficient reason for finding that the claimant was not an 
employee however; in the modern labour market workers provide services for consideration 
in a wide variety of forms.
59
 
 
A key point for the EAT was the degree of control which the club exercised over the claimant 
in relation to her working arrangements; she was required to work one Saturday and one 
Monday twice a month and to work one night a week.  She had to be present on Thursday 
evenings, to give ‘free’ dances and if the club directed her to a customer she could not 
                                                           
57
 Quashie v Stringfellows Restaurants Ltd [2012] All ER (D) 229 (Dec). 
58
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refuse to attend to him.  It was this element of control which established that the claimant 
was in fact an employee.
60
 
 
The Court of Appeal took a different view, primarily because they did not regard it as 
appropriate in the circumstances for the EAT to have interfered with the findings of fact 
made by the first instance tribunal, particularly in relation to the existence of a contract of 
employment.
61
  The conclusions of the tribunal were not perverse, and there were no 
grounds which justified the EAT in opening them up again and substituting its own 
judgement.
62
 
 
The only substantial judgement in the Court of Appeal was given by Elias LJ, who found that 
the economic risk taken by the claimant, coupled with the lack of obligation on the part of 
the defendants to provide any remuneration, supported the tribunal’s conclusion that there 
was no contract of employment.
63
  However, the remuneration point was not 
determinative, and it was necessary to look at the circumstances in the round.
64
  Ultimately 
the critical point was not whether the findings of fact made by the employment tribunal 
were preferable to the findings of fact by the EAT; but that the EAT should not have been 
interfered with the findings at all.  
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Another case which supports the approach of considering the situation in its entirety is 
Knight v Fairway and Kenwood Car Service; here a mini-cab driver failed to establish 
employment status in relation to the cab firm which supplied him with customers.
65
   As 
Pigott suggests the absence of control appears to have been a significant factor in this 
failure.
66
  The claimant was not even obliged to work at all.
67
  Furthermore, it was significant 
that not only were there written terms, on the facts there was no reason to doubt that they 
were genuine and accurately reflected the arrangement between the parties.
68
 
 
 In other recent cases courts and tribunals have considered the totality of the relationship 
between the parties, and assessed whether the facts in the round support a conclusion that 
the arrangement amounted to employment for the purposes of relevant statutory 
provisions.
69
   
 
 So in summary an individual’s employment status will depend upon two issues: 1) the terms 
upon which he or she is providing services to another party.  In establishing these the fact 
finding tribunal will look at all of the circumstances of the case, and not confine itself to the 
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ambit of any written agreements; and 2) the scope of the legislative provisions upon which 
he or she is seeking to rely.     
 
In the case of Church in Wales clergy, the first of these issues encompasses specific legal 
questions relating to the employment status of ministers of religion.  These questions are 
explored in detail below.  However it must be remembered that the particular complexities 
which apply to religious ministers exist in addition to the wider complexities which have 
been introduced above.   
 
1.3 Employment status - special considerations relating to ministers of religion in general 
 
It would clearly be futile to discuss particular aspects of employment protection in relation 
to Church in Wales clergy, if their status as ministers of religion barred them from any 
recourse to employment law.  Until the closing decades of the twentieth century, the 
prevailing orthodoxy was that this was indeed the case.   
 
In Re National Insurance Act 1911: Re Employment of Church of England Curates70 the High 
Court concluded that curates were not employees, but were office holders; and that the 
functions and control of curates was determined by ecclesiastical jurisdiction rather than 
contract.  Parker J stated that:  
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 Re National Insurance Act 1911: Re Employment of Church of England Curates (1912) 2 Ch 563 
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‘I have come to the conclusion that the position of a curate is the position of a person who 
holds an ecclesiastical office, and not the position of a person whose rights and duties are 
defined by contract at all.’71 
And: 
‘whatever authority either [the bishop or vicar] exercises over him is an authority which can 
be exercised by virtue of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and not an authority which depends in 
any case upon contract’72 
 
His conclusion raised two questions for later courts and tribunals to address: 1) Does 
holding an office automatically preclude an individual from claiming employment status? 
And; 2) Is it ever possible for work encompassing spiritual duties to be governed by contract, 
rather than the exclusive jurisdiction of the spiritual authority which confers them?   
 
With regard to the first question, it should be emphasised that although Parker J found that 
Church of England curates were office holders and were not employees, he did not assert 
that office-holding and employment were mutually exclusive states.
73
   The conclusion that 
a particular group of workers had duties which derived exclusively from their office and not 
from any contractual agreement, does not amount to a finding that office-holding and 
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employment are necessarily incompatible in all circumstances.  Nevertheless, some 
commentators still appear to treat office holding and employment as mutually exclusive 
states.
74
 
 
Cranmer asserts that: 
 
“the Church of England, whose Review of Clergy Terms of Service concluded unequivocally 
that parish clergy should continue to be office-holders rather than employees”.75 
 
The words ‘rather than’ convey a clear sense than employment status and office holding are 
either or choices.  However, an alternative and more nuanced phrasing would have been 
‘parish clergy should retain the status of office holders and not take on the additional status 
of employment’.  
 
Recent case law has clearly affirmed the view that the question of whether an individual is 
an employee is entirely separate from the question of whether he or she is an office 
holder.
76
   Office holders, including some clergy, may or may not also be employees.
77
   
However the issue has generated sufficient controversy to merit closer examination. 
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In Diocese of Southwark v Coker78 the chairman of the employment tribunal, Prof. Rideout, 
found that that the claimant who was an assistant curate, was not an office holder.  This 
conclusion was related to Prof. Rideout’s finding that Coker was an employee, and it drew 
criticism both from the EAT
79
 and the Court of Appeal.
80
  Mummery LJ concluded: 
“The critical point in this case is that an assistant curate is an ordained priest. The legal 
effect of the ordination of a person admitted to the order of priesthood is that he is called 
to an office, recognised by law and charged with functions designated by law in the 
Ordinal, as set out in the Book of Common Prayer........ It is unnecessary for him to enter 
into a contract for the creation, definition, execution or enforcement of those 
functions.”81 
 
However, even this statement does not amount to an assertion that it is impossible for an 
individual to be both an office holder and an employee; rather Mummery LJ argued that the 
nature of the office to which Church of England curates are appointed made it ‘unnecessary’ 
for them to enter into contractual obligations.   Therefore, his reasoning on the issue of 
office holding/employment appeared to leave open the possibility of the Church of England 
entering into contractual relations with its clergy should it deem it necessary or even 
expedient at some future point.  Furthermore, there was once again no attempt to define 
‘office holding’, or to clarify which aspects of the curate’s relationship with the church 
meant that it was properly characterised as an ‘office’. 
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In Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission,82 Lord Hoffman took a stronger 
line, arguing that the concepts of office holding and employment had always been distinct in 
UK law, and that clergy had always been understood to be office holders.    
 
The case concerned a female Church of Scotland minister, who was alleged to have had an 
affair with a married elder in her parish.  She was suspended with pay whilst the allegations 
were investigated, but resigned before formal disciplinary proceedings could be carried out.  
Ms Percy issued a claim in the employment tribunal, asserting that she had been 
discriminated against on grounds of her sex and unfairly dismissed.  She cited s.6 of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975, and argued that the Church of Scotland had treated her differently 
from male ministers against whom similar allegations had been made, and who had not 
been subjected to formal investigation and proceedings.   
 
The employment tribunal rejected her claim on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the 
EAT and the Court of Session both dismissed her appeal.
83
  In the Court of Session the Lord 
President held that where duties were essentially spiritual, there was a rebuttable 
presumption against an intention to create legal relations, and was not satisfied that the 
presumption could be rebutted on the facts before him.
84
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In considering the appeal, Lord Hoffman found that The Church of Scotland had intended to 
create legal relations with its ministers, but on the basis of office holding and not 
employment, and it was for courts and tribunals to apply the law on this basis.  In particular, 
it was not appropriate to confer statutory employment protection which applied to all 
employees, but only the office holders named in the statute.  Parliament must have been 
aware that such legislation would exclude clergy, and it was not for the courts to extend its 
remit.
85
 
 
However, Lord Hoffman was dissenting; Lord Nicholls who gave the leading speech took a 
different view, and also dealt with the office holding point at length.  He acknowledged the 
one element of Parker J’s reasoning in Re: Employment of Church of England Curates86 was 
that curates were appointed to ecclesiastical office as distinct from entering into a contract 
of service.  Nevertheless he cautioned that: 
 
‘The contrast is capable of misleading.  It needs to be handled with care in the present 
context.’87 
 
He noted that before modern statutory employment protection was introduced, office 
holders generally enjoyed greater legal protection than employees or servants, particularly 
in relation to dismissal.  Furthermore the legal concept of holding an office was of uncertain 
ambit.
88
   In contemporary law holding an office, even an ecclesiastical one, was not 
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incompatible with simultaneously being party to a contract to provide services.
89
  He cited 
Slynn J in Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance,90 and the EAT in Johnson v Ryan,91 
to support this conclusion.  In the Johnson case the claimant was a rent office and 
consequently statutory office holder, but it did not automatically follow that she was 
therefore not an employee.   If legal obligations deriving from an office could coexist with 
obligations deriving from contract in that context, why not in the ecclesiastical sphere? 
 
The Court of Appeal in New Testament Church of God v Stewart,92 and the EAT in Macdonald 
v Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland,93 both followed Lord Nicholl’s reasoning on this 
point, and it is submitted that it represents the current legal position.   Firstly, it is the 
clearly expressed majority view of the House of Lords in Percy v Church of Scotland,94 and is 
therefore binding authority.   
 
Secondly, even Lord Hoffman, the firmest critic of this analysis, did not put forward an 
argument as to why employment and office holding could not coexist.  Thirdly, as will be 
discussed further below, the concept of ‘employment’ is proving increasingly malleable.  An 
individual may be an employee for some purposes but not for others.
95
  Therefore whether 
an individual may be both an employee and an office holder must surely depend upon what 
is meant by ‘employee’ in the given context.  As there is no longer a broad or firm 
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understanding of employment, it is no longer appropriate to make unyielding 
generalisations about the consequences of applying the label employee. 
 
Consequently, the first question raised by Parker J’s conclusions: 1) Does holding an office 
automatically preclude an individual from claiming employment status?, must now be 
answered negatively.  Which leaves the second question: 2) Is it ever possible for work 
encompassing spiritual duties to be governed by contract, rather than the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the spiritual body which confers them?   
  
Evans
96
 interprets the decision in Re: Employment of Church of England Curates as drawing a 
distinction between: 
 
‘contractual obligation and spiritual authority which is of its nature extra-legal, and which it 
was argued, was what bound a curate in the Church of England to his vicar.  And it was 
taken that if such a distinction existed, the relationship must be one thing or the other and 
could not be both’ 
 
However, it is not clear that this interpretation can be supported by a careful reading of the 
judgement given by Parker J.
97
  His thorough judicial analysis did not focus on the question 
of whether a contractual obligation and ties of spiritual authority could theoretically co-
exist.  Instead it revolved around the very practical issue of how precisely the appointment 
and working arrangements of curates were regulated.  The judge was quite properly not 
concerned with the hypothetical question of whether things could be arranged differently, 
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but analysed the arrangements which were in fact in place.  He concluded that the curate’s 
duties were imposed by ecclesiastical jurisdiction not a contract for service.  Given that 
curate’s working arrangements were not regulated by an agreement purporting to be 
binding in secular contract law, there was no need to speculate about such an agreement 
(and any such speculation would technically have been non-binding obiter dicta).  
 
This point is significant because this case has remained the starting point for academic
98
 and 
judicial
99
 discussions of the employment status of Church of England clergy for almost one 
hundred years, and has not been overruled.  It is therefore important to be clear about 
exactly what precedent the decision sets. 
  
It is also worth noting that Parker J was considering whether there was an employment 
relationship between a vicar and a curate, and that this was a material consideration for 
him: 
  
‘If I were to hold that the vicar and his curate were in the position of master and servant, I 
might be imposing on the vicar at common law very serious liabilities, from which I think, in 
all common sense, he ought to be exempt.’100 
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Although Parker J did not elaborate upon what he meant by ‘serious liabilities’ at common 
law, it appears from the context that he had in mind the contractual liabilities which would 
flow from finding that curates were employed by their vicars.  In rejecting this approach and 
concluding that the curates’ working arrangements were governed solely by the 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, he shielded vicars from the personal liability in contract to which 
they would otherwise have been exposed. 
 
The arrangements for appointing and paying Church of England and Church in Wales clergy 
have changed radically since the case was decided, and it seems unlikely that a vicar or 
other priest tasked by the church with supervising and training a curate would be the choice 
of ‘employer’ in any proceedings brought by a curate in a contemporary court.   Training 
incumbents are not directly involved in the remuneration of curates, and the Draft Clergy 
Terms of Service
101
 treat senior clergy as having a managerial and pastoral role with regard 
to junior colleagues.
102
  Training incumbents are presented as acting as line-managers within 
the greater structure of the Church in Wales, and like curates are subject to the direction 
and discipline of that organisation.
103
  It would therefore be difficult to construe training 
incumbents as employers, rather than senior colleagues. 
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In the later case of Rogers v Booth,104 a Salvation Army Officer argued that she was a worker 
for the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
105
  Greene MR concluded that the 
relationship between the officer and her General was spiritual rather than contractual.   
Once again Evans interprets this as evidence that the court saw spiritual and contractual 
obligations as being incompatible, quoting the judgement and adding emphasis: 
 
‘relationship between the appellant and the General of the Salvation Army was a purely 
spiritual one, and not [my emphasis] a contractual one’106 
 
However it could be argued that the judgement is in fact more nuanced than this 
interpretation acknowledges.  Greene MR examined the ‘Orders and Regulations for Officers 
of the Salvation Army’
107
 and concluded that they described a rule of life and work for 
individuals electing to follow a chosen spiritual path, rather than setting out terms of 
employment.  For instance, he noted that it was clear that money was paid to officers so 
that they did not have to find other means of supporting themselves; it was not paid as 
remuneration for work done: 
‘Then Appendix I sets out a number of undertakings which are embodied in the application 
form which the intending officer has to sign, and to which I shall refer in a moment. On p 444 
of the book is a chapter entitled “Salary,” and para 1 says this: 
'Every officer becomes such upon the distinct understanding that no salary or allowance is 
guaranteed to him.' 
Then there is this: 
'The officer is pledged to do his duty, with or without pay; he works from love to God and 
souls, whether he receives little or much.' 
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This supported his conclusion that this particular arrangement was exclusively spiritual in 
character.  However, he did not assert that it was impossible to envisage any arrangement 
with a substantial spiritual element also having a contractual dimension. 
 
As Hoskins observes,
108
 there are dicta from later cases which acknowledge the possibility of 
spiritual and employment relationships co-existing, even though such co-existence was not 
found on the facts before the court.  She cites Slynn J in Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board 
of Finance109 (see further discussion below), and Dillon LJ in President of the Methodist 
Conference v Parfitt.110   
However, these judicial pronouncements were made in cases which, taken as a whole, 
tended to weaken any argument for the possibility of spiritual and contractual obligations 
being held together.   
 
Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance111 concerned a stipendiary lay-reader rather 
than an ordained minister.  Barthorpe was licensed by the bishop, but had also been given a 
document headed ‘Terms of Reference for Employment’.  Consequently, it could be argued 
that there was evidence of an intent to enter into contractual relations, in addition to the 
ecclesiastical relationship conferred by the licence and set out in its terms.   Although Slynn J 
did acknowledge the theoretical possibility of finding an employment contract in an area 
regulated by ecclesiastical jurisdiction, he also flagged up the difficulty of establishing the 
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contracting parties and doubted that office holders such as bishops, incumbents and 
cathedral deans could be employees.   
 
In President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt,112 the recognition by Dillon LJ that a 
person undertaking spiritual work could have a contract covering matters such as holidays 
and remuneration, was accompanied by an assertion that this would be unusual.  
Furthermore, May LJ based his findings on the conclusion that there was no intention to 
create legal relations, and therefore could be no enforceable contract of any kind. 
 
The House of Lords continued on this somewhat confused trajectory in Davies v 
Presbyterian Church of Wales,113 seeming to affirm the possibility of ministers having 
employment contracts, whilst at the same time being unwilling to conclude that one existed 
on the facts at issue, and cautious about when such a finding might properly be made. The 
only substantial judgement was given by Lord Templeman.  Like Dillon LJ in President of the 
Methodist Conference v Parfitt,114 he acknowledged the theoretical possibility of a contract 
existing in relation to a spiritual post: 
 
‘My Lords, it is possible for a man to be employed as a servant or as an independent 
contractor to carry out duties which are exclusively spiritual’.115 
 
However, he then went even further than Dillon LJ in describing the practical limitations of 
this possibility: 
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‘A pastor is called and accepts the call. He does not devote his working life but his whole life 
to the Church and his religion. His duties are defined and his activities are dictated not by 
contract but by conscience. He is the servant of God. If his manner of serving God is not 
acceptable to the Church, then his pastorate can be brought to an end by the Church in 
accordance with the rules.’116 
 
In characterising those in ministerial appointments as ‘servants of God’ undertaking a whole 
life commitment to serve God when accepting their appointments, he restricted the scope 
for clergy to argue that they were employees.  They would need to show a clear and definite 
agreement being made with an earthly entity as well as with God; evidence of appointment 
to a spiritual post would not be enough, as Davies’ failure demonstrated.  Even if this could 
be established, it would also be necessary to show that there were clear contractual terms 
of the sort enforceable in the secular courts, and that they parties intended for them to be 
legally binding. 
 
Subsequent judicial decisions indicated a marked reluctance by Employment Appeal 
Tribunals to find an intention to create legal relations.  In Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak 
Gurwara117 and Guru Nanak v Sharry118 it was found that written agreements using the 
phrases ‘employee of the temple’ and ‘contract’ respectively were not sufficient to 
demonstrate an intention to create legal relations.  In Birmingham Mosque v Alavi119  a 
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written statement of contractual intent, and clear terms about salary, hours and duties were 
not held to be sufficient to establish intention to form a contract.   
 
The Court of Appeal took at similarly restrictive line in Diocese of Southwark v Coker.120 
Mummery LJ followed Re National Insurance Act 1911: Re Employment of Church of England 
Curates in finding that Church of England curates were covered by ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
rather than secular contract law.  He also stated that Davies v Presbyterian Church of 
Wales121 and President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt122 both turned on the absence 
of an intention to create legal relations. 
 
Writing before Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Misssion123 had been decided, 
Doe
124
 argued that the cases of Davies v Presbyterian Church of Wales and President of 
Methodist Conference v Parfitt saw the first emergence of the judicial idea that there was a 
rebuttable presumption against an intention to create contractual relations in cases 
involving ministers of religion; and that the EAT in Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurwara,125 
Guru Nanak v Sharry126 and Birmingham Mosque v Alavi127  had effectively moved to the 
point where the presumption had become irrebuttable.   
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Although Doe’s analysis accurately reflects judicial decisions at the time his article was 
published, subsequent rulings by the higher courts
128
 have rejected the existence of any 
presumption against an intention to create legal relations in the case of religious ministers, 
let alone an irrebuttable presumption.  Furthermore, there is reason to doubt whether the 
presumption ever actually existed in a coherent form.  At best it was an inchoate concept, 
which the higher courts chose in due course to retreat from rather than to crystallise. 
 
Firstly, it was not clear from whence the supposed presumption originated.  It was not 
referred to in Re: Employment of Church of England Curates 129 or Rogers v Booth.130    As it 
could not be justified on the basis of authority, it needed a clear and reasoned underpinning 
if it was to survive and develop.  In Methodist Conference v Parfitt131 Dillon LJ and May LJ 
gave different reasons for rejecting the existence of a contract between the minister and 
the Methodist church.  Dillon LJ stressed the practical and legal difficulty of expressing 
spiritual duties in enforceable contractual terms,
132
 whilst May LJ
133
 focused on the idea that 
the agreement between Parfitt and the Methodist church was not in its nature a contractual 
agreement.    Neither discussed the point that secular organisations, such as NHS trusts, 
sometimes enter into contracts with clergy to perform the spiritual duties of chaplaincy.
134
    
If, as Dillon LJ in particular stressed, expressing spiritual duties in contractual terms was so 
challenging, why was it achievable in that context?  What was it about religious 
organisations and ministers which made contractual relations so problematic? 
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The House of Lords did little to elucidate the question in Davies v Presbyterian Church of 
Wales.135  As set out above, Lord Templeman stated that the minister was a servant of God, 
not of the Church, and that his behaviour was governed by conscience rather than 
contact.
136
   This statement was somewhat problematic when the church for which Davies 
served evidently expected his working life to be governed by its rules, and not solely by his 
conscience; Lord Templeman dealt extensively with the relevant ‘book of rules’ in his 
judgement.
137
   
 
He did not, however, articulate clearly why these rules, or Davies’ agreement to abide by 
them, should not be contractual.  Given that he also acknowledged the theoretical 
possibility of churches entering into contracts with ministers, this left the reason for the 
presumption, and its scope uncertain.  If it was possible to rebut the presumption, what had 
to be proven in order to achieve this? 
 
The decision of Mummery J in Diocese of Southwark v Coker138 added no further explanation 
for the purported presumption, nor did it give further guidance about its extent or 
limitations.  Therefore, even at the highpoint of this trend, the presumption was of 
uncertain scope, origin and purpose.  It is not surprising that such a confused and unformed 
legal concept failed to survive.  The now complete retreat from the presumption (in so far as 
it existed), endorsed by both the Supreme Court
139
 and the Court of Appeal,
140
 achieved 
                                                           
135
 Davies v Presbyterian Church of Wales (1986) 1 All ER 705. 
136
 Davies v Presbyterian Church of Wales (1986) 1 All ER 705  per Lord Templeman para 20. 
137
 See for example ibid, para 7. 
138
 Diocese of Southwark v Coker (1997) Times, 16 July. 
139
 Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission [2006] IRLR 195. 
43 
 
without any of the authorities being reversed, is further evidence of the fragility of the 
concept. 
 
The retreat began when the House of Lords considered Percy v Church of Scotland Board of 
National Mission.141   In this case the court found that a minister within the Church of 
Scotland was an employee for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination Act.  Baroness Hale 
directly attacked the idea that the spiritual character of ministers’ work sets them entirely 
apart from other professionals, putting out that other professionals, including lawyers, are 
obliged to serve higher principles and values.    
 
In seeking to establish that there was a contract in place, Lord Scott argued that if Ms 
Percy’s salary had been withheld, then she would surely have been able to sue for non-
payment.   This statement is striking, as it appears to take for granted that there must have 
been an intention to create legal relations in regard to the financial aspects of Ms Percy’s 
working arrangements; it contrasts sharply the reluctance of the Employment Appeal 
Tribunals to find any such intention in the cases discussed above.  
 
In the wake of this decision, Duddington argued that it had created a situation in which 
ministers were covered by discrimination law, but not by other aspects of employment 
law.
142
  It was not clear however that this was actually the case.  The judicial 
pronouncements discussed above in Davies v Presbyterian Church of Wales, President of the 
Methodist Conference v Parfitt and Diocese of Southwark v Coker left open the possibility of 
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a minister and his faith community choosing to enter into a legally enforceable contract of 
employment. 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed this interpretation in New Testament Church of God v 
Stewart,143 finding that the Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission144 did not 
overrule the earlier cases, but established that the fact finding tribunal is no longer required 
to approach its consideration of the minister/church relationship with the presumption that 
there was no intention to create legal relations.  A spiritual motivation for engaging in work 
does not necessarily preclude an intention to create legal relations.  As a result the minister 
in this case was permitted to bring a claim for unfair dismissal. 
 
This conclusion is consistent with the general approach which UK law takes towards the 
intention to create legal relations.  As Hibbert argues,
145
 the courts are reluctant to allow 
parties to escape from purported agreements on the basis that they had no intention to 
create legal relations.  He cites the cases of (1) Maple Leaf Macro Volatility Master Fund (2) 
Astin Captial Management Ltd v Rouvroy and another,146 and Bear Stearns Bank plc v Forum 
Global Equity Ltd,147 in support of this.  Both cases are drawn from the commercial rather 
than the employment sphere, but both demonstrate an unwillingness to allow parties to use 
either intention to create legal relations, or uncertainty, as a means to wriggle out of 
economically disadvantageous agreements.  Mapleleaf was concerned with whether a 
negotiated term sheet was binding in relation to an agreement to borrow money from a 
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hedge fund, and Bear Strearns involved a telephone agreement to sell loan notes for a 
certain price.   In both instances the parties were found to be contractually liable. 
 
In both cases the relevant test was held to be how would a reasonable man, versed in the 
relevant business, view the agreement?   Asking at what stage a commercial party may draw 
back from a bad bargain is very different to asking whether a relationship between two 
parties constitutes employment.  Nevertheless, the cases illustrate that the courts do not 
ordinarily apply a high threshold in establishing an intention to create legal relations.   
 
Also agreements which would appear to an objective and informed outsider to be 
contractually binding will be taken to be so.  Many of the clergy employment cases involved 
an exchange of documents which a reasonable person versed in human resources and 
employment practice, might well have deemed to be a contract of employment. For 
example in Guru Nanak v Sharry a document was exchanged which was expressly labelled 
‘contract’.
148
  
 
The general principles of contract law are as relevant to employment contracts as they are 
to commercial ones.   If a special standard of intent to create legal relations was required in 
the context of clergy employment contracts, there would have be a demonstrable legal 
justification for this. 
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One possible justification for caution, if not for a legal presumption, was raised by the House 
of Lords in Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission.149  The court noted that 
Article 9 of the ECHR does require the fact finding tribunal to adopt a different approach to 
evidence where religious practices and beliefs are involved: 
 
‘Article 9 – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, and to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.’150 
 
The requirement to respect faith and doctrine imposed by this article means that a court 
should not readily impose a legal relationship on members of a faith community where this 
would be contrary to their religious beliefs. 
 
It is submitted that whilst this interpretation of Article 9 has some merit, there are several 
reasons to think that accepting an intention to create legal relations in cases involving 
ministers is unlikely to lead to many successful challenges on human rights grounds.   
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First, the case law in this area suggests that the risk of courts imposing a legal obligation on 
religious communities, without there being sufficient evidence to demonstrate an intention 
to create legal relations, is slight.  The decisions in Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurwara,151 
Guru Nanak v Sharry,152 and Birmingham Mosque v Alavi,153 seem to indicate reluctance on 
the part of some tribunals to acknowledge and enforce the legal obligations which members 
of such communities voluntarily undertake.  In light of this generally cautious approach, it 
seems unlikely that courts will begin imposing legal obligations where evidence is not found 
to support them. 
 
The Court of Appeal in New Testament Church of God v Stewart154  made it clear that the 
matter of intent to create legal relations is set to remain a live issue in cases concerning 
employment of ministers; the question will not be taken for granted without proper 
consideration.  Because some faith groups have doctrinal objections to contracts with 
ministers being subject to the jurisdiction of the secular courts, it will not be automatically 
assumed that any particular religious organisation intended to create legal relations.  Arden 
LJ
155
 even went so far as to be critical of Baroness Hale’s judgement in Percy v Church of 
Scotland Board of National Mission.156  She recognised Baroness Hale’s judgement as having 
sought to reverse the trend in case law to find a lack of intention to create legal relations; 
                                                           
151
 Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurwara (1990) ICR 309. 
152
 Guru Nanak v Sharry EAT 21/12/90 (145/90). 
153
 Birmingham Mosque v Alavi (1992) ICR 435. 
154
 New Testament Church of God v Stewart [2008] IRLR 134. 
155
 Ibid, para 63. 
156
 Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission [2006] IRLR 195. 
48 
 
and cited Koeller v Coleg Elidyr (Camphill Communities Wales) Ltd157  as evidence of the 
need to keep this matter in the judicial consciousness. 
 
Koeller was another Court of Appeal decision, also with Arden LJ sitting.  It concerned a 
cooperative community which undertook the care and training of handicapped persons in 
the care and training of a communal environment.  Decisions were made collectively by 
consensus, and the community operated on a non-hierarchical basis.  It was accepted that 
members of the community were free to leave at any time without obligation, and also that 
members could be asked to leave if it was decided to be in the best interests of the 
community.  In that context, Arden LJ regarded an intention to create legally enforceable 
obligations as running counter to the basis on which the organisation was formed.    
 
Although the circumstances did not involve a conflict between religious doctrine and the 
possibility of recourse to secular law; the situation was comparable because there was a 
clear conflict between the shared vision and ideology of the group and the prospect of 
litigation.  Creating legally enforceable obligations was fundamentally incompatible with the 
group’s ethos and objectives. 
 
However, it is not the case that the organisations like the community in Koeller can only be 
protected with special emphasis on the question of intention to create legal relations.  It is 
well established law that such an intention is a requirement in the formation of any 
contract.
158
  If, as in Koeller, there are grounds to argue that the intention was absent, then 
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the parties concerned may do so.  Nothing in Percy implied that this element of contract law 
should be dispensed with altogether; it was its application rather than its existence which 
the court appeared to modify.   None of the dicta in Percy suggest that parties who 
genuinely do not wish their arrangements to be legally enforceable will have their intentions 
overridden by the courts.  
 
The EAT endorsed this view in Macdonald v Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland.159   
Macdonald was a minister, and was found on examination of the facts to be an office holder 
but not an employee.  In reaching this conclusion Smith LJ was influenced by the fact that 
there was no documentary or even oral stipulation about hours or work, leave or sick pay
160
; 
and by the fact that he was not monitored or supervised by the respondents or their local 
presbytery.
161
  Citing Percy v Church of Scotland,162 she found that there was no 
presumption for or against the existence of an intention to create legal relations in cases 
involving ministers; the starting point should be a neutral one. 
163
 
 
‘Before leaving this matter I should add that Percy determined that when considering the 
issue of whether parties intended to create legal relations in the context of church and 
clergy, a tribunal ought not to begin with a presumption that there was no intention to 
create such a relationship. The correct starting point is, rather, a neutral one.’164 
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Smith LJ also sought to distinguish this situation from the ‘labelling’ or sham contract 
cases;
165
 on the basis that in those instances there was no doubt that the parties intended 
to enter into some sort of contractual relationship which was legally enforceable.  The 
question about intent to create legal relations went to the existence of the contract, rather 
than the label which should be attached to it. 
 
The understanding of the current position of ministers put forward by Smith LJ can be 
summed up as follows: 
i) There is no fixed rule as to whether ministers are or are not employees.  The 
question of employment status is for the fact finding tribunal, and will usually be 
a mixed question of fact and law (although it may be exclusively a question of 
law if it rests entirely on the construction of documents.) 
ii) There is no hard and fast rule as to whether a working agreement amounts to a 
contract of employment.  However there will usually be a significant degree of 
control, the worker will be expected to provide personal service in return for 
remuneration and will not appear to be in business of his own account. 
On the facts of the case it was found that the minister was not an employee. 
 
If these principles are applied in future cases, no contractual obligations will arise in the 
absence of a genuine intention to create legal relations.   A court or tribunal will only find an 
employment relationship, if the agreement which the parties have reached supports this.  If 
religious organisations are not treating their ministers as employees, then they will not be 
held accountable as employers.  If they are treating their ministers as employees, then 
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judicial recognition of this fact is not an infringement of their Article 9 rights.  It is not 
possible to assert a doctrinal position which is utterly incompatible with demonstrable 
behaviour.  Furthermore courts would not be imposing any spiritually alien framework on 
such bodies; they would simply be recognising the framework which they had chosen to 
adopt. 
 
Although Smith LJ distinguished the labelling cases from the Macdonald case, the labelling 
cases would be relevant wherever it was accepted that there was an intent to create some 
sort of contractual relationship.  The Court of Appeal reiterated in Protectacoat Firthglow 
Ltd v Szilagyi,166 that the label which the parties choose to attach will not conclusively 
determine employment status; the court is concerned to ascertain the true nature of the 
legal relationship.  If the arrangements made by faith groups dealing with ministers truly 
amounts to employment, then the court is recognising rather than imposing this status.  
Whilst dictating the way in manner faith communities dealt with ministers would clearly be 
a potential infringement of Article 9, recognising the legal consequences of their chosen 
course of conduct need not be. 
 
In the first place, the specific situation rule, as it emerged from Sahin v Turkey,167 is of 
relevance in context.  The case concerned the dress code of a Turkish university, which 
refused to allow students admission to lectures or enrolment on courses whilst wearing 
Islamic headscarves or beards.  It was held that in exercising his or her freedom to manifest 
religious beliefs, an individual may need to take into account a specific situation to which 
they have voluntarily submitted.   
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In the UK the courts have applied this principle in both educational
168
 and employment 
169
contexts.  As Tyme
170
 argues when considering Article 9 rights, there is a key distinction 
between the freedom to hold a religious belief, and the freedom to manifest that belief or 
to act upon it.  R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School (the Begum case)171 concerned the 
refusal of a school to allow a female pupil to attend school wearing a jilbab, as this was 
contrary to the uniform policy.  The House of Lords found that the decision by the school did 
not contravene Article 9; as per Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffman and Lord Scott, the article did 
not permit individuals to manifest their religious beliefs at any time and place of their 
choosing.  Consequently there was no infringement of the pupil’s Article 9.1 rights, and no 
need to consider whether any limitation of rights was justified under Article 9.2. 
 
In Ladele v London Borough of Islington,172 the UK courts found that the employing local 
authority was justified in not permitting a registrar to manifest her religious beliefs by 
refusing to perform civil partnership ceremonies for same sex couples.  In Eweida v BA,173 
the defendant airline’s prohibition on wearing a cross at work was not found to be indirect 
discrimination when examined by the domestic courts.  The cases were joined for 
consideration by the Strasbourg court,
174
 along with two others: Chaplin and McFarlane.    
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The Chaplin case concerned a Christian nurse who was not permitted to wear a cross and 
chain around her neck whilst carrying out clinical duties for health and safety reasons; the 
employer imposing the prohibition was an NHS body and uncontroversially a public 
authority.  The McFarlane litigation was brought by a relationship counsellor disciplined and 
ultimately dismissed because he could not reconcile his interpretation of Christian scripture 
with counselling same sex couples, and his private sector employer could not accommodate 
a counsellor with these issues. 
 
In giving judgement the ECHR did appear to partially retreat from the specific situation rule: 
 
‘It is true, as the Government pointed out and as Lord Bingham observed in R (Begum) v 
Governors of Denbigh High School case, that there is case-law of the Court and Commission 
which indicates that, if a person is able to take steps to circumvent a limitation placed on his 
or her freedom to manifest religion or belief, there is no interference with the right under 
Article 9.1 and the limitation does not therefore require to be justified under Article 9.2.  For 
example, in the above-cited Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedekcase, the Court held that “there would 
be interference with the freedom to manifest one’s religion only if the illegality of performing 
ritual slaughter made it impossible for ultra-orthodox Jews to eat meat from animals 
slaughtered in accordance with the religious prescriptions they considered applicable’.175  
 
However, it is important to note that the context of these cases was that of employment, 
and that the livelihood and career of the applicants was at stake: 
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‘Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the Court considers 
that, where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion in the workplace 
[emphasis added], rather than holding that the possibility of changing job would negate any 
interference with the right, the better approach would be to weigh the overall balance when 
considering whether or not the restriction was proportionate’.176 
 
A religious organisation acting as an employer is something very different from an individual 
employee confronted with a restriction on religious freedom in the workplace.  Here the 
specific situation rule would be being applied to employer rather than employee.  In 
voluntarily entering the specific situation of employing people, religious organisations would 
be effectively consenting to limit their freedom to manifest their beliefs, in so far as such 
manifestation was in conflict with employment law. 
 
This argument might be accused of circularity, were it not for its factual context.  This 
application of the specific situation rule does hinge upon the notion that religious 
organisations choose to act as employers, which in turn depends upon accepting their intent 
to enter into legal relations.  However provided that the religious organisations in question 
are behaving as employers, then their intent to enter into legal relations is real rather than 
implied or imposed. 
 
Religious organisations cannot logically have it both ways; it is not possible for them to claim 
that it would be against their doctrines and beliefs to have employed clergy, and at the 
same time to treat their clergy as employees.  If religious organisations want to offer 
                                                           
176
 Ibid. 
55 
 
applicants to clerical posts the promise of rights and protection akin to that of other 
professions, and also to implement mechanisms of control and accountability which mirror 
those of the secular employment world, then they must accept the consequences of doing 
so.  
 
Even if this argument were to fail, and a court concluded that being subject to employment 
law was indeed a limitation of the religious organisation’s Article 9 rights, following Eweida 
it is highly likely that this limitation would be found to be proportionate.  The United 
Kingdom would be limiting the Article 9 rights of the employing religious organisation in 
order to protect the rights of religious minister employees, including Convention rights: for 
example under Article 6 (Right to a fair trial), Article 8 (Privacy), Article 9 (Freedom of 
religion, conscience and belief), Article 10 (Freedom of expression) and Article 14 
(Discrimination in relation to Convention rights).  In Eweida the ECHR stated that: 
 
‘The Court generally allows the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation when it 
comes to striking a balance between competing Convention rights’.177 
 
In addition to these human rights considerations, the legal specific context of the Church in 
Wales (and most other churches which are not fully established in the manner of the Church 
of England or the Church of Scotland) means that the concerns raised by Arden LJ in New 
Testament Church of God v Stewart178 cannot logically apply in relation to contract. 
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  As Doe argues,
 179
 it is difficult to assert that members have no intention to form 
contractual relations when dealing with their church, given that non-established churches 
are ordinarily voluntary associations, and as such, exist by virtue a multilateral contract 
between their members.   As the legal framework of the church is based upon these 
contractual agreements, it is difficult to see how the church could claim that contractual 
agreements between members (including ministers) and the church are repugnant to its 
doctrines.  On the facts the church may or may not have entered into a contractual 
relationship with a given minister, but if it did not, the reasons must have been pragmatic 
rather than doctrinal.  If the church had a doctrinal objection to contractual relations 
between its members, it would not be able to exist in civil law by means of a multilateral 
contract. 
 
Although cogent this argument had not been tested in any of the reported cases however. 
Following the findings of the Court of Appeal in Stewart, the question of intention to create 
legal relations is likely to continue to receive particular scrutiny in cases concerning clergy of 
any faith. In light of Macdonald, it appears that although this issue may be given more 
consideration than it would in most secular cases, such consideration will at least be from a 
neutral starting point.  Macdonald  also confirms that in general terms, ministers are in the 
same position as other workers; they may or may not be employees, and their employment 
status can only be determined by considering their circumstances as a whole. 
  
This leaves ministers, churches and other religious organisations subject to the complexities 
and uncertainties relating to all questions of employment status.   It is certainly possible for 
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ministers, including those within the Church in Wales, to be employees.  However, as will be 
explored further below, different ministers enter into different kinds of working agreement 
with the church.   This is one reason why the question of whether Church in Wales clergy are 
employees requires qualification and explanation before it can be adequately addressed. 
 
But a further consideration is the complexity of contemporary employment law, and the 
shifting definition of employment.  Some commentators in the ecclesiastical context have 
been slow to engage with the wider secular picture.  Cranmer comments,
 180
 in relation to 
the Macdonald case, as follows: 
 
‘It should be noted, however, that the Employment Judge’s declaration [i.e. Judge MacKenzie 
in the Employment Tribunal phase of the Macdonald case] in paragraph 104 of his 
determination that ‘it is accepted that Church of England recognises Ministers are 
employees’ (quoted by Lady Smith at paragraph 41 of her judgement without further 
comment) was simply wrong.  That inelegant statement will come as a considerable surprise 
to the Church of England, whose Review of Clergy Terms of Service concluded unequivocally 
that parish clergy should continue to be office-holders rather than employees’.181 
 
This analysis takes no account of the chameleon character of employment in the present 
context.  As the Percy case illustrates, it is entirely possible for a worker to be an employee 
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for some purposes and not for others. In Maga v Trustees of Birmingham Archdiocese of the 
Roman Catholic Church,182 a Roman Catholic priest was treated as an employee for the 
purposes of vicarious liability, although this was on the basis of a concession by the 
defendants.  In contrast in JGE v Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocese it was 
common ground between the parties that Roman Catholic priests were not employees.183  
(Neither party explored the idea that an individual might be an employee for some legal 
purposes and not others, or attempted to list the purposes for which such priests were not 
deemed to be employed.)  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
relationship was akin to employment for the purpose of vicarious liability. 
 
It is no longer helpful to speak in absolutes.  An individual’s employment status will vary 
depending upon the purpose for which it is being ascertained.  This is true for Church in 
Wales clergy as for other workers. 
 
Although the employment status of the priest at the centre of the JGE case was not an issue 
between the parties, Ward LJ nevertheless chose to examine the case law on ministers of 
religion, and drew out the following principles: 
 
1) each case must be judged on its own particular facts; 
2) there is no general ‘presumption’ of lack of intent to create legal relations between 
clergy and their church; 
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3) a factor in determining whether the parties must be taken to have intended to enter 
into a legally binding contract will be whether there is a religious belief held by the 
church that there is no enforceable contractual relationship; and 
4) it does not follow that the holder of an ecclesiastical office cannot be employed under 
a contract of service.184 
 
These principles are consistent with the foregoing analysis of the law, and form a useful 
basis to examine the position of Church in Wales clergy in the discussion which follows. 
1.4 Church in Wales clergy and secular employment law 
 
1.4 (a) Intention to create legal relations-the general policy and doctrine of the Church in 
Wales on secular contracts and recourse to secular law 
Do the professed beliefs of the Church in Wales allow for its members to enter into legally 
binding contracts with one another, enforceable in secular law?  Are there any doctrinal 
prohibitions against suing fellow Christians?  (The separate issue of whether Christians may 
sue non-Christians is not directly relevant to the point at issue, given that litigation between 
clergy and the church would by its very nature involve exclusively Christians). 
There are passages in the Bible which cause some Christians to question whether litigation 
with their co-religionists is compatible with their professed faith.
185
  The most relevant 
verses are from Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, 1 Corinthians 6:1-8: 
                                                           
184
 Ibid para 29. 
185
 See for example arguments offered by individuals marketing themselves to perspective clients as legal 
advisers with a Christian ethos and focus: M Tozer ‘Christians and Lawsuits: Two Wrongs Don’t Make A Right’ 
http://www.christian-attorney.net/christians_lawsuits.html (accessed 24/10/2012). 
60 
 
When any of you has a grievance against another, do you dare to take it to court before the 
unrighteous, instead of taking it before the saints? Do you not know that the saints will 
judge the world? And if the world is to be judged by you, are you incompetent to try trivial 
cases? Do you not know that we are to judge angels—to say nothing of ordinary matters? If 
you have ordinary cases, then, do you appoint as judges those who have no standing in the 
church? I say this to your shame. Can it be that there is no one among you wise enough to 
decide between one believer and another, but a believer goes to court against a believer—
and before unbelievers at that? 
 In fact, to have lawsuits at all with one another is already a defeat for you. Why not rather 
be wronged? Why not rather be defrauded? But you yourselves wrong and defraud—and 
believers at that.186 
It is abundantly clear that these verses have not prevented Christians suing one another in 
secular as well as religious law courts for the past two millennia.
187
  There are good reasons 
to argue that these verses should be read as addressing a particular pastoral problem in a 
specific circumstance, and not an attempt to promulgate rules which Christians should 
follow for all time regardless of context. 
The available evidence suggests that the Christian community in first century Corinth was an 
intense and volatile environment, prone to internal conflict as well as dispute with its 
founder Paul.
188
  Hays argues that Paul’s condemnation of litigation related to a wider 
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concern, that the Corinthians were not a cohesive, mutually supportive family as befitted 
part of the Body of Christ.
189
  Furthermore, the pagan, secular courts may have been 
inclined to favour the privileged classes of society, and litigation may have been one 
mechanism for richer members of the Corinthian church to further exploit and oppress their 
impoverished brethren.
190
 
These very particular circumstances did not apply in other contexts, so it can be argued that 
Paul’s apparent prohibition should not be generally applied.  Furthermore, Paul condemns 
the Corinthians for taking disputes ‘before unbelievers’ this was not a relevant consideration 
once Christianity became the normative religious position in Western Europe; judges and 
lawyers were assumed to be Christian and even the secular law which they applied was 
deemed to have a Divine origin.
191
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the concerns about litigation referenced above have 
never found a mainstream place within Anglicanism, given that Christians suing Christians 
was an accepted and everyday reality for the culture in which the church and its doctrines 
evolved. 
Recourse to secular law nowhere forbidden within the Principles of the Canon Law, and 
there are some principles which in practice can only be carried out fully in collaboration with 
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the secular law and its courts.
192
   For instance, churches are required to satisfy the 
requirements of civil law in relation to the holding of property, and permitted to hold 
property in trust.
193
  The fiduciary obligations of trustees in civil law may require them to 
take legal action in some circumstances, for example if this is necessary to protect or 
reclaim property held in trust.
194
 
Therefore, there is entering into legally enforceable contracts with Christians, and suing on 
them if necessary, is not incompatible with either Anglican doctrine or practice.  In fact, as 
Doe argues, non-established churches in Common Law jurisdictions owe their very legal 
existence to a multilateral contract between the members, so where Anglican churches are 
in this position, it would be impossible to argue that they were doctrinally incapable of 
entering into contracts in secular law.
195
 
With regard to the specific context of the Church in Wales, there are numerous examples of 
the church as an organisation electing to enter into contracts which are enforceable through 
the secular courts in order to carry out its mission and manage its day to day affairs.  These 
include for instance: contracts outlining the terms of loans to clergy to purchase cars, 
contracts governing the hire of churches and church halls to third party organisations, 
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contracts to purchase data projectors and contracts for filming in churches or 
churchyards.
196
 
In light of all of the foregoing, it is not viable to argue that the Church in Wales has any 
doctrinal difficulty with creating legal relations which are enforceable in the secular courts.  
However, whether there is an intention to create legal relations in the specific case of clergy 
employment is a different question. 
1.4 (b) Intention to create legal relations - the doctrine of the Church in Wales and the 
specific case of clergy employment contracts 
Nothing within the Principles of Canon Law Common to the Churches of the Anglican 
Communion (‘PCL’) in relation to ministry either precludes or requires agreements between 
clergy and the church which are enforceable in the secular courts.
197
  The Preface to Part IV 
of the Principles of Canon Law, which deals with ministry, acknowledges the diversity in 
culture and language across the Anglican Communion, but nevertheless identifies some 
core, unifying beliefs about the nature of ministry.
198
  Given the very different political, 
social and cultural contexts within which the provinces operate, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that no universal principle can be identified in relation to engagement with secular contract 
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and employment law.
199
  For example, the Nippon Sei Ko Kai/Anglican Episcopal Church in 
Japan
200
 functions within a very different secular legal and social context than the Iglesia 
Anglicana del Cono Sur de América/Anglican Church of the Southern Cone of America.  
Normative social and legal assumptions about work, dispute resolution and agreements may 
be very different in Tokyo and Santiago de Chile.  
However, if Anglican theology and doctrine was incompatible with clergy contracts which 
were enforceable in secular courts in any circumstances, then this norm would be found 
embedded in the individual legal systems of the member provinces and therefore reflected 
in the Principles of Canon Law.  As it is not, there is evidently nothing fundamentally un-
Anglican about such arrangements.  So is there anything in the specific context and legal 
structures of the Church in Wales which would render civil law employment contracts 
problematic in this particular case? 
The factual context of the Roman Catholic diocese of Portsmouth as discussed in the JGE 
case provides a useful counterpoint for the Church in Wales.  It was common ground 
between the parties that the priest at the centre of the litigation was not an employee and 
that there was no intention to create legal relations between said the priest and his 
bishop.
201
  However, the Court of Appeal considered at length the facts and background 
upon which this common understanding was based.
202
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The defendants contended that although the parish church from and within which the 
tortfeasor priest operated was part of the Diocese of Portsmouth, responsibility for 
operating and managing it rested with the parish priest and not with the diocese.
203
 
Furthermore, neither they nor the bishop could removed the priest from his post in the 
parish or from the priesthood itself, except in accordance with the processes of Canon Law 
which require proof of grave cause.
204
 Directions as to the manner of carrying out the office 
in question were universal and set out in canon law rather than being given by the bishop to 
individual parish priests.
205
   The diocese and bishop could only issue guidelines for the 
whole diocese through Episcopal decrees, generally promulgated via letters to clergy.  The 
only oversight or vigilance as to how the universal canon laws were being carried out in each 
parish and how the priest was fulfilling his duties took place through a periodic visitation, 
which had to be at least quinquennial.  
Priestly appointments were managed by advertisement and application, when the bishop 
wanted priests to move he invited them to a meeting and informed them of their new 
appointment.
206
  Priests were free to decline.  If they accepted, the clergy would be 
informed but no formal letter of appointment would be sent, the diocese would be 
informed of the change via a letter Ad Clerum.  No terms and conditions would be imposed 
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on the parish appointment above and beyond those set out in canon law.  Financial support 
for the priest came not from central funds, but from directly from the parish.
207
  
Both sides took expert advice on the canon law applicable at the time (the Code of Canon 
Law promulgated in 1917,
208
 and all of the evidence given related to this code rather than 
the current version promulgated in 1983
209
), although there was little material 
disagreement between the two experts.
210
  The following pertinent points were agreed:  
i) Bishops were appointed the Pope, who as Bishop of Rome shares their Episcopal 
orders.  Bishops are not delegates of the Pope but have full independent 
authority over their own diocese; nevertheless they are ultimately answerable to 
him. 
ii) Secular law in England and Wales does not recognise the Roman Catholic Church 
as an entity with legal personality, but regards it as an unincorporated 
association.  Consequently each diocese ordinarily sets up a charitable trust to 
hold property and manage its affairs. 
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iii) In Canon law each parish is a separate legal entity; any property belongs to the 
parish rather than the diocese.  In canon law the position of the priest is a 
perpetual ecclesiastical office to which successive individuals are appointed.  
Subject to the oversight of the bishop and applicable diocesan laws and 
regulations, the responsibility for running the parish lies with the parish priest. 
The parish priest is not a delegate of the bishop and does not receive instructions 
on how to run the parish. 
iv) The parish priest may be removed or transferred by the bishop against his will, 
but only in accordance with the processes set out in the Code of Canon Law.  An 
aggrieved priest subject to such involuntary removal has recourse to the 
Congregation for Clergy in Rome. 
v) The priest has a duty of reverence and obedience to the bishop, but exercises his 
ministry as collaborator rather than someone subject to supervisory control of 
the sort found in secular employment.  There are penalties prescribed by canon 
law which a bishop may invoke against a priest, but these did not mean that a 
priest was subject to managerial supervision in the secular sense.  The experts 
agreed to leave to the court to determine how far the availability of such 
penalties rendered the relationship one of ‘close supervision’ or ‘control’.
211
  
A slightly more nuanced position was fleshed out when the experts were cross-examined.  
The claimant’s expert Dr Costigane conceded that there was no direct control in the sense 
of the bishop monitoring a priest’s daily activities; however if certain major departures from 
                                                           
211
68 
 
the Code of Canon law would generate an issue and result in Episcopal action.
212
  The expert 
for the defence, Monsignor Read repeated the point made in his written opinion that 
although parish appointments were not subject to advertisement and application, and also 
that a priest was not free to choose where to go but obliged to accept the direction which 
his bishop chose, once in post a priest nevertheless has great freedom in determining how 
he carries out his office.
213
  Bishops do not give detailed instructions about running parishes 
to specific priests, but issue general norms of conduct to their clergy as a whole.
214
  
Examining this picture as a whole, both experts and the Court of Appeal accepted that the 
relationship between a Roman Catholic priest and his bishop was not one which could or 
should be characterised as secular employment.  However, when the relationship between 
Church in Wales clergy and their bishops is examined in a similar level of detail, it becomes 
apparent that they have a very different overall working context.  Many of the factors which 
pointed so firmly against an employment relationship in the JGE case are either not present 
or exist in a different form. 
In JGE the corporate structure and governance of the Roman Catholic church (as it operated 
under CIC 1917) was of particular significance in two respects: i) bishops were appointed by 
the Pope in Rome and operated in accordance with a universal Code of Canon Law which 
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was applicable throughout the Roman Catholic world;
215
 and ii) parishes were financially 
independent units responsible for supporting their own priests. 
The corporate structure and governance of the Church in Wales is very different.  Diocesan 
bishops are elected by an Electoral College.
216
  The Electoral College is composed of 
members from within the Church in Wales.
217
  Like other members of the Church in Wales, 
diocesan bishops are subject to the law and constitution of the Church in Wales.
218
  There is 
no universal canon law applicable throughout the Anglican world.
219
  Bishops are subject to 
the law and regulations of the province within which they operate. Therefore the link 
between the individual acting in a supervisory capacity, and the organisational structures 
which might be identified as employer, is demonstrably more immediate than in the Roman 
Catholic Church.  Neither could an argument be made about the problems applying broad 
international norms in specific national contexts. 
The Church in Wales may be described as a partially disestablished or quasi-established 
church.
220
  As Garcia Oliva persuasively argues, it is neither possible nor desirable to make a 
simple binary distinction between churches which are established and churches which are 
not; there are different models of establishment reflecting differing relationships between 
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churches and the states which they operate.
221
  Nevertheless, despite its quasi-established 
status, in relation to legal personality, secular law regards it as an unincorporated voluntary 
organisation whose members are organized and bound together by private contract.
222
  It 
could be argued that the position of the Church in Wales in respect of legal personality is 
subtly but significantly different from that of the Roman Catholic Church in the UK.   
Neither has a single, overarching legal personality at a national, institutional level.
223
  Both 
churches however operate in the secular world through entities which do have juridic 
personality.   As discussed in JGE Roman Catholic diocese set up charitable trusts to hold 
property and manage their affairs.   
In the case of the Church in Wales at a national level, the Representative Body is 
incorporated by Royal Charter and the Governing Body is recognised as an ‘appropriate 
authority’ for the purposes of the Sharing of Church Buildings Act 1969, Schedule 2.
224
  At a 
diocesan level each Diocesan Conference is required to appoint or cause to be appointed a 
Diocesan Board of Finance.
225
  The composition and functions of this board are not 
specified, but the Diocese of St Asaph has opted to incorporate it under the civil Companies 
Acts to hold property and funds for the diocese in accordance with its Memorandum and 
Articles of Association.
226
 
                                                           
221
 J Garcia Oliva, ‘Church, State and Establishment in the United Kingdom in the 21
st
 Century: Anachronism or 
Idiosyncrasy’, Public Law (July 2010) 482-504  
222
 N Doe, The Law of the Church in Wales (University of Wales Press: Cardiff 2002), 11. 
223
 In other words, there is no legal entity with the title ‘The Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom’ or 
‘The Church in Wales’.  Both churches do however have legal institutions which operate at a national level e.g. 
The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales. 
224
 Ibid 12. 
225
 Const. Ch IV A, Part V, 24.  
226
 Ibid p 332, see also Companies House, Company Details, St Asaph Diocesan Board of Finance (The), 
Company No 00188626:  
http://wck2.companieshouse.gov.uk/ee63fb8ce25443a4e293f21cb603dbdc/compdetails (accessed 
10/11/2012) 
71 
 
In contrast at parish level, parishes are governed by their own representative assemblies, 
Parochial Church Councils.
227
 These do not have legal personality, as the Welsh Church Act 
1914 dissolved ecclesiastical corporations,
228
 and consequently their members may be 
personally liable for any contractual liabilities which they incur.
229
  There is nothing however 
to prevent members incorporating as limited companies to avoid such liability if they are 
inclined to do so, or setting up charitable trusts in relation to specific funds or projects. 
Therefore, both the Church in Wales and the Roman Catholic Church exist without an 
umbrella juridic personality at a national level, but in practice function through created 
entities which are recognised by secular law.  The contractual analysis which Doe applies to 
the Church in Wales and other non-established churches can properly apply to the Roman 
Catholic Church in the United Kingdom,
230
 was applied to the Roman Catholic Church in 
Buckley v Cahal Daly. 231 In this case a priest sought a declaration that he had been 
unlawfully removed.  Campbell J held that since the Roman Catholic Church was a voluntary 
association, its canon law relating to the status of clergy existed as the terms of a contract.  
  
As the JGE case highlights, intent to create legal relations is a genuine question in relation to 
contracts in the religious sphere.  Given that a court found that a priest and bishop intended 
their relationship to be governed by canon law not secular law, a court might also find that 
all members of the faithful intend their relationship to be governed by canon law not 
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secular law.
232
  Would a different conclusion perhaps imply that Roman Catholics intended 
their relationships with brother and sister Catholics outside of the UK and presumably not 
parties to such a multilateral contract, to be on a different legal basis from their relationship 
with fellow Catholics who were also British nationals?  And if so, could this position be 
reconciled with the Catholic understanding of sacred bonds sets out in the Code?
233
  If not, 
then a secular court finding and imposing contractual ties would potential be an 
infringement of members’ rights under Article 9. 
The probable answer is to be found in a nineteenth century decision, Forbes v Eden,234 
which remains the leading authority in this area.  It concerned an action by a cleric in the 
Scottish Episcopal Church to set aside certain canons passed in 1863, which were intended 
to cement the union between that church and the Church of England and the Church of 
Ireland.  Lord Cranworth held as follows: 
‘Save for the due disposal and administration of property, there is no authority in the Courts 
either of England or Scotland to take cognizance of the rules of a voluntary society entered 
into merely for the regulation of its own affairs. 
If funds are settled to be disposed of amongst members of a voluntary association according 
to their rules and regulations, the Court must necessarily take cognizance of those rules and 
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regulations for the purpose of satisfying itself as to who is entitled to the funds. So, likewise, 
if the rules of a religious association prescribe who shall be entitled to occupy a house, or to 
have the use of a chapel or other building’.235 
So a court will take cognizance of the mutually agreed rules of a church or other voluntary 
association if required to settle a dispute about funds or property, but has no authority to 
interfere with a dispute about purely internal affairs.  This position is essentially in harmony 
with Canon 22 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law which states that: 
‘Civil laws to which the law of the Church yields are to be observed in canon law with the 
same effects, insofar as they are not contrary to divine law and unless canon law provides 
otherwise.’ 236 
The complicating factor of course may be determining what are purely internal affairs. 
However interesting though these questions are, it is submitted that they may be something 
of a red herring for the purposes of the current discussion.  It is uncontroversial that both 
the Roman Catholic Church and the Church in Wales function through legal entities designed 
to overcome their lack of juridical personality at a national level.  This being the case, it is 
submitted that their lack of juridical personality would not be a fatal objection to their 
entering into employment relations with their clergy.  Although a relevant factor in JGE, it 
was certainly not treated as an absolutely decisive one, either in that case or any other 
decision concerning clergy status.  If other highly persuasive factors pointing towards 
employment were found to be present, a court or tribunal would be in a position to identify 
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a suitable juridic person to fasten with status as employer.
237
  The House of Lords 
specifically made this point in the Percy case, noting that the particular structural challenges 
presented by many churches should not in themselves be allowed to defeat clergy 
employment claims.
238
 
It was significant in JGE that the parish paid the priest and that his income did not come 
from central church or diocesan funds.  In contrast in the Church in Wales, stipendiary clergy 
have their stipend provided at a provincial level by the Representative Body.
239
   The system 
for appointing parish priests was also highlighted as significant; such posts were not subject 
to advertisement and application but within the discretion of the bishop.  
Within the Church in Wales the arrangements for appointing parish clergy are complicated, 
and the persons involved in the appointment process will depend upon the particular 
circumstances of the parish and appointment involved.
240
  However, as part of this process 
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it is common for appointments to be advertised in the Church Times and on diocesan 
websites, and for applications to be invited in a manner similar to that in many secular 
contexts.
241
  This presents a relationship which looks far more like one of employment than 
the exercise of episcopal discretion without any application process within the Roman 
Catholic context.  A situation in which both parties ordinarily make and accept an offer (i.e. 
to give and to perform duties) is more naturally categorised as contractual than one in 
which one party gives a direction which the other is morally and spiritually expected to 
accept. 
The point that a Roman Catholic parish may be removed or transferred against his will, but 
only in accordance will due process of canon law, is not necessarily inconsistent with secular 
employment law or radically different from the position of Church in Wales clergy (the latter 
is discussed further below).  An employment contract may contain provisions requiring an 
employee to work in a different location if the employer requires this; and dismissal would 
usually only be in accordance with a set process (not least because this is necessary to avoid 
falling foul of the Employment Rights Act and facing claims for unfair dismissal).
242
   
However, the fact that the procedure for dissatisfied Roman Catholic clergy is an appeal to 
Rome arguably suggests that the parties do not intend the cleric to have recourse to a 
secular employment tribunal.  Although again it is submitted that this point is not 
conclusive; it is possible to imagine a secular employer with an appeals or grievance 
procedure which ultimately escalated to a head office outside of the jurisdiction.  This would 
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not automatically preclude an employee suing for unfair dismissal (including constructive 
dismissal) if he or she was not satisfied with the outcome of the internal procedure. 
Similarly, the lengthy discussion in JGE on the ability of a bishop to direct the manner in 
which a priest carried out his duties could not be said to be conclusive in relation to 
employment, rather it was a further addition to the already vexed body of case law on the 
‘control’ issue in the context of highly skilled employees.  Nothing in the judgement 
indicated that the bishop was in a radically different position from, for example, an NHS 
trust in relation to a consultant surgeon. 
In JGE the court was clear that contracting with priests as employees for the purposes of 
secular labour law was incompatible with Roman Catholic doctrine.  But contrasting the 
respective positions of the two churches, it can seen that most of the factors which led the 
court to conclude that employment was inconsistent with Roman doctrine in JGE, either 
would not apply, or would operate in a very different way in an Anglican context.  There is 
nothing in that case which suggests convincingly that by analogy with the Roman Catholic 
Church, Church in Wales’ doctrine is inconsistent with secular employment relations 
between church and clergy. 
1.5 Intention to create legal relations - In which contexts, if any, does the current practice 
of the Church in Wales demonstrate an intention to create legal relations with its clergy? 
Stating that a religious community may do something is distinct from stating that it actually 
does it.  Having established that there is no doctrinal reason why the Church in Wales 
should not enter into employment arrangements with its clergy, it is still necessary to ask 
whether it in fact does so. 
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At present the Church in Wales is effectively operating a two-tier system in relation to clergy 
service: i) Common Tenure, which applies to all new appointments, and to all clergy already 
in post who voluntarily opted into the Common Tenure arrangement after its introduction; 
and ii) clergy who have chosen to remain working under the pre-Common Tenure regime.
243
  
The differences between these two regimes make it appropriate to examine them 
separately. 
1.5 (a) Common Tenure 
It was the expressly stated intention of the Church in Wales to introduce this regime in 
response to an ultimatum from secular government, to provide clergy with employment 
rights reflecting those given to secular employees or to have such provision imposed by 
statue.
244
  Clergy were expressly stated to be remaining office holders.
245
  However, it is now 
clear from JGE and other case law that office holder and employee are not mutually 
exclusive states.  It is complicated that the Church in Wales both presents the new rights as 
existing within a voluntary framework and being parallel with the rights available to 
individuals working in the secular sphere. However, it is submitted that both logic and 
human rights law require this ‘voluntary’ arrangement to be enforceable in the secular 
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courts if necessary.  If this is not the case, then Church in Wales clergy in no sense enjoy 
parallel rights to secular employees.   
Consider the hypothetical case of a Church in Wales Representative Body or a given diocese 
arbitrarily refusing to honour its obligation to grant paid maternity leave to a female 
cleric.
246
  There would be no possible religious or doctrinal argument for such a denial.  
Aside from other considerations, a church can hardly expressly and deliberately provide for 
something in writing and then subsequently claim a faith based problem with it.  There be 
potential legal arguments about estoppel and legitimate expectation, but more 
fundamentally, there would be a factual problem of inconsistency for the church to 
overcome.  Having made express and detailed written provision at an institutional level, it 
could not hope to put forward a credible argument about a genuine doctrinal objection to 
its own deliberately adopted provisions.   
A secular tribunal or court refusing to hear a claim from such a cleric purely on the basis of 
the religious context of her work would present difficulties in relation to Article 9 and Article 
14.
247
   The state would be denying her access to justice on the basis of her faith based work 
and lifestyle, and failing to recognise her right to freedom from discrimination on grounds of 
sex. 
Furthermore, it is hard to plausibly argue that clergy or the Church in Wales truly perceive 
their obligations to be purely voluntary. The relationship between stipendiary clergy and the 
church would cease to be tenable if the church decided to withhold payment for clergy 
services; the majority of stipendiary clergy are dependent upon this income.   In the Percy 
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case, as discussed above, the court accepted that if her monetary payment had been 
withheld the minister would have had a claim in respect of this debt.
248
 
Similarly, what meaningful protection would the disciplinary rules and procedures, 
proficiency requirement or the grievance procedure afford to clergy if they could be 
dispensed with at the whim of the church?
249
  Although these all effectively provide for due 
process and a right to a hearing in an internal forum, there are of little use if the institution 
is not contractually bound to honour them. What purpose do they serve if the church can 
decide to dismiss clergy without reference to them and face no consequences in civil law? If 
the Church in Wales cannot ultimately be made to honour its obligations by a secular court, 
then the terms of the CTS are really statements of vague intent or aspiration rather than 
rights.   This position is difficult to reconcile with the stated intent of both secular 
government and the Church in Wales to provide clergy with employment rights and 
protection.
250
  
Furthermore, the other side of the coin is that if the terms of the CTS were non-contractual, 
then the obligations imposed upon clerics within them would not have contractual force 
either.  This again seems to contradict the church’s expressed desire to impose professional 
standards of service and conduct upon its clergy.
251
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The CTS set out terms which suggest something more closely akin to a standard 
employment arrangement in the secular world than the model described in the JGE case, in 
which Roman Catholic clergy were presented as operating independently in parishes and 
receiving minimal direction.  In addition to statements on, inter alia: Work/Life Balance and 
Hours of Work; Holiday entitlement; Training and Retreats; Special Leave Provisions; 
Expenses; Clergy Sickness; Discipline and Ministerial Development, the CTS are accompanied 
by Guidelines which set out in detail how clergy are to carry out their ministry.
252
 
The Guidelines include statements making it clear that clergy are required to work 
collaboratively with colleagues, and to accept direction in their ministry from the wider 
Church, including their bishop.
253
  Overall the picture which emerges from the CTS is one of 
a priest as a worker within a wider organisation, subject to direction, obliged to cooperate 
with others and to meet specified professional standards.  In return he or she receives 
remuneration and employment rights, and there is a strong case that there is intent by both 
parties to enter into legal relations enforceable in a secular court.
254
   For many purposes 
this arrangement will amount to employment in secular law. 
1.5 (b) Ministry Outside of Common Tenure 
Clergy who have not taken up a new post since the introduction of Common Tenure, and 
who had not chosen to opt into the scheme remain subject to the pre-existing 
arrangements.  Like other clergy they are of course subject to an oath of Canonical 
                                                           
252
 CTS and CTS Guidelines. 
253
 See for example CTS 8.1: ‘Clergy swear an oath of canonical obedience to the bishop and agree to be bound 
by the Constitution of the Church in Wales’; CTS 8.2: ‘Clergy should participate fully in the life and work of the 
deanery, archdeaconry, diocese and province, giving support and respect to those given responsibility of 
leadership and oversight’; CTS 8.4: ‘Clergy should acknowledge and respect the ministry of other clergy’; and 
CTS 9.3: ‘Clergy should participate fully in continuing ministerial education and in Bishop’s Review, knowing 
that accountability involves regular review personally and with others’. 
254
 The position of non-stipendiary clergy in the Church in Wales, who do not receive financial remuneration 
from the Representative Body is dealt with further below. 
81 
 
obedience and bound by the Constitution of the Church in Wales and judgements of its 
courts and tribunals.
255
 This means that they are also subject to its considerable body of 
quasi or soft legislation, including for example policies on Child Protection and Ministry with 
Vulnerable Adults, as well as the provincial statement on ministry ‘Cure of Souls’.
256
 
The document Cure of Souls deals with leadership, liturgical responsibility, pastoral ministry, 
confidentiality and administrative responsibility.  It does not conflict in any way with the 
CTS, and much of its contents are re-presentations of duties deriving from the pre-existing 
law of the Church in Wales.
257
   
In pragmatic terms clergy working outside of the Common Tenure arrangement are 
performing the same practical functions and subject to the same body of canon law as those 
working within it.  For instance the duty to celebrate the Holy Eucharist applies equally to all 
priests, ultimately deriving as it does from the liturgical rubrics of the Church in Wales.
258
  
Just because certain priests have not signed up to Common Tenure (and therefore CTS 6, 
which opens with the statement: ‘You are to preside at the Holy Eucharist’259) it does not 
follow that they are somehow exempt from the general duty imposed by the rubrics. 
However, the pertinent question in this context is not whether canon law applies to clergy 
outside of Common Tenure (it clearly does and that point is uncontroversial) but whether 
opting not to enter into the arrangement alters their position in secular law.  Does it 
indicate that such clergy do not have an intention to enter into a contractual relationship 
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with their church?  Did they perhaps reject Common Tenure precisely because they did not 
wish to be treated more like a secular employee?   
The answer to that question must surely be, it depends, and the analysis has come full 
circle.  Many of the same arguments which applied to clerics within Common Tenure about 
payment of stipend would be equally relevant to their stipendiary brothers and sisters 
outside of the scheme; is it really probable that such individuals believe their stipend to be a 
purely voluntary payment, which the church may at anytime decide to withhold for no 
reason?   
Whether there is an intent to create legal relations may well depend upon the matter in 
question; a court for example might make a different finding about payment of stipend and 
an obligation to attend a training course.  The intention of the parties is a question of fact, 
and will depend on the circumstances of the case.  It is submitted however that it is not 
possible to assert that the mere fact that a clergy chooses not to opt in to Common Tenure 
does not prove that he or she has lack intention to create legal relations in respect of any 
aspect of his or her working life. 
This conclusion raises the related point that whether or not an employment relationship is 
found to exist, will always depend upon what is meant by ‘employment’ in the given 
context.  As argued at length above, it is no longer possible to adopt a universal and 
inflexible understanding of ‘employment’ within the United Kingdom, or indeed the 
European Union. 
A final point should be made in relation to clergy operating outside of Common Tenure, and 
that is that this is necessarily a transitional position.  All new appointments are subject to 
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Common Tenure. Therefore the previous arrangements, like unregistered land, will 
gradually be replaced and brought within the new regime through an organic process of 
change. 
1.5 (c) Non-stipendiary clergy 
As discussed above, what is meant by employment will be dependent upon the context.  
The Common Tenure arrangements are open to all clergy, stipendiary or otherwise.  
Furthermore recent case law suggests that courts are increasingly prepared to accept that 
consideration in an employment contract need not always be wages in the conventional 
sense.  An opportunity to earn money and even to gain or maintain professional skills, 
experience and contacts or the provision of accommodation may all be sufficient.
260
 
On this basis many clergy not in receipt of a stipend could claim to be employees, at least 
for some purposes.  A retired non-stipendiary priest receiving regularly receiving fees for 
occasional offices, a house for duty priest being provided with accommodation in return for 
services; and a priest taking a career break to care for young children but nevertheless keen 
to remain active in ministry to some degree and keep  up professional contacts and 
knowledge in the diocese. 
1.6 Conclusions 
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What is meant by employment will depend upon the context of the question; different 
types of working arrangements are covered by different provisions of labour and anti-
discrimination legislation.   
Ministers of religion in general may be both employees and office holders as far as secular 
law is concerned.  Whether there is intent to create legal relations between a minister and 
the faith community for which he or she works will be a question of fact, no judicial 
presumption is now applied in respect of this matter. 
There are no doctrinal objections which would negate any intention to create legal relations 
between Church in Wales clergy and their church.  The working arrangements currently in 
place suggest that in at least some circumstances, a secular court would be prepared to hear 
a claim from a Church in Wales cleric and construe him or her to be an employee. 
The chameleon nature of the concept of employment in secular law, and the wide variety of 
working arrangements in the contemporary Church in Wales mean that every case will turn 
on its facts. 
The legal consequences of any given working arrangement in an employment or quasi-
employment situation will depend upon the subject in dispute.  Different factors may be 
relevant in a sex discrimination claim and a claim for unfair dismissal.  The following chapter 
goes on to look at Church in Wales working arrangements within the specific context of 
vicarious liability. 
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CHAPTER 2 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND CHURCH IN WALES CLERGY 
 
2.1 Overview 
Having established in the previous chapter that the courts construe employment and quasi-
employments relationships differently in different contexts, it is necessary to ask how the 
working arrangements of Church in Wales clergy would be regarded for the specific purpose 
of vicarious liability. 
The basic principle of vicarious liability can be stated quite succinctly: 
‘When it applies it exists independent of fault.  It is a rule under which D2 is liable for the tort 
of D1, on grounds of his relationship to D1 and his connection to D1’s tort’.261 
However, the question of when this principle should be applied is a complex one, and 
continues to exercise both academic commentators,
262
 and the judges, throughout the 
Common Law world.
263
  Under what circumstances is it appropriate to make a defendant 
who is not at fault liable for the conduct of a tortfeasor?  In answering this question, courts 
apply a two-stage test: 
‘The first stage involves an inquiry into the relationship between A and B; whether it is a 
relationship (classically employment) to which the principles of vicarious liability may attach.  
The second involves an inquiry into the act of omission of B which is in question; whether the 
act was within the scope of employment or other relationship’. 264 
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In relation to Church in Wales clergy this two-stage inquiry will raise the following questions: 
1) Is the relationship between an individual cleric and his or her bishop one to which 
vicarious liability may attach?   
2) If question 1) can be answered in the affirmative, what category of acts and 
omissions will come within the scope of that relationship or relationships? 
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to consider who the law on vicarious 
liability has developed. 
2.2 Development of the law on vicarious liability 
 
Prior to the late seventeenth century there was no concept of vicarious liability in English 
and Welsh law.
265
  A master was however liable for the acts of his servants if he had 
commanded them, on the basis that these were then effectively the master’s own actions 
carried out by the servant.  From this position, there was a gradual movement to one in 
which a master could be made liable for actions which he did not command, provided that 
they were for his benefit and in the course of the servant’s employment.
266
 
The doctrine as it developed was not confined to negligence by an employee but came to 
encompass deliberate wrong doing on their part.
267
  However, in the case of dishonest or 
criminal behaviour, the question of scope of employment was always particularly 
problematic; so much so that Lord Denning MR once described the case law on this subject 
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as ‘baffling’.268  Furthermore although employment was the usual relationship giving rise to 
vicarious liability, the principle was never confined to master and servant relations.
269
 
Recent case law in the UK and Canada has considered vicarious liability in relation to clergy, 
and has devoted much attention to the issue of liability for deliberate wrong-doing and also 
the issue of liability in the context of non-standard employment relationships. 
2.2 (a) Vicarious liability for deliberate wrong-doing-the current issues 
 
In Lister and others v Hesley Hall Ltd,270  Lord Steyn271 referred to the two Canadian cases of 
Bazley v Curry272 and Jacobi v Griffiths273 describing them as ‘luminous and illuminating’,274 
and stating that wherever problems of vicarious liability and sexual abuse ‘are considered in 
future in the common law world these judgements will be the starting point’.275   
These decisions were duly considered in the subsequent cases of Maga v Trustees of the 
Birmingham Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church,276 JGE v English Province of Our 
Lady of Charity and another,277and Various Claimants v The Catholic Welfare Society and 
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Others.278  Furthermore, although the Canadian decisions were not dealt within the 
judgements given in or EL v Children’s Society,279 both the Lister and JGE cases were 
analysed.  Therefore, Bazley and Jacobi indirectly influenced these decisions as well, by 
virtue of having shaped the UK case law which was applied. 
A key factor in the ratio of both Bazley and Jacobi was the concept of ‘enterprise risk’.280  
However, this factor was not understood and adopted in a consistent manner in the UK 
decisions which followed.  It is submitted that this had two undesirable consequences: 1) 
judicial and academic confusion about the distinction between vicarious liability and direct 
liability in negligence; and 2) continuing uncertainty about when vicarious liability will be 
successfully established, particularly in the context of religious organisations. 
It is true that in the most recent decision, the Supreme Court did emphasise the importance 
of the ‘creation of risk’ in the establishment of vicarious liability in cases of sexual abuse.281 
However, as will be discussed further below, there was still little or no guidance as to what 
factual elements would be required to demonstrate ‘creation of risk’.   
It is likely that more is required that mere opportunity for the wrong-doing (otherwise 
presumably employers would be liable for sexual assault committed by one adult against 
another working in an office or a factory); but how much more
282
?  And does the term 
‘creation of risk’ differ materially from the phrase ‘enterprise risk’ favoured in the Canadian 
cases?  If not, why was different terminology adopted?  If so, how does it differ?   
                                                           
278
 Although not considered by the Court of Appeal in Various Claimants v The Catholic Society Welfare and 
Others [2010] EWCA Civ 1106, the Supreme Court did analyse the Canadian authorities in detail, see [2012] 
UKSC 56.    
279
 EL v Children’s Society [2012] EWHC 365 (QB). 
280
 Bazley v Curry 174 DLR (4
th
) 45 per McLachlin J paras 22, 30, 41-46 and Jacobi v Griffiths 174 DLR (4
th
) 71 per 
Binnie J  paras 42-64 and 79-85. 
281
 Various Claimants v The Catholic Society Welfare and Others [2012] UKSC 56 per Lord Phillips para 87.   
282
 For a UK judicial discussion of the insufficiency of mere opportunity in this context, see Lister and others v 
Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22 per Lord Millet para 82. 
89 
 
For as long as these questions remain unanswered, it is likely that the current confusion and 
uncertainty will remain. 
2.2 (b) The Decisions in Bazley, Jacobi and Lister 
The claimant in the Bazley case had been sexually abused as a child in a residential care 
facility.
283
  The abuser was an employee of the Children’s Foundation, a non-profit 
organisation which ran the home.  The question arose as to whether the Foundation could 
be held vicariously liable for his deliberate and gross wrong-doing.  Although the non-profit 
status of the organisation was considered at length in the judgement,
284
 there was no 
suggestion that it had any religious ethos or spiritual mission.  The Foundation required its 
employees to act as parent figures for the children in its care, in both physical and 
emotional terms.
285
  They were not only permitted but expected to relate to the children in 
an intimate way, assisting with personal hygiene and tucking them into bed.
286
   
Although not discussed in the judgements, the case was inevitably decided in the shadow of 
what Ogilvie describes as the ‘infamous’ litigation over widespread civil and criminal wrongs 
perpetrated in residential schools for Native American children.
 287
   In one case over 11,000 
claimants sued a Roman Catholic lay order.
288
  In Canada there has been a public scandal 
and national tragedy over the abuse of vulnerable children in institutions, on a scale 
unmatched by anything in the United Kingdom. 
                                                           
283
 Bazley v Curry 174 DLR (4
th
) 45. 
284
 Ibid per McLachlin J paras 47-56. 
285
 Ibid per McLachlin J, para 2. 
286
 Ibid: ‘As substitute parent, it (the Foundation) practised “total intervention” in all aspects of the lives of the 
children it cared for.  The Foundation authorised its employees to act as parent figures for the children.  It 
charged them to care for the children physically, mentally and emotionally.  The employees were to do 
everything a parent would do, from general supervision to intimate duties like bathing and tucking in at 
bedtime.’ 
287
 M H Ogilvie, Religious Institutions and the Law in Canada (Irwin Law: Canada 2003), 317. 
288
 Ibid. 
90 
 
In the leading judgement, McLachlin  J expressed the view that policy considerations had 
played a crucial role in the development of the law on vicarious liability.
289
  However, she 
did not accept that the pragmatic policy considerations could be permitted to shape the 
outcome of cases at the expense of legal rules, and examining the previous case law she 
identified a ‘unifying principle’.290  
In each instance where an employer was liable for the unauthorised tort of an employee, it 
could be said that ‘the employer’s enterprise had created the risk that produced the tortious 
act’.291  Or, in other words, ‘the employee’s conduct is closely tied to a risk which the 
employer’s enterprise has placed in the community’.292 
Having considered both the existing precedent and examined the policy reasons for 
vicarious liability, McLachlin J went on to lay down some principles to guide future courts 
determining liability for intentional and unauthorised wrong-doing.  She held that courts 
should ‘openly confront the question of whether liability should lie against an employer 
rather than obscuring the decision beneath the semantic discussions of “scope of 
employment” and “mode of conduct”,293 and found that liability was generally appropriate 
where ‘there is a significant connection between the creation or enhancement of a risk and 
the wrong that accrues therefrom, even if it is unrelated to the employer’s desires’.294 
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McLachlin J set out a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in assessing whether 
there was sufficient connection between the tort and the risk which the employer’s 
enterprise had created or enhanced.
295
  These were: 
a) The opportunity which the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her 
power; 
b) the extent to which the tort may have furthered the employer’s aims; 
c) the extent to which the tort related to friction, confrontation or intimacy inherent in 
the enterprise; 
d) the extent of the power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim; 
e) the vulnerability of victims to the wrongful exercise of the employee’s power. 
In this case, it was highly significant that the role of substitute parent put the employee in a 
position of both power and intimacy over the victim, and made it difficult for the child to 
make an effective complaint.
296
   The abuser had legitimate reason, indeed, even a duty, to 
engage in close and private physical contact with the child at bedtime and bath-time, and 
was a role model whom the child was encouraged to emulate and obey.   
There was no suggestion by McLachlin J that the employer was doing anything wrong in 
giving its employees this kind of intimacy and power.  Its enterprise in caring for children 
was legitimate, even laudable; and providing substitute parent-figures was an appropriate 
was of pursuing that enterprise.  Nevertheless, it set up a situation in which there was an 
inherent risk of a paedophile employee abusing the trust and authority accorded to them by 
their role.   Properly understood the concept of ‘enterprise risk’ as outlined did not 
introduce issues of fault into vicarious liability.  Whether the employer’s enterprise 
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introduces or enhances a risk to the community is a question of fact independent of 
culpability.  
In the second Canadian case of Jacobi297 the ratio and principles of Bazley were applied, but 
the majority judgement was given by Binnie J and McLachlin J put forward a dissenting view.  
This case concerned a club for children and teenagers which sought to provide behaviour 
guidance and to promote positive health, social, educational, vocational and character 
development.
298
  There was no suggestion in the judgements that the club’s attempts to 
promote and foster the well-being of its members, was done within a religious environment 
or with any proselytising intention.   
The tortfeasor was employed by the club as a program director, and was held out as a role-
model and trusted confidant.   He befriended the claimants, developed a friendship with 
them outside of club hours and invited them to his home.  He then took advantage of this 
trust to sexually abuse them, for the most part away from club property and not during 
working time. 
In the opinion of McLachlin J. the test laid out in Bazley was satisfied.  The club expected its 
employee to develop friendly, trusted relations with the young people attending, and to act 
as a role-model and mentor.   There was a risk associated with this intimacy, exacerbated by 
the vulnerability of many of the young people who came from disadvantaged or troubled 
backgrounds.
299
  The predatory employee was found by the trial judge to exercise a ‘god-
like’ authority over his young charges.
300
  Overall the special situation of trust and respect 
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fostered by the abuser was part of the club’s enterprise, and therefore vicarious liability 
should apply even though the goals of the club were praise-worthy.
301
 
The majority of the court disagreed however: Binnie J emphasised that in contrast with the 
Bazley case, the employee had no parenting role.302  The employer’s enterprise was 
providing group recreational activities for young people; the abusive employee was only 
able to commit the wrongful acts when he managed to subvert this and gain private access 
to the victims.
303
  His legitimate access to the victims in pursuance of his employer’s 
enterprise was always in public.   
Neither was he required to touch the victims in any intimate way comparable to that 
expected of the employee in Bazley.304  Steadying a child on gym equipment is very different 
from helping to bathe a child and tuck him or her into bed.  Furthermore, in contrast with 
the situation in Bazley, the victims returned home to parents who should have had regard to 
their interests, and been aware that the activities in the employee’s home were not part of 
the club’s program.  The mentoring role did not generate a relationship of intimacy and 
power which could be equated to that of adults in a parental role.  The employer’s 
enterprise provided an opportunity for the abuser to meet and groom his victims, but it did 
not introduce or enhance the risk of their being abused.   It was common ground from 
Bazley that mere opportunity was not enough to establish liability.305  Therefore, the 
majority of the court found that on the facts of Jacobi, vicarious liability could not be 
established. 
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The UK House of Lords had to consider similar issues in Lister.306  The case concerned abuse 
of boys resident in a boarding annex to a school for pupils with emotional and behavioural 
difficulties.
307
  The leading speech was given by Lord Steyn, and he cited the Canadian cases 
with strong approval.
308
  But he described the test outlined in those cases not in terms of 
enterprise risk, but of ‘close connection’.   
Lord Steyn formulated the test for liability as follows ‘whether the warden’s torts were so 
closely connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employers 
vicariously liable’,309 and found on the facts that it would.  In his opinion the perpetrator’s 
abuse was ’inextricably interwoven’ with the carrying out of his duties as warden. 
Lord Clyde adopted a similar approach in his speech, referring to cases in which an employer 
had been entrusted with the safekeeping of something, noting that in such circumstances it 
was usually not difficult to demonstrate a ‘sufficient connection’ between the wrongful act 
of the employee and the employment, and thereby establish vicarious liability.
310
  He also 
referred to the Canadian cases, analysing Bazley as follows: ‘the essence of the decision 
seems to me to lie in the recognition of the existence of a sufficient connection between the 
acts of the employee and the employment’.311  He noted that this was affirmed in Jacobi and 
that ‘These two decisions seem to be consistent with the traditional approach recognised in 
this country’.312 
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On the facts of Lister Lord Clyde held that whilst an opportunity for wrong-doing would not 
have been sufficient to establish sufficient connection between the tort and the 
employment for vicarious liability to arise, the warden had a general duty to look after and 
care for the victims.  This function had been delegated to him by his employers, and he was 
performing this function at the time of the abuse.
313
 
Lord Hobhouse expressly stated that he was basing his judgement on English authority, and 
that he did not believe it appropriate to follow the lead given by the Canadian cases.
314
  He 
explained vicarious liability in the following terms: ‘their [the employers’] voluntary 
assumption of the relationship towards the plaintiff and the duties that arise from that 
relationship and their choosing to entrust the performance of those duties to their 
servant’.315  He agreed however that on the facts the employer was vicariously liable, as it 
had undertaken to care for the boys, and delegated this duty to the warden who abused 
them. 
Like Lords Steyn and Clyde, Lord Millet stated that he had found the Canadian authority to 
be of much assistance.
316
  He also stressed that the warden had a duty to care for the boys 
who suffered from his abuse, and that he committed the assaults by virtue of abusing the 
special position he occupied in order to perform this duty.
317
  His employer was therefore 
liable for his conduct, whereas it would not have been liable for the actions of a 
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groundsman or gardener, who merely took advantage of the opportunity to abuse children 
with which his employment provided him.
318
  
Unlike the other members of the House of Lords, Lord Millet did use the word ‘risk’ once in 
his speech,
319
 observing that in residential settings where vulnerable people are cared for 
‘there is an inherent risk that indecent assaults on the residents will be committed by those 
placed in authority over them, particularly if they are in close proximity to them and 
occupying a position of trust’.320  However, he did not analyse the case in terms of 
enterprise risk, but of duty and proximity. 
Therefore, the majority of the House of Lords purported to follow the two Canadian cases 
and encouraged future courts to do likewise, but adopted a markedly difference 
terminology and emphasis from that of the leading judgements in Bazley and Jacobi.   The 
question ‘is there a sufficient connection’ is a more nebulous one than ‘did the employer 
cause or enhance a risk’?  It is not clear how strong a connection must be in order to qualify 
as ‘sufficient’.  Nothing comparable was offered to the list of principles for consideration 
laid out in Bazley.321  
The Maga case 
The courts had occasion to apply the ‘close connection’ test outlined in Lister in Maga v 
Trustees of the Birmingham Archdiocese.322 The difficulties generated by the imprecise 
nature of the test are apparent in the reasoning in Maga.  
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The claimant was a boy from a non-Roman Catholic family who met Fr Clonan, a curate with 
a special brief for youth work, whilst admiring his sports car.
323
  The claimant was aged 
around twelve or thirteen at the time.
324
  Fr Clonan struck up a friendship with the claimant, 
inviting him to attend church discos and getting him to do various odd jobs in return for 
money.  He never engaged with him on a ‘religious level’ or sought to involve him in 
attending worship.
325
   
Tragically, Fr Clonan was a paedophile and abused the claimant.  When the boy attempted 
to complain about this to Fr McTernan, the priest who ran the parish in which Fr Clonan 
worked, he was dismissed and warned that his mother would be told he was ‘playing up’.
326
  
Fr McTernan shared a presbytery with Fr Clonan and was his immediate supervisor. Despite 
being on notice that Fr Clonan was a potential abuser, he made no attempt to monitor his 
behaviour, or to report any concerns to the ecclesiastical hierarchy or the police. 
In analysing the case, Neuberger MR referred to the close connection test set out by Lord 
Steyn in Lister.327  He took account of the fact that Lord Hobhouse adopted a different 
approach in that same case, but concluded the majority of the court found the Canadian 
cases correct and helpful.
328
  He emphasised that the fact that Fr Clonan’s work had given 
him the opportunity to abuse the claimant was not sufficient to fix his employer with 
liability
329
.  However, taking a global view of the situation, there was evidence that the 
requisite close connection could be established.
330
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Fr Clonan normally wore clerical garb, and had a ‘special role, which involves trust and 
responsibility in a more general way than a teacher, doctor or a nurse’.331  His priestly status 
enabled him to hold himself out as having such role and authority.
332
  Furthermore he had a 
duty to evangelise which meant that he was supposed to befriend and gain the trust of non-
Catholics like the claimant.
333
  He had a special responsibility for youth work,
334
 and he used 
church functions like the disco and church premises to cultivate and abuse the claimant.
335
  
Evidence was also heard that ‘spending time alone with people who were searching for 
truth’ was a ‘normal’336 and proper part of a priest’s work. 
In the Court of Appeal Neuberger MR did then go on to consider the two Canadian cases 
referring with approval to the requirement that there was a ‘material risk of harm occurring 
in the sense that the employment significantly contributed to that harm’.337 He then set out 
the five factors listed in the Canadian cases for assessing this (see the foregoing discussion). 
He found that all but b) (the extent to which the employee’s action furthered the 
employer’s enterprise) were applicable.  He also noted that by its very nature, factor b) 
would hopefully never apply in the context of sexual abuse. 
However, he did not consider each of the factors separately nor in detail; neither did he 
explicitly relate the factors to the different issues which he had identified on the facts.  At 
the end of this section of his judgement, he returned to Lord Steyn’s concept of ‘close 
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connection’.
338
  Therefore, although risk was referenced, ultimately his conclusion was 
presented in terms of close connection. 
Longmore LJ analysed the case slightly differently, distinguishing Lister on the basis that the 
Roman Catholic diocese had not taken on a duty to care for the claimant in the way in which 
the school in Lister had done.339  Nevertheless he found that the diocese was part of the 
Roman Catholic Church, and consequently had an analogous obligation by virtue of its 
teachings and purported special care for the vulnerable and oppressed.
340
 
He held that the church had invested Fr Clonan with clerical garb, bestowed the title ‘Father’ 
and concluded ‘It is difficult to think of a role nearer to that of a parent than that of a priest.  
In this circumstance the absence of any formal legal responsibility is almost beside the 
point’.341  He emphasised that Fr Clonan’s priestly status and authority gave him 
unquestioned private access to the claimant.
342
  
He also referred with approval to the Canadian decisions, noting in Bazley how much 
significance was attached to the quasi-parental role of the employees, and the power 
dependency relationship which this engendered.
343
  Longmore LJ concluded ‘this exposition 
of the law is highly relevant to the position of Father Clonan in respect of whom there 
undoubtedly existed a “power or dependency relationship” with the Claimant arising from 
his position as a priest.344 In all the circumstances there was a ‘sufficiently strong’ 
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connection between what Fr Clonan was authorised to do and the abuse which he 
committed for vicarious liability to apply.
345
 
He observed that he would not lay any emphasis on Fr Clonan’s ‘duty to evangelise’ as it was 
too nebulous a concept to be analytically useful, but that in all matters he agreed with Lord 
Neuberger.
346
   
Smith LJ gave a brief final judgement, expressing the view that the duty to evangelise was 
not a key factor; a priest or pastor without such a doctrinal duty who committed abuse by 
virtue of position and ostensible authority would be no different from Fr Clonan.
347
   Her 
reasoning was that a minister of an non-evangelical denomination might have other 
grounds to make pastoral contact with individuals, which he or she could then subvert for 
the purposes of abuse.
348
 Therefore, she found that there was no material distinction 
between the judgement of the Master of the Rolls and Longmore LJ, and agreed with 
both.
349
 
Therefore, although the Court of appeal referred to the Canadian cases with approval, all of 
the judgements laid more emphasis on the ‘close connection’ test required by Lister than 
the more precise ‘enterprise risk’ inquiry set out in Bazley and Jacobi. The consequence of 
which, is that is difficult either to draw out or to substantiate the reasons for the court 
finding a close connection in this instance.   The issue that the facts of Maga were 
apparently much nearer to the circumstances of Jacobi than Bazley adds further complexity, 
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given that in the former case vicarious liability was held not to apply.  In light of this, it is 
perhaps not surprising that cases subsequent to Maga have not followed a predictable 
pattern in terms of outcome or reasoning. 
Deconstructing the two leading judgements in Maga it is clear that leaning towards ‘close 
connection’ rather than ‘enterprise risk’ shifted judicial consideration away from the facts of 
the case.  By not considering in turn each of the five factors in the Canadian cases, the 
judges failed to ask in a methodical way what Fr Clonan was required to do, what real 
authority he had to do it and how his role and authority generated a risk for the claimant. 
Lord Neuberger laid great stress on the trust and responsibility which Fr Clonan’s priestly 
status conferred.
350
  However, he did not address how real or relevant this was for the 
claimant or his parents.  Would a teenager brought up in a non-Roman Catholic household 
in 1970s Britain necessarily revere or trust a priest by virtue his office and attire?  In reality, 
were there not grounds to suggest that Fr Clonan’s sports car gave him more credibility in 
the claimant’s eyes than his dog-collar?   These questions were not even explored by Lord 
Neuberger, much less resolved.    
This is in sharp contrast to the approach of both McLachin J and Binnie J to status and 
authority exercised by the abuser in Jacobi.351  Although they reach different conclusions, 
they both considered the impact which the authority conferred by the employer would have 
had on the victim, and gave reasons for their findings which future courts could analyse. 
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Lord Neuberger also emphasised how Fr Clonan’s role had given him an ostensible reason to 
spend time alone with the claimant.
352
  Here the facts did diverge from Jacobi, as in that 
case it was a very material factor that the perpetrator had no work-related justification for 
being alone in private with his victims. 
But again, it is not wholly clear that the sweeping judicial pronouncement can be supported 
by the facts.  Fr Clonan had reason to spend time alone ‘with people seeking the truth’.353  
There seems to have been little or no pretence that the claimant was seeking spiritual 
advice.  It is not apparent from any evidence presented in the judgement that Fr Clonan 
really had legitimate grounds to be spending a lot of time alone with one particular boy who 
was not a member of the congregation, nor likely ever to become one, especially in places 
like his bedroom in the presbytery.    
In fact as Lord Neuberger found, Fr Clonan’s behaviour should have raised major concerns 
for his senior colleague Fr McTernan.
354
    
This finding is not easily reconciled with the conclusion that his priestly role gave him 
unquestioned private access to his victim.  If Fr Clonan really had only been engaging in 
behaviour which was to be expected for a priest doing his job, then Fr McTernan would 
surely have had no grounds for concern.  Tragically this clearly was not the case.  Fr Clonan 
was doing things which could not be explained away as part of his ordinary duties. 
In a similar way Longmore LJ asserted that it was difficult to think of ‘a role nearer to that of 
a parent than that of a priest’355 before going on draw parallels with Bazley and the kind of 
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power and dependency relationship which existed between the victim and abuser.
356
  Again 
it is far from clear that this assertion can be supported on the facts.  In Bazley the abuser 
was in the role of primary-carer; he had complete power over the most aspects of the 
child’s day to day life.  The abusive employee had reason to be alone with the child and for 
intimate physical contact whilst assisting with tasks like washing and dressing.  He also had 
the opportunity to use and manipulate the trust and attachment with a young child is likely 
to form with a parental figure.   
The title ‘Father’ in no way gave Clonan that sort of power over his victim, or reflected that 
level of intimacy.  That is not to say that there was not a relationship of ‘power or 
dependency’ of some sort, or to suggest that Fr Clonan did not abuse it in an appalling way.  
But to equate his relationship to the victim so directly with that of a young child and 
parental figure is deeply problematic.   
There was a complicating factor the Maga case, which may perhaps explain the judges’ 
readiness to find vicarious liability without entering into a careful analysis of the factual 
matrix in relation to legal principle.  In most cases vicarious liability is pleaded precisely 
because the employer is not culpable for the injury suffered by the claimant.  Here however 
there was negligence by the employer.  It was found that Fr McTernan was negligent in 
supervising Fr Clonan, even by the standards of the time.  He knew or should have known 
that his junior colleague was abusing boys, or at the very least that this was a strong 
possibility, and yet failed to take any action.
357
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It is submitted, however, that it would have been preferable for the judges to have laid 
more emphasis on the claim in negligence against the diocese, rather than making a finding 
of vicarious liability for trespass without detailed reasoning to substantiate this and to 
provide guidance for future courts.  The victim could have gained compensation for his 
injury which he suffered through the negligence of Fr McTernan.   
It was conceded for the purposes of the case that priests were to be treated as employees 
for the purposes of vicarious liability, so it was uncontroversial that the diocese were 
vicariously liable for any negligence on the part of Fr McTernan.  It was also clear from the 
facts that Fr McTernan had indeed been negligent in failing to monitor the activities of his 
curate, when he had been put on notice that he posed a potential risk to children.  Finding 
the diocese liable for harm suffered by the claimant as a result of this negligence would 
have avoided further muddying the already clouded waters of vicarious liability for 
deliberate wrong-doing. 
There is another interesting parallel with the Jacobi case here.  Although the defendants 
were found not to be vicariously liable, the case was remitted to determine whether the 
club was liable ‘under a fault based cause of action’,358 whether negligence or breach of 
some other duty.  If an employee is using his or her employment to gain access to young 
people for purposes not connected to the proper performance of his or her duties, and the 
employer knows or ought to know that this is happening, then that employer may well be 
directly liable in negligence if those young people suffer abuse or other harm. 
Obviously whether a cause of action lies in negligence will depend upon the facts, but in 
many instances of this kind it will be more appropriate to pursue negligence than vicarious 
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liability for deliberate wrong-doing.  There is no need for claimants or courts to stretch 
credibility in asserting a connection between the employee’s duties and the abuse if, as in 
Jacobi, it is not obviously apparent.   The employer is not liable because the employee was 
acting on its behalf when the tort took place; the employee may well not have been so 
doing.  The employer is liable because they knowingly exposed third parties to a risk of 
foreseeable harm, and straightforward Donoghue v Stevenson principles apply.359   
If the employer carried out appropriate criminal record checks and employee training, and 
the employee was doing nothing ostensibly wrong or beyond what was required of them, 
then any harm or abuse suffered by third parties would probably not be reasonably 
foreseeable.  If however, the employer becomes aware that the employee is using his or her 
position to do something suspicious which was not required of him or her, for example to 
spend time alone with children or young people , then harm does become reasonably 
foreseeable.  Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle applies;
360
 the defendant employer should 
have those children or young people in mind when deciding to continue to place its 
employees in a position of privileged access to them. 
2.3 Post-Maga Cases - Close Connection Test 
The lack of clear guidance which the ‘close connection’ test and its application have given 
has been apparent in subsequent case law.  Up until the recent judgement by the Supreme 
Court in Various Claimants, UK courts were inclined to emphasize connection rather than 
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risk.
361 Even now it could not be said that the Supreme Court has definitively adopted 
‘enterprise risk’ as a test; risk appears to remain simply a strong indication and a highly 
persuasive factor in establishing the required ‘close connection’ between the tort and the 
relationship between the tortfeasor and his or her employer.  Nothing akin to the checklist 
outlined in Bazley  was proposed or set out.  Neither was it wholly clear whether UK courts 
looking for evidence of a ‘creation of risk’ are looking for the same factors as Canadian 
courts considering enterprise risk. 
2.3 (a) Various Claimants - In the Court of Appeal 
In Various Claimants v Catholic Welfare Society and others,362 the Court of Appeal was 
required to determine whether a religious brotherhood, ‘the Institute’, (existing in law as an 
unincorporated association) was vicariously liable for sexual abuse perpetrated by its 
members. 
The brothers were a teaching order of laymen,
363
 and at the relevant time had brothers 
teaching in a school which was run by an independent organisation.  This third party 
organisation was the brothers’ employer.  Some of the brothers abused pupils at the school, 
and the question arose as to whether the Institute could be held vicariously liable for their 
actions. 
The Canadian cases were not explicitly discussed, and the judicial analysis focused on close 
connection.  However, ripples of the ‘enterprise risk’ doctrine were felt via reference to Lord 
Millet’s judgement in Lister.  Hughes LJ interpreted Lord Millet’s dicta is setting out the 
following highly relevant consideration to questions of close connection ‘whether D2 has 
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put D1, for his own purposes, into a position, in which the risk of a tort of the kind committed 
is inherent’.364 
Even though the court acknowledged that following the decision in Viasystems (Tyneside) 
Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd,365 there was no difficulty in finding that more than 
one party could be vicariously liable for the actions of the same tortfeasor.  Therefore, both 
the employing school and the brotherhood could have been found vicariously liable,
366
  but 
the brotherhood was nevertheless still not found to be liable for the actions of an abusive 
brother.
367
 
This was despite the fact that the brothers were readily identifiable as such by their title, 
even if not wearing a habit.
368
  The brotherhood was more akin to a professional 
organisation than an employer,
369
 and whilst teaching the brothers were not acting on 
behalf of others in the society.
370
  All of this was so even though the mission of the 
brotherhood was teaching and the brothers were subject to the discipline and direction of 
their order.
371
  Because the order had not taken on a duty to care for the pupils at this 
particular school, and then delegated this to brothers sent there to teach, such individuals 
could not be said to be fulfilling their duties on behalf of the order.
372
  And even if this 
conclusion was wrong, the other members of the order were scattered all over the world 
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and could not be said to have the necessary interest in the running of this particular school 
to satisfy the close connection test.
373
 
In commenting on the decision Coe and Leonard observe that the conclusion is difficult to 
reconcile with Maga.374  The issue was not that there was no employment relationship, and 
it was clear on the facts that the brothers had ‘two managers’.
375
  Although legally 
employed by a third party, their order had control over all aspects of their lives, including 
their teaching.  The argument that the brothers were scattered all over the world and could 
not therefore have the necessary close connection could be made of any large organisation 
operating worldwide.  Why should members of an unincorporated association be treated 
differently from employees, if an employment relationship was not required for vicarious 
liability? 
There is considerable merit in this reasoning, especially as the judgements do not unpack 
why geographical distance is inconsistent with a ‘close connection’.  It is also submitted that 
a different conclusion might have been reached if the ‘enterprise risk’ test had been applied.  
The fact the Supreme Court returned to focusing on risk and came to the opposite decision 
lends considerable weight to this argument.  
 Teaching was the enterprise in which the unincorporated association was engaged.  
Conferring members with status and respectability and sending them to schools as teachers 
potentially enabled the individual abusers to gain trust and authority, and sexual abuse of 
pupils by adults is an inherent risk of operating in a school context.  If in Maga a particular 
brief for youth work and outreach, combined with priestly status was sufficient to establish 
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a ‘close connection’, it was not clear why recognising and enabling a lifetime vocation to 
teaching, combined with conferring religious status was not treated in a similar manner.  If a 
list of factors like the one set out in the Canadian cases had been applied, it might be easier 
to understand the reason for the Court of Appeal distinguishing between this case and 
Maga.  But the close connection test does not set out clear criteria in this way. 
2.3 (b) JGE v English Province of Our Lady of Charity and another 
In the subsequent case of JGE v English Province of Our Lady of Charity and another,376 
MacDuff J at first instance confirmed that employment was not necessary for vicarious 
liability, and that a Roman Catholic priest was in a relationship ‘akin to employment’.377 The 
judge had been asked to determine as a preliminary issue whether the diocese could be 
held vicariously liable for the alleged actions of a priest (something which was not 
challenged by the diocese in Maga).378  
The case concerned a claimant who had been resident in a children’s home which was run 
by an order of Roman Catholic nuns (the first defendant).  She argued that the second 
defendant charitable trust (the Trust) were responsible for a church in the diocese of which 
one Fr Baldwin was priest.  As resident at the children's home, the claimant had attended 
this church. The claimant issued proceedings against both defendants, alleging, inter alia, 
that she had been repeatedly sexually abused and raped by Fr Baldwin, both when he 
visited the children’s home and when she attended church.  
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Although the Canadian cases were cited and considered in the judgement, MacDuff J 
observed that ‘close connection may be easier to recognise than to define’.379  A worrying 
statement in relation to certainty for future litigants, and an effective admission that the 
‘close connection’ test as it has emerged from Lister is not providing judges with clear 
principles to apply. 
When the case was considered by the Court of Appeal, the court expressed unease at 
determining the matter of vicarious liability as a preliminary issue given that both stages of 
the two stage test were fact sensitive.
380
  Nevertheless they reluctantly consented to 
consider the terms of issue which had been defined by the Master at an earlier stage in the 
litigation process.
381
  But they were clear the decision related solely to vicarious liability 
arising between a parish priest and a bishop, not as between a bishop and other priests 
carrying out non-parochial functions within the diocese.
382
 
Ward LJ analysed the problem in terms of the priest’s relationship with the bishop, on the 
basis that the Roman Catholic Church had no legal personality.
383
  It was common ground 
between the parties that priests were not employees of the bishop.
384
  Nevertheless he still 
considered this question, with assistance from the joint statement prepared by the parties’ 
respective experts on canon law, before concluding that there was no contract of service 
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between the bishop and the diocese. In fact there was no contract at all, as there was no 
intention to create legal relations in secular law.
385
 
From this starting point Ward LJ went on to examine whether the relationship between the 
priest and the bishop could be described as ‘akin’ to employment for the purposes of 
vicarious liability.  He considered the Canadian case of John Doe386 in which the Supreme 
Court of Canada applied the principles set out in Bazley and Jacobi to find a Roman Catholic 
bishop vicariously liable for sexual abuse by a priest.  Ward LJ emphasised that the court in 
that case had been satisfied that the necessary connection existed between the ‘employer’ 
created or enhanced risk and the wrong which the plaintiff sought to establish.
387
  
He noted the point made by counsel for the diocese that the facts in JGE differed 
significantly from those in John Doe, where the priest had been operating in an isolated 
rural community, and was consequently placed in a position of far greater power and 
influence than priests most in other settings.  Nevertheless, he concluded that the case was 
authority from a powerful court which commanding respect even though it was not binding 
in this jurisdiction.
388
  This response to the point made by counsel is slightly confusing, as 
the argument that the facts could and should be distinguished does not relate to the 
powerful persuasive value of non-binding judgments given by appellate courts in the 
common law world.  If the facts could be properly distinguished then the decision would not 
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be binding even if it had come from the UK Supreme Court.  Given the significance which 
Ward LJ attached to the decision, it is important to examine it in comparison to JGE. 
The facts in John Doe were both unusual and extreme.  The priest worked in geographically 
isolated communities which were overwhelmingly Roman Catholic and devoutly religious, 
even the schools were denominational.  There were few other community leaders and 
authority figures, as well as an absence of nearby and visible state authority in the form of 
police officers and courts.
389
   
In such circumstances the priest exercised a degree of power which was not comparable to 
that of a Roman Catholic priest in a UK context.  Functioning within the part of the UK 
covered by the Portsmouth Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, the priest in JGE was a 
representative of a minority religion in a mixed religious and social setting.  There were no 
comparable issues of geographical isolation, and no absence of alternative authority figures.  
The statement given in evidence in John Doe, that some members of the community 
believed that ‘the priest could turn you into a goat’390 would be shocking and unlikely in a 
modern Western European context. 
It is also significant that the Roman Catholic Church does not teach, promote or even 
condone the notion that priests have magical powers and can zap errant parishioners into 
caprine form.
391
  It is not responsible for folk-beliefs unrelated to its doctrine or practice.  
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Neither does it have any control over geography or secular infrastructure.  Which raises the 
question of to what extent was it really the employer or principal who conferred the power 
on the tortfeasor?  If in reality the power was conferred by the victim or a third party, is 
vicarious liability appropriate? 
Once again a sharp contrast is apparent between the decision in John Doe and the decision 
in Jacobi, as well as in the approach of different senior Canadian judges.  In both cases it 
could be argued that the employer or principal knowingly placed the tortfeasor in a context 
in which he would be able to exercise social and emotional power, but in neither case did 
the employer or principal create that context or confer that power.  The power came from 
the way in which third parties chose to respond to a youth leader and a priest.  Not all 
Roman Catholic priests are placed on a pedestal by the entire community in which they 
serve, and not all youth leaders are hero-worshipped by the young people they work with.  
In John Doe the employer’s role was sufficient, whereas in Jacobi it was not; yet the 
language used in the cases was extremely similar.  Both abusers enjoyed ‘god-like’ status in 
the eyes of their victims.
392
  However, the judges disagreed as to where their employers 
should be held accountable for this.  In both cases, McLachlin J was of the view that the 
employer had placed an individual in a position likely to attract reverence and trust, and 
furthermore this was not incidental to the role, but something which was intended and 
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conducive to the role being successfully fulfilled.
393
  It was foreseen by the employing 
authorities and considered a benefit that parishioners should look up to their priest; in 
Jacobi she had expressed the same way about young people and a coach or mentor, 
fostering trust and respect was part of the role.  But in Jacobi McLachlin was in the minority, 
and Binnie J who gave the leading judgement stated: 
‘The liability of the club cannot be determined solely on the basis of the subjective reaction 
of the victim.  There is no suggestion that an ordinary girl of Jody’s age and background, 
knowing the nature of Griffith’s employment as an organizer of after school recreation, 
would have considered that he had “god-like” job created status’.394 
He also noted with approval United Kingdom case law which had affirmed: 
‘The need to relate the victim’s impressions to some objective inducement, express or 
implied, by the employer’.395 
However, interestingly, McLachlin CJ found herself again in the majority, and in agreement 
with Binnie J in the subsequent case of KLB v British Columbia.396  In that case she held that 
the state was not vicariously liable for the actions of foster parents, as there was insufficient 
control, and the independence of the foster family was essential to the government goal of 
providing family care.
397
  The fact that the State deliberately placed foster parents in a 
position of great power over vulnerable children was not in itself enough.  Although the 
court was not unanimous in this reasoning, Arbour J gave a strong dissenting judgement, 
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arguing that foster parents do act on behalf of the government
398
 and emphasising the 
power given to them.
399
  It may or may not have influenced both judges that the argument 
was academic, given that all agreed that the claim was statute barred for limitation reasons. 
However, the differing outcomes of Jacobi, KLB and John Doe, and the significantly different 
analyses of the judgements involved, do demonstrate an employer’s liability for 
unauthorised deliberate wrong-doing carried out for the personal gratification of an 
employee is complex and fact specific.  This kind of case will always be on the margins of 
vicarious liability.   
It is therefore puzzling that Ward LJ did not address the important factual differences 
between John Doe and JGE in his otherwise thorough and extensive judgement, if only to 
explain why he concluded that they were not material.  What were the similarities which 
established a sufficient link between the enterprise of the bishop and the conduct of the 
priest?  This would be particularly helpful for future courts and litigants faced with non-
Roman Catholic clergy, attempting to assess whether a sufficient connection could be 
established within a different church structure. 
However, Ward LJ did go on to note recent United Kingdom case law establishing that more 
than one party may be held vicariously liable for the actions of the same tortfeasor.
400
  
These cases demonstrate that vicarious liability can apply in circumstances where there is 
no standard employment relationship between the principal and the tortfeasor.   Such 
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instances generally concern ‘borrowed’ employees, who were effectively acting under the 
direction of more than one party at the time of the tort.
401
 
Ward LJ then considered the underlying reasons of principle for the imposition of vicarious 
liability, ultimately concluding that it was born out of a mixture of policy considerations.
402
 
Furthermore, he noted that whilst understanding that policy was key to understanding legal 
development, the law needed to proceed on the basis of principle rather than expediency if 
it was to be coherent.
403
  He therefore when on to attempt to establish and set out the 
principles governing this area, in an effort to determine whether vicarious liability could 
properly apply in the case of a Roman Catholic priest. 
Citing an academic article by Richard Kidner,
404
 Ward LJ set out five signposts for vicarious 
liability, and analysed the relationship between priest and bishop against them.  The 
signposts were: 1) Control by the employer of the employee; 2) Control by the contractor of 
himself; 3) The organisation test: how far is the activity of the employee central to the 
employer’s business in relation to its objective?; 4) The integration test-how far is the 
activity of the employee integrated into the organisational structure of the enterprise?; and 
5) Is the person in business on his own account?
405
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On the basis of the above, Ward LJ concluded that it was proper for vicarious liability to 
apply.
406
  Although the relationship was akin to employment rather than employment, 
enough of the signposts were pointing in the right direction.  Whilst the control exercised by 
the bishop was not that of a conventional employment, parish priests were subject both to 
canon law and Episcopal direction, authority and sanction.
407
  Ultimately Ward LJ found that 
there was little difference between the control exercised by a bishop over a priest and a 
health trust over a surgeon: 
‘neither is told how to do the job but both can be told how not to do it’.408 
Ward LJ then described the ecclesiology of the Roman Catholic Church in the following 
terms for the purposes of the organisation test: 
‘Translating that into secular language, there is an organisation called the Roman Catholic 
Church with the Pope in the head office, with its “regional offices” with their appointed 
bishops and with “local branches”, the parishes with their appointed priests.  This looks like a 
business and operates like a business.  Its objective is to spread the word of God.  The priest 
has a central role in meeting that target.’409 
With regard to the integration test, the parish priest was found to be wholly integrated into 
the organisational structure of the Church’s enterprise.
410
  As far as the entrepreneur test 
was concerned, on balance the priest was found to be more like an employee than an 
independent contractor.  Even though his income came from collections at Mass rather than 
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a salary, he was required by canon law to reside in the parochial house, which looked like an 
employee making use of his employer’s tools of the trade.
411
 
In summary: 
‘I distilled the essence of being an employee to be that he is paid a wage or salary to work 
under some, even if only slight, control of his employer in his employer’s business for that 
business.  Father Baldwin may not quite match every facet of being an employee by in my 
judgement he is very close to it indeed.’412 
This however was not in itself sufficient for vicarious liability to be imposed; in Ward LJ’s 
view, it also had to be ‘just and fair’ to it to apply.
413
  He supported the conclusion that it 
was in two ways.  Firstly by recourse to the man on the fictional Clapham omnibus, who 
would see the priest as a servant of the parish.
414
  But secondly, and Ward LJ considered 
more importantly, on the basis of a hypothetical scenario.
415
 
Ward LJ posed the question of a priest riding a bicycle to administer the last rites, as he was 
bound to do by canon law.  Suppose that he negligently injured somebody on a pedestrian 
crossing; the priest is uninsured and has taken a vow of poverty;
416
 would it really be right to 
conclude that the injured party had not right to recover against the bishop or the diocese?  
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Ward LJ emphatically thought not.
417
  However, this conclusion highlights a problem with his 
analysis.  Having satisfied himself that the abusive priest was in a relationship akin to 
employment, Ward LJ did not go on to explain why his conduct in sexually abusing children 
was so closely related to the duties within the scope of the quasi-employment relationship 
as to make the imposition of vicarious liability appropriate.  Presumably Roman Catholic 
bishops cannot be liable for every tortious action committed by their parish clergy, so where 
do the boundaries lie, how can a connection and enterprise risk be established?  In Maga 
the priest had a special brief for Evangelism and youth work, which was a significant factor 
in the court concluding that the bishop was liable for his actions in abusing a minor whom 
he had befriended.
418
  Therefore in Maga it was clear that the priestly status of the abuser 
did not confer a duty of care towards the world at large, and the fact that his senior 
colleague was aware of the potential risk was important. But what was it about the 
circumstances in JGE that justified the imposition of liability?   
To say that bishops are potentially vicariously liable for the actions of their clergy does not 
answer the question of which actions and when.  What if a priest were to commit a sexual 
assault whilst in plain clothes and on holiday, and in place where no-one was aware of his 
clerical status?  Presumably the bishop would not be liable in such an instance.  So what are 
the factors needed to establish the necessary nexus between his duties and the assault? 
Ironically the supposedly uncontroversial example given by Ward LJ of a bicycle accident 
illustrates the problem very well.  Perhaps if the priest is rushing to administer sacraments 
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to the dying that is fairly clear, as Ward LJ noted it is required of him by canon law.
419
 Also at 
the other end of the spectrum it may be quite simple.  If a priest crashes into someone on 
his bicycle whilst visiting his best friend on his day off, outside of his parish boundaries, then 
it seems clear that his bishop will not be liable.  The accident in no way related to his duties 
or the ‘enterprise’ of the diocese.   
However, what about a case somewhere between these two extremes?  But priests do not 
have set working hours or specific duties.  What of a priest on a journey into town, planning 
to buy his sister a birthday present and intending to visit a housebound parishioner if he has 
time before the evening mass.  Will the bishop be liable for an accident on that journey?   Or 
supposing priest rides off to the supermarket, intending to buy food for himself and some 
biscuits and crayons for the Sunday school, he negligently crashes into a pedestrian on the 
way home, and as his shopping spills onto the tarmac he realises that he forgot the crayons 
and biscuits after all.  Was the journey related to his duties?  Is the bishop liable?  Nothing in 
the judgement of Ward LJ really assists in reaching a conclusion. 
Some of these difficulties were eluded to in the dissenting judgement given by Tomlinson LJ.  
He observed that it would have been easier for the claimant to have established liability if 
the abusive priest had been given some responsibility for the home in which she had been 
resident was when the abuse took place, or special care or oversight for the order of nuns 
who ran it.
420
 The link between his duties and the alleged abuse was unclear.  Furthermore 
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he also expressed disquiet about characterising the priest as being in a relationship akin to 
employment, especially on the basis of John Doe.421  
Tomlinson LJ noted the extreme and unusual geographical and social context of that case,
422
 
and also some confusion in the judgement.  It was not clear which elements of the power, 
which the priest in the Canadian case of Doe so terribly abused, were conferred by his 
appointment as an agent or quasi-employee of the diocese, and which flowed from his 
status as an ordained priest.
423
  Put slightly differently, a priest is always a priest, whatever 
he is doing and whenever he is doing it, ordination is a permanent state and if valid never 
becomes invalid.
424
  However, this is very different from stating that every action 
undertaken by a priest is pursuant to the particular appointment or office which he occupies 
at the time in question.  Therefore, which actions are and actions are not within or related 
to the duties conferred by a particular appointment are key to the question of vicarious 
liability. 
Tomlinson LJ also expressed his dissatisfaction with transposing the concepts of ‘enterprise’ 
and ‘benefit’ into a church context, as it was difficult to say that the priest was acting for the 
benefit of the bishop, and a commonality of interest is not sufficient to constitute an 
enterprise.
425
 Furthermore, the Maga case was distinguishable from the present litigation 
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precisely because employment and all the assumptions accompanying it were accepted 
without question in Maga.426 
Although he agreed with Ward LJ in dismissing the appeal, Davies LJ considered that the 
analysis in John Doe427 related to the status conferred by ordination to the priesthood rather 
than arising from appointment as priest of a parish.  Therefore, it was not his appointment 
to that particular parish which generated the risk.  He also doubted the appropriateness of 
the trial judge in the present case having been influenced by it to possibly conclude that 
placing a priest into a community was a ‘risky enterprise’.
428
 
However, Davies LJ did accept that there was a quasi-employment relationship.
429
  The 
priest is appointed and entrusted to further the bishop’s aims and purposes.
430
  In addition, 
where a bishop is repeatedly warned of the misconduct of a parish priest, it would be odd if 
his legal duty to investigate and take action had no real content because he was held to 
have no power to take action.
431
 
Unlike Tomlinson LJ, Davies LJ regarded Fr Baldwin’s duties as parish priest to visit and care 
for those within his parish constituting a sufficient connection between his appointed role 
and the alleged abuse.
432
 There was no need to have recourse to the problematic concepts 
of benefit or enterprise; in visiting the residential home he was carrying out the duties of 
the role to which he was appointed. 
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Taken together the three judgements demonstrate how little current judicial consensus 
there is in this area.  The current state of the JGE litigation appears to establish that a 
Roman Catholic bishop is vicariously liable for the actions of his parish priests in carrying out 
the duties to which they are appointed.  However, which actions relate to those duties 
remains unclear, particularly in relation to sexual abuse.   
2.3 (c) EL v Children’s Society 
Another recent case in this sphere is EL v Children’s Society.433 It concerned abuse which 
took place in a residential home run by a Church of England charity.
434
  The charity 
employed a couple to live in and run one of their homes along family lines, with the 
intention that they became parental figures for the children in their care (in fact the term 
‘house-parents’ was used by the Children’s Society).
435
  Their son Frank lived with them, 
initially full-time and afterwards during breaks from national service and university.  He 
admitted to having abused the claimant and other boys living at the home in the 1950s.  
After his death his estate settled a claim from the claimant, who continued to pursue the 
defendant for vicarious liability.
436
   
 In considering this claim Haddon-Cave J made reference to Lord Millet’s dicta on risk in 
Lister,437 and went on to state that a two-stage was required to determine vicarious liability: 
1) was the relationship between the Defendant and the tortfeasor such that vicarious 
liability should apply; and 2) was there a connection between the Defendant and the act or 
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omission of the tortfeasor in question?  The court is required to make a judgement on a 
synthesis of these two factors. 
On the facts it was found that the claim for vicarious liability failed because not only was 
Frank not an employee of the defendant, it had not been established that he was ever 
officially or unofficially left in charge of the house and children.
438
  Frank had no duties 
conferred on him by the Children’s Society.  Although his parents had authority to engage 
suitable third parties to deputise for them at a daily-rate, Frank would not have been 
regarded as a suitable person and was not so engaged.
439
   
Furthermore, it was accepted by the claimant that when the instances of abuse took place, 
Frank’s parents were at home and he was not in even the most casual or temporary charge 
of the household.
440
  The only real status or position which Frank had was an ‘air of 
authority’441 conferred on him by being son of the House-parents.  
Taken as a whole, therefore, ‘The evidence does not begin to satisfy the fact sensitive tests 
of vicarious liability in Lister and Various Claimants.  Indeed, the evidence, if anything, points 
to a conclusion of positive non-employment of Frank Bibby by the Defendant’.442 
Haddon Cave J also concluded that the claim was time-barred, and that it would not be 
appropriate to exercise discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.
443
  Therefore 
a full trial did not take place in this case.  This is also relevant because the length of time 
since the events took place made gathering and assessing evidence on vicarious liability 
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extremely difficult.  Nevertheless, there are a number of issues which can be drawn out of 
the judge’s approach to this question. 
The ‘fact sensitive’ test was concerned with closeness of connection rather than risk, and 
once again there is a difficulty in identifying precise factors which led to the judge’s finding.  
The dicta that the evidence pointed to, if anything, ‘a positive non-employment’ 444 of Frank 
Bibby is particularly hard to understand, given that in light of Various Claimants 
employment status is not a determinative factor in vicarious liability.  The court appeared to 
mistakenly assume a need to establish an employment relationship.  In Various Claimants 
(see discussion above) the brothers could well be described as ‘positively not employed’ by 
the Institute, as remuneration flowed from them to the Institute rather than the other way 
around.  Nevertheless considered as a whole, the relationship was one to which vicarious 
liability was found to attach.  In over emphasising the employment dimension, the court did 
not consider the facts as holistically as it might have done. 
Because of the long lapse of time, and death of all of the Biddy family, much of the evidence 
about what the Defendant did came from its official policies and handbook.  But as a non-
human person, the defendant could not do anything without acting through human agents.  
Frank’s mother and father were two such human agents, and there was little direct and 
reliable evidence about how they used Frank and the status which they accorded him.  Had 
the evidence been available, and had an enterprise risk approach been taken, it is possible 
that vicarious liability might have been established regardless of Frank’s lacking 
employment status. 
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As in the Bazley case, the enterprise was concerned with caring for children in a residential 
setting and attempting to provide a substitute family environment.  The enterprise, acting 
through the two House-parents, chose to achieve this by allowing other adult members of 
their immediate family informal and unsupervised access to the children in their care, as 
would be the case in most biological families.  In bonding appropriately with the children, 
Frank would have been furthering the aims of the enterprise by helping to provide a quasi-
familial environment.   
If an enterprise is prepared to use an adult to further its aims, why should it automatically 
be absolved from vicarious liability simply because no employment relationship existed?  
Employment status is not a requirement for vicarious liability.  As the Canadian courts 
argued, an enquiry focused on risk shifts any analysis away from semantics about scope of 
employment and onto the defendant.  What risks did the defendant create or enhance with 
its enterprise?     By allowing various adults unfettered access to the children in pursuance 
of their aims, the defendants in EL created the risk that the children would be abused. 
But as with Maga the position in EL was complicated further by culpability on the part of the 
defendants.  Had the case been brought in time, and had the relevant evidence therefore 
been available available, it might well have been possible to establish that the Mr and Mrs 
Bibby failed to appropriately oversee their son’s interaction with the children, and that this 
failure was negligent and a direct rather than vicarious claim could have been made.  
Furthermore, although not relevant to the instant case, the defendants were aware of 
separate allegations of sexual abuse by Mr Bibby senior.
445
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In addition to negligence and wrong-doing by Mr and Mrs Biddy in the house, there was 
evidence that the charity had been negligent at an institutional level.  One former employee 
who worked in the house gave evidence that she had been concerned about the regime 
there, and wrote to the charity’s headquarters asserting that Mr Bibby senior was violent 
and that the children were afraid of him.  Rather than investigating this claim, the response 
of the charity was to write to Mr Bibby, who responded by dismissing the employee.
446
 
Because of the evidentiary difficulties and the limitation issues, the question was academic 
in this case.  But it is submitted that had a full trial been possible, as in Maga, it would have 
been more appropriate to focus on negligence on the part of the defendant (arising both 
from the negligence of Mr and Mrs Biddy in failing to monitor their son’s contact with the 
children, and also from the Children Society’s failure to investigate when concerns were 
raised by third parties about the conduct of the Biddys in their role as house-parents) than 
vicarious liability for trespass.  Where a principal has been negligent, there is no need to 
introduce the complexity of vicarious liability.   
Furthermore, stretching the law of vicarious liability to spare apparently deserving claimants 
the difficulty and trauma of establishing negligence on the part a culpable defendant (as 
arguably happened in Maga and could potentially have happened in EL v Children’s Society) 
will not produce good precedent for future cases in which employers and quasi-employers 
are less culpable. 
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2.3 (d) Various Claimants-Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court demonstrated a move back towards highlighting the significance of risk 
in this context, in a decision which reversed that of the Court of Appeal set out above.
447
  
The Supreme Court held that the Institute was vicariously liable for criminal assaults 
committed by brothers working as teachers.  However, they did not abandon the test and 
language of close connection; rather they emphasised the creation of risk as a significant 
factor in establishing such a connection.   Neither did they adopt the term ‘enterprise risk’ 
from the Canadian authorities, nor provide clear guidance as to what actually constitutes 
creating a risk. 
The only substantial judgement was given by Lord Phillips, with the assent of Lady Hale, Lord 
Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lord Carnwath.  He noted that ‘the law of vicarious liability is on the 
move’,448 and provided an overview of the issues, summarising recent developments with 
the following propositions: 
i) It is possible for an unincorporated association to be vicariously liable for the 
torts of its members. 
ii) D2 may be vicariously liable for the tortious act of D1 even though the act in 
question constitutes a violation of the duty owed to D2 by D1 and even if the act 
in question is a criminal offence. 
iii) Vicarious liability can even extend to liability for a criminal act of sexual assault. 
iv) It is possible for two difference defendants, D2 and D3, each to be vicariously 
liable for the single tortious act of D1. 
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None of the propositions in points i) to iv) above were new, rather than were an attempt to 
encapsulate the legal position which had emerged from recent case law.  He also adopted 
the two stage test outlined by Hughes LJ at para 37 of his judgement in the Various 
Claimants litigation in the Court of Appeal, and affirmed the requirement for there to be a 
synthesis between the two stages.
449
  However, he differed from Hughes LJ in his 
understanding of the second stage.  He accepted Hughes LJ understanding that stage one 
involves assessing whether the relationship between D1 and D2 one which is capable of 
giving rise to vicarious liability. 
Lord Phillips declined to follow Hughes LJ with regard to the second stage.  Hughes LJ 
described this as an examination of the connection between D2 and D1, and the act or 
omission of D.  In contrast Lord Phillips explained it as follows: 
‘What is critical at the second stage is the connection that links the relationship between D1 
and D2 [my emphasis] and the act or omission of D1, hence the synthesis between the two 
stages’450 
In the instance case both stages were in issue.  It was necessary to establish whether the 
relationship between the Institute (the brotherhood as a whole, an unincorporated 
association in UK secular law) and the individual brothers teaching in one particular school 
was capable of giving rise to vicarious liability.  The Institute argued, and the Court of Appeal 
had agreed, that the relationship of individual brothers to the Institute was insufficiently 
close to give rise to vicarious liability for sexual abuse.
451
  
                                                           
449
 Ibid, para 21. 
450
 Ibid. 
451
 Ibid, para 23. 
130 
 
Lord Phillips acknowledged that he could understand the difficulty which Hughes LJ had had 
with accepting that individual brothers on the other side of the world could be vicariously 
liable for sexual assaults committed in an English school.
452
  However, counsel for the 
Institute had not taken any point on the nature of the Institute before the Supreme Court; 
and Lord Phillips in any case regarded theoretical arguments about its nature to be a long 
way from the ‘realities’ of the case; in his view the critical issue would be access to funds 
held by trusts and insurance cover of trustees.
453
 
In other words, there might be practical difficulties in extracting money from brothers and 
funds outside of the jurisdiction, but this was not relevant.   There were funds within the 
jurisdiction which potential claimants could look to if successful in bringing a claim and 
these were held by entities with legal personality.
454
   
This pragmatic approach by Lord Phillips arguably makes good sense in relation to financial 
reality.  If claimants are able to enforce judgement against a legal entity with funds in the 
UK, any theoretical difficulties or opportunities relating to enforcing against different 
entities abroad, could well be viewed as an unhelpful distraction.  However, the logic of this 
position is less easily defensible in relation to matters of principle and justice. 
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Lord Phillips asserted that the Institute was not a contemplative order, and that the reason 
for its existence was to carry on the activity of teaching.
455
  But this is a somewhat simplistic 
analysis of the De La Salle brotherhood.  Their self-understanding is not that they are a 
group of men engaged on a joint enterprise to provide a certain sort of education.  The 
brothers see themselves as living out their particular vocation to the religious life; this 
involves community, chastity, obedience, evangelism and work in Christian education.
456
  
The Institute does not straightforwardly exist to provide education, in the same way that a 
secular charity might conceivably exist simply for the purpose of helping retired donkeys or 
saving a particular piece of woodland.  The object of the brotherhood is not solely to 
provide education, but a relational context in which the brothers can live out their vocation 
and spirituality. 
It is potentially problematic to say that all endeavours which might come within the ambit 
of the brothers’ vocation are acts done to further a joint enterprise.  Much the same issue 
exists as discussed about in relation to priests; it is very difficult to discern which activities 
constitute acts done in an individual’s capacity as a brother and might be defined as actions 
done purely on the individual’s own behalf.  It is doubtful in either case that Roman Catholic 
priests or lay brothers would recognise the distinction as meaningful, as defining some 
aspects of life as spiritual and others as non-spiritual is inconsistent with Roman Catholic 
theology and Canon Law.
457
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Taking a concrete example, evangelism is a key part of the mission and vocation of the De La 
Salle brotherhood.
458
  Imagine a case in which a lay teaching colleague invites a brother to 
the christening of his infant daughter and to the party afterwards: both events take place 
within the school where the brother works.  Attending the post-service gathering could 
reasonably be interpreted as an opportunity to make contacts and evangelise, much as the 
priest in Maga was said to be engaged in evangelism whilst discussing his sports car with a 
young boy.
459
   Whilst at the party, he gets into an argument about religion with an 
aggressive atheist, the discussion becomes heated and the brother throws a punch.  Would 
the Institute be liable for this trespass?  Or suppose that the brother spills hot tea over a 
fellow guest or drops a heavy tray of sausage rolls on their foot; are the institute liable in 
negligence for personal injury?  However these questions are answered, the conclusion is 
problematic in relation to Lord Phillips' analysis.   
If they are answered in the affirmative (and this would be the logical conclusion from his 
reasoning, and the broad brush approach which he took to the purposes of the Institute) 
then where can the line reasonably be drawn?  What if a brother went into a pub of his own 
accord, had a similar argument and hit somebody, would liability still attach?   The mission 
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of the Institute and vocation of the brothers is so wide and all encompassing that more or 
less any activity will be covered.  Effectively the brotherhood would all be liable for all torts 
committed by one of their brethren.   
This kind of liability has long since been abandoned in relation to husbands and wives.
460
  If 
the spiritual commitments and promises in the marriage service do not leave the parties 
mutually legally responsible in tort, why should the vows of lay brothers be treated 
differently?  There are possible Human Rights Act objections to imposing legal burdens on 
individuals whose religious convictions and lifestyle choices lead them to devote themselves 
to a celibate community which are considerably greater than those imposed upon 
individuals who commit themselves to marriage or civil partnership.
461
 
Article 8 of the ECHR confers a right to respect for private and family life and as discussed 
above Article 9 confers a right to freedom of conscience, belief and religion.  Furthermore, 
Article 14 prohibits discrimination with respect to Convention rights on a number of 
grounds, including on religious belief.   
If therefore, individuals who choose to order their private and family life around a celibate 
community rather than a sexual partnership are subjected to burdens (i.e. liability in tort) 
not placed upon adults opting for marriage or civil partnership, then there is the possibility 
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of a claim under Article 8, possibly in conjunction with Article 14.  In addition, in choosing to 
live as part of a celibate brotherhood the members of the Institute are manifesting their 
religious beliefs.  Consequently, there is also the potential for a claim under Article 9, again 
either freestanding or in conjunction with Article 14. 
If however the Institute would not be liable for the actions of an individual brother at a 
Christening party or in a pub, then that leaves the question of which activities would be 
covered by the vicarious liability of the Institute.  In this case, clearly not all activities which 
could plausibly be said to be within the scope of the brothers' vocations or the Institute's 
mission and purposes are within the ambit of the vicarious liability.  Having made this 
concession, it is no longer easy to see why brothers working in a different school (and 
possibly on a different continent) are construed as being engaged in a joint enterprise with 
brothers teaching elsewhere, purely because they are providing education which is one 
element of the Institute's mission. 
Is it truly fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious liability on the whole Institute in these 
circumstances?   This question is especially pertinent when it is remembered that there was 
no danger of vulnerable claimants being left without a remedy if such liability was not 
imposed.  In the instant case, there was no doubt that the secular employer was vicariously 
liable; indeed the claimants were content to recover from the employer.  In almost all 
circumstances in which a brother teaching in a school committed a sexual assault on a pupil, 
the institution which employed him in secular law, and/or the institution which owned and 
managed the school in secular law, would be vicariously liable for the tort.  Both such 
institutions (if different) would need to have legal personality, assets and insurance in order 
to fulfil these functions.  Consequently, failing to find the Institute vicariously liable would 
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not have left claimants either without an action, or without an action against a defendant 
with assets and insurance. 
However, regardless of the merits, Lord Phillips made the finding which he did, and went on 
to consider the essentials of a relationship giving rise to vicarious liability.  He identified the 
policy objective underlying vicarious liability as being to ensure, as far as fair, just and 
reasonable, that liability for tortious wrong is borne by a defendant who amongst other 
things has the means to compensate the victim.
462
  He did not however engage with the 
point that in the case before him (and realistically in similar future cases involving religious 
orders teaching in schools) the claimants would have an alternative defendant with 
sufficient means to pay any costs and damages which might be awarded.  Any organisation 
owning and running a school and employing teachers would have legal personality, assets 
and insurance. 
Lord Phillips then went on to consider the issue of control in vicarious liability, reiterating 
that in contemporary law control requires an employer to be able to direct what an 
employee does, not how he or she might do it.
463
  However, he did not regard the way in 
which the doctrine of control had been applied in some judgments relating to dual vicarious 
liability as either correct or helpful.
464
  In the Mersey Docks case May LJ (at para 16) found 
that where there was potential for dual vicarious liability, the court should consider who 
had responsibility to prevent the negligent act; who was entitled to give orders as to how 
the work should or should not be done?
465
  In contrast, Rix LJ reached the same conclusion 
as May LJ, but via a different route.  He questioned whether the doctrine of vicarious 
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liability, designed for the benefit of claimants was about control.  Instead, the relevant 
question was whether the employee was so much a part of the work, business or 
organisation of both employers as to make it just for them to answer for his or her 
negligence.
466
   
Lord Phillips preferred the analysis of Rix LJ.
467
  He even questioned whether the subsequent 
decisions of the Court of Appeal in Hawley v Luminar Leisure and Biffa Waste Services might 
have had a different outcome if the court had followed Rix LJ rather than May LJ.
468
  In both 
of those cases the court found that on the facts only one defendant was vicariously liable, 
but Lord Phillips suggested that if an integration test rather than a control test had been 
applied a finding of dual vicarious liability might have been reached. Given that vicarious 
liability is not based upon any fault, it might be argued that spreading the compensation 
load is just where there is genuinely joint employment and responsibility for the tortfeasor. 
Turning to the issue of the relationship between the Institute and individual brothers, Lord 
Phillips again rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in having distinguished the 
present case from JGE (which concerned the relationship between a Roman Catholic priest 
and his bishop).
469
  He found that the relationship between brothers and the Institute had 
many of the ‘all the essential elements’ for the purposes of vicarious liability of an 
employment relationship.
470
  He listed these as follows: 
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i) The Institute was divided into a hierarchical structure and conducted its activities 
as if it were a corporate body. 
ii) The teaching activity was conducted by the brothers because their superior in 
the order directed them to do this; the secular employment contracts with the 
other defendants would not have existed but for this direction. 
iii) The teaching activity was undertaken in furtherance of the objective or mission 
of the Institute. 
iv) The manner in which the brother teachers were obliged to conduct themselves 
as teachers was dictated by the Institute’s rules.  (Of course their behaviour was 
also governed by the rules and procedures of the schools, but Lord Philips did not 
address the implications or significance of this in any detail.  Questions like what 
would have been in the position in the event of a conflict between the rules of 
the school and the commands or rules of the Institute were not considered.  
Neither was the relevance of the fact that the relationship which the brothers 
had with the school was enforceable in secular contract law, whist their 
relationship with the Institute was not).  
Lord Phillips did acknowledge two key differences between the relationship and 
employment, namely that it was governed by vows rather than contract, and that rather 
than being paid by the Institute, the brothers transferred their earnings to it.
471
  However, 
he did not consider either of these differences to be material, and in fact regarded them as 
rendering the relationship between the brothers closer than that of employer and 
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employee.
472
 
There are a number of problems with this assessment.  It is far from clear that points ii) to 
iv) are necessarily and obviously points which make the brothers’ relationship with the 
Institute akin to employment rather than akin to a private spiritual or social arrangement, 
such as marriage or membership of a club.   And in any case, given that employment is not 
an absolute requirement for vicarious liability, it is questionable as to why this should have 
been such a dominant focus. 
Point ii) appears to relate to the brothers’ motivation for entering into secular employment 
contracts, namely that of having received instructions from their Superior in the order.  
However, those instructions would not have force in secular law, the brothers being bound 
to the Institute by their vows rather than contract law, as Lord Phillips himself 
acknowledged.
473
  Why should a private, spiritual arrangement between individuals give rise 
to liability in civil law in this particular context, when such arrangements are not ordinarily 
within the ambit of secular jurisdiction?  Consider for instance a couple had married using a 
form of vows which required obedience on the part of the wife, who both supported this 
ideological stance.  An obvious example would be the BCP 1662.
474
   
As discussed above, husbands are no longer liable for the tortious conduct of their wives.  
Even if a husband instructed his wife to take a particular job, or the couple both regarded 
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working in a certain field as part of a shared vocation, for example as missionaries, there is 
no reason to suppose that the general doctrine would be reversed.  In fact the legislation 
which released husbands from liability for their wives was passed at a time in the BCP 1662 
marriage service requiring wifely obedience remained the only form of words offered by the 
Church of England.
475
  Therefore, had the promise of obedience affected the legal position 
some provision would surely have been made for it, given that it formed part of the form of 
service of the established church.  So why was a private, spiritual promise requiring 
obedience on the part of an order of lay brothers so clearly and obviously different from a 
private, spiritual promise requiring obedience by a wife? 
Point iii) is similar in many ways.   It appears that Lord Phillips is here categorising teaching 
as part of the ‘enterprise’ of the Institute (although he explicitly did not adopt the word 
‘enterprise’ from the Canadian cases).  Presumably in order to demonstrate that the 
conduct giving rise to the tort was undertaken in furtherance of this enterprise.  However, 
this is only relevant if the Institute is categorised in institutional rather than relational terms.  
Are the vows of the brothers binding them to a collective enterprise, or are they sacred 
promises to adopt a shared lifestyle and pursue connected vocations?  In other words, do 
the brothers understand themselves to be engaged in a joint project of Christian education, 
or supporting one another in their common but individual vocations in this field?  Only if the 
former analysis is adopted rather than the latter does Lord Phillip’s third point become 
relevant.    
Exactly the same logic applies to the fourth point.  The rules of the Institute do not just 
                                                           
475
 Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935. 
140 
 
cover the teaching activities of the brothers, but to the whole of their lives and lifestyle.
476
  
Exactly the same point could be made in relation to marriage vows.  These cover behaviour 
in the home, workplace and everywhere else.  If they affect how a person functions they 
necessarily affect how they conduct themselves at work, but they do not generate vicarious 
liability. 
So, therefore, everything hinges on the first point.  On the facts the Supreme Court decided 
that the Institute conducted its affairs as if it were a corporate body, and had a hierarchical 
structure which supported and enabled this endeavour.   There is scope to question how fair 
and accurate this analysis was, and little reasoning is given to support it.  Presumably, 
however, this will be a significant question for other religious orders in a similar situation; 
do they function as a corporate body with a shared and identifiable mission?  Otherwise it is 
hard to see how or why they should be differentiated from other private arrangements and 
commitments between individuals.   
The Supreme Court concluded that the brothers were effectively teaching for the Institute, 
even though it did not employ them.  Again it is not clear where or how the line will be 
drawn in future cases.  What about religious orders with a more general mission, and with 
members in secular employment to support themselves and their brothers or sisters?  Was 
the fact that the brothers were part of a teaching order and committed the torts whilst 
teaching critical?  As it stands the Various Claimants judgement has apparently widened the 
scope of vicarious liability without clearly indicating where its boundaries might lie. 
This is further demonstrated by an apparently casual but critical point made by Lord Phillips 
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at paragraph 61.  After such a lengthy discussion he proceeded to briefly adopt an 
alternative analysis: 
‘Provided that a brother was acting for the common purpose of the brothers as an 
unincorporated association, the relationship between them would be sufficient to satisfy 
stage 1, just as in the case of action be a member of a partnership.  Had one of the brothers 
injured a pedestrian when negligently driving a vehicle owned by the Institute in order to 
collect groceries for the community few would question that the Institute was vicariously 
liable for his tort.’ 
This perfectly illustrates the points discussed above about the scope of liability within 
religious communities.  Suppose the example given by Lord Phillips is tweaked very slightly; 
what if the brother set out on foot but chose to borrow a friend’s bicycle?  What if he forgot 
to buy bread for the Institute but went off for a bicycle joyride on a summer evening and ran 
into a pedestrian?  What if he was using a third party’s car but driving with insurance paid 
for by the Institute?  Again there is the undesirability of rendering his brothers liable for 
everything which he might do amiss in the eyes of secular law on the one hand, and the 
impossibility of providing coherent guidance as to which actions should properly be 
excluded from liability on the other. 
But whatever the weaknesses may be identified in his argument, there is no doubt that Lord 
Phillips held that the connection between the brothers and the Institute was sufficient to 
justify the imposition of vicarious liability.  He therefore went on to consider whether in the 
circumstances it was appropriate to impose liability for sexual abuse. 
In this context Lord Phillips did specifically note the importance of the employer or quasi-
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employer having created or ‘significantly enhanced’ a risk to the victims.
477
  It was essential 
that the employer or quasi employer had a relationship with the abuser which put him or 
her in a position to: 
a) carry on the employer’s business or further its interests, and; 
b) did so in a manner which created or significantly increased the risk of the victims 
suffering the relevant abuse.
478
  
If this was the case then Lord Phillips asserted that there would necessarily be a strong 
causative link between the close connection and the acts of abuse.  He stated that creation 
of risk was not merely a policy consideration, but one of the criteria for establishing a close 
connection.
479
   Whilst creation of risk was not of itself sufficient to give risk to vicarious 
liability ‘it is always likely to be an important element in the facts which give rise to such 
liability’.480 
Consequently, the current position in UK law appears to be that the ‘close connection’ test 
encompasses the ‘enterprise risk’ test, but goes beyond it.  Lord Phillips did not specify what 
additional elements must be found as well as enterprise risk if the close connection test is to 
be established, or the way in which the Canadian concept of ‘enterprise risk’ and the UK 
concept of ‘close connection’ interrelate.  This is regrettable, as it leaves scope of continued 
uncertainty in future cases. 
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On the facts the Supreme Court had no hesitation in finding that the close connection test 
was satisfied.  The relationship between the Institute and the brothers was much closer to 
employment than that of the bishop and priest in the JGE case, and the mission and 
business of the Institute was common to every brother in it.
481
    According to Lord Phillips 
the business and mission was the provision of a Christian education to boys, and all brothers 
joined and remained members of the Institute to further this
482
. 
In this instance the Institute placed the brothers in cloistered accommodation on school 
premises alongside very vulnerable boys.
483
  They were vulnerable because they were in a 
school, ‘virtually prisoners’ within a school, in addition their personal histories made it 
unlikely that their complaints would be believed if they attempted to disclose their abuse.
484
  
The Supreme Court found that this was not a borderline case, but that in all circumstances it 
was fair, just and reasonable for the Institute to be held vicariously liable for the abusive 
and tortious conduct of the brothers.
485
 
However, it is submitted that overall the analysis of the Court of Appeal was to be preferred.  
It was far from clear that the evidence demonstrated that the members of the Institute 
were genuinely engaged in a shared enterprise, rather than fulfilling their personal 
vocations within the shared framework of their order.  Furthermore, there were secular 
employment contracts in place, and an employer who clearly was vicariously liable for their 
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abusive actions as teachers.   Once again, there was no need to stretch the boundaries of 
vicarious liability in order to provide a remedy for deserving claimants. 
2.3 (e) The combined impact of the Post Maga cases and the Close Connection Test in 
Current UK law 
Although UK courts since Lister have purported to endorse the decisions in Bazley and 
Jacobi, in reality the ‘close connection’ test adopted by Lord Steyn in Lister is different from 
the consideration of ‘enterprise risk’ which played a prominent part in the two Canadian 
decisions.  And although Lord Phillips in Vicarious Claimants did focus more on risk as an 
element of the close connection test, he did not elucidate how the two tests relate in 
practice.  As discussed above, something more than enterprise risk is required to satisfy the 
close connection test, but exactly what additional, mandatory elements are required 
remains uncertain.  
Whilst the appellate courts in Britain continue to refer to risk in analysing vicarious liability, 
they do not systematically look at the factors which may generate or enhance such risk, in a 
way comparable to that seen in the Canadian case law.   
Rather, they look for a ‘close connection’ without having any objective standard by which to 
measure such closeness.  The result is a less clear and predictable test. Two regrettable 
consequences have flowed from this: 1) a degree of confusion about the appropriate 
distinction between vicarious and direct liability in negligence; and 2) a continuing 
uncertainty about when vicarious liability will be established, particularly in relation to 
religious institutions. 
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The blurring of boundaries between vicarious and direct liability is illustrated by both Maga 
and EL v Children’s Society.  In both instances there were good reasons for the focus of the 
case to rest primarily on negligence by the principal, and yet this was not drawn out in the 
judgements.  This may partially be because seeking a ‘close connection’ between the tort 
and the principal ties the principal ‘closely’ to the misfeasance.  In contrast, asking ‘Did the 
enterprise carry an inherent risk of this kind of wrong doing’ is a more objective question.  
Risk may be inevitable and exist independently of any carelessness or poor practice.   
Following Lister and Maga confusion about the proper boundaries of vicarious liability is 
apparent in academic commentary as well as case law.  In an article on Maga and vicarious 
liability,
486
 Cranmer cites and discusses Webster v The Ridgeway Foundation School487 as a 
decision on vicarious liability.   This is striking as the case did not concern any question of 
vicarious liability, and the word ‘vicarious’ appears nowhere in the judgement. 
The first claimant was a schoolboy who got into an argument with another pupil.
488
  The two 
arranged a fight on school property after the end of the school day, deliberately choosing 
the tennis courts as an unobserved spot.  Unbeknown to the first claimant, his opponent 
contacted family members and friends to provide support, and a group of adults turned up 
at the tennis court.  One of these attacked the first claimant with a claw-hammer.  The first 
claimant attempted to sue the school for the injuries which he suffered; the other claimants 
were members of his immediate family who saw him lying in a pool of blood after the 
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attack, and attempted to sue the school for the post-traumatic stress disorder they suffered 
as a result.
489
  
Their claims were not founded upon any suggestion that the school was vicariously liable for 
the action of strangers with weapons.   Nichol J summarised the negligence claim as being in 
three parts: 1) that the school failed to take proper care to keep the site secure; 2) that the 
school was negligent in failing to do more to establish better discipline and deal more 
effectively with racial tensions; and 3) that the school should have done more to protect the 
first claimant on the date of the attack.
490
   
Thus all of the claims were based on a duties in negligence owed directly by the school to 
the first claimant.  The claimants pleaded that the third party attackers were a danger 
against which the defendants should have guarded the first claimant.  In that sense they 
were no different from a non-human danger, such as faulty electric wiring or a broken 
banister in the school building.    
In the event the claim failed, as the court found that whilst the school owed the first 
claimant a duty to take reasonable care to keep him reasonably safe whilst on school 
premises, they were not in breach of that duty.
491
 Furthermore in relation to many of the 
alleged omissions the claimants were not able to demonstrate a causal link between the 
alleged failing and the injury suffered.
492
  Although a factually complex case, it ultimately 
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turned upon the well established principles of negligence flowing from Donoghue v 
Stevenson493 and subsequent case law. 
At no stage did the claimants, defendants or the judicial analysis attempt to introduce the 
concept of vicarious liability.  This is unsurprising.  There is scope for debate about the most 
appropriate encapsulation of the legal test of the link between the defendant, the tortfeasor 
and the tort in the context of vicarious liability; however, there is no doubt that there must 
be a strong nexus must exist.  It is well established that a school will not be vicariously liable 
if an employee whose work does not involve direct contact with the children commits an 
assault.
494
  If they have been negligence in selection or supervision a school might be 
directly liable for an assault by a gardener, but it will not be vicariously liable. 
This being the case, it is impossible to see how they could be vicariously liable for an assault 
by a stranger and a trespasser.  Not only is there no employment or quasi-employment 
relationship, there is no relationship of any sort and no possible way of asserting that the 
tortious action or omission is somehow committed on behalf of the defendant. 
Therefore, given that the case which Cranmer cites to support his contention that vicarious 
liability for sexual assault is treated different from vicarious liability for non-sexual assault is 
in fact wholly unconnected with vicarious liability, the rest of his argument must fall.  
However, the very fact that he makes the argument is a worrying indication of the current 
confusion between direct and vicarious liability. 
The second unfortunate consequence of the way in which the law has developed from Lister 
onwards, is the continuing uncertainty about when vicarious liability will be established, 
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particularly in relation to religious institutions.  In going down the route of ‘close 
connection’ rather than focusing more consciously on ‘enterprise risk’ and the five factors 
set out in the Canadian cases, the higher UK courts have failed to provide clear guidance as 
to when vicarious liability will and will not apply.  The differing outcomes of Maga and 
Various Claimants at the Court of Appeal stage provide a good illustration of this, as does 
the contrast in approach between the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in Various 
Claimants.   
It is not suggested that there is any way to make this area of law simple, or that cases will 
ever be anything other than very fact specific.  The opposing outcomes of Bazley and Jacob,i 
and the way in which McLachlin J gave the leading judgement in the former and a dissenting 
judgement in the latter, demonstrate this eloquently.  Nevertheless, the Canadian emphasis 
on ‘enterprise risk’ and accompanying factors for consideration provide a useful judicial 
tool.  Risk factors can be listed and balanced more easily than the vague notion of a close 
relationship.  They can be set out in a way which makes it easier for future judges, litigants 
and commentators to identify their relationship to the facts and ratio of a case. 
It is submitted that it would be of practical benefit were the UK courts to model future 
judgements more closely on the two cases so warmly commended in Lister. It would provide 
greater guidance and certainty.  And it would also be wholly in keeping with earlier UK 
caselaw. 
The classic decision in Lloyd v Grace Smith & Co,495 which marked the beginning of the 
modern law of vicarious liability for intentional wrongdoing, could appropriately be analysed 
in terms of enterprise risk.  The case concerned a solicitor’s clerk who dishonestly induced 
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the widowed plaintiff to sign her property over to him, defrauding her all that possessed 
and leaving her a pauper.
496
  The court found that the employing solicitor should be 
vicariously liable, on that basis that he ‘carries on business under a style or firm which 
implies that unnamed persons are, or may be, included in its members.  Sandles [the 
dishonest clerk] speaks and acts as if he were one of the firm.  He points to the deed boxes in 
the room and tells her that they are quite safe in “our” hands.............Who is to suffer for this 
fraud?  The person who relied on Mr Smith’s accredited representative, or Mr Smith who put 
this rogue in his place and clothed him with authority?’.497 
The solicitor did business through his clerk; convincing clients to place faith in the firm was 
part of the clerk’s role, as was handling and safeguarding their documents.  An inherent risk 
in this was that the clerk might defraud a client in some way, especially when the firm had 
given him a responsible position and held him out as being trustworthy.  Some of the firm’s 
clients would inevitably be vulnerable and confused by legal documents or business 
matters, and would be particularly susceptible to an abuse of the clerk’s power.  The firm 
had therefore (albeit innocently) introduced the risk of them being defrauded by the 
confidence trickster clerk. 
Although this is a retrospective analysis being placed upon an old case, it does fit with the 
language used in the original judgement.  Lord Macnaghten emphasised the vulnerability of 
the client, the status conferred on the clerk and the way in which this induced the client to 
trust him.
498
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Therefore, it could be argued that more thoroughly adopting the Canadian doctrine of 
enterprise risk would not be a new departure for UK courts and would not mark a change in 
the law.  Rather it would illuminate previous case law and provide valuable guidance for the 
future. 
It would not be a panacea, particularly as Davies LJ argued in JGE that ‘enterprise’ is not an 
easy concept in relation to churches.
499
 But it is submitted that although not easy it is 
certainly far from unworkable, and it does allow an element of flexibility.  It may be possible 
to ask, what is the enterprise upon which a church or other religious organisation is involved 
in a particular context?  Although the enterprise at a macro-level may be vague and couched 
in theological rather than temporal terms, at the level of a particular project or undertaking 
it may be much more concrete. 
For example, asking what is the ‘enterprise’ of the Roman Catholic Church or the Church in 
Wales, in terms which make sense in relation to tort law, may well be a difficult and 
unfruitful enquiry for a court.  But asking what is a parish attempting to do or provide for 
the community in which it is set, or what is the purpose of a particular youth project or 
drugs counselling service may be entirely possible.  Given that vicarious liability relates to a 
particular appointment, it is possible to ask what a given individual was appointed to do and 
was purpose this was hoped to fulfil. 
These questions are of course inextricably linked to the questions of scope of duties of care 
discussed in relation to negligence.  What are clergy tasked with doing, what are clergy 
publically held out as doing and what are the risks inherent in them doing it?  The question 
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of enterprise risk cannot be considered in isolation from the question of clergy duties.  
Hence the outcome of cases will always be fact-specific.    
Different conclusions may be reached in relation to different churches or other religious 
groups: an Orthodox rabbi may not have the same set of duties as a Baptist minister.   And 
different conclusions may also be reached in relation to different ministers within the same 
church, because they may have a different relationship with that church and also be 
appointed to perform different tasks.  For example the vicarious liability implications for the 
work of a non-stipendiary curate in a rural parish, and a priest appointed to run a city centre 
project with young people may be radically different. 
Hence we turn from the general law to the specific position of the Church in Wales.  
2.4 What is the position in the Church in Wales? 
 
2.4 (a) Clergy and their bishop - is this relationship one to which vicarious liability may 
attach? 
 
Anglican theology teaches that priests do not act independently when carrying out their 
ministry, but collaboratively with their bishop and the rest of the presbyterium.
500
  
Principles of canon law which are common throughout the Anglican Communion 
demonstrate: 
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1) Priests function on behalf of the diocesan bishop, sharing and assisting him or her in 
the care of souls of the diocese.
501
  (Although the words ‘on behalf of’ are not 
expressly used, the bishop is described as ‘chief pastor’; he or she is the person with 
ultimate responsibility for pastoral care in the diocese.  Consequently it is reasonable 
to describe those to whom he or she delegates it as functioning on his or her behalf.)   
2) Priests are accountable to the bishop for the exercise of their ministry, and are 
subject to discipline in accordance with the canons of their Province if they fail to 
carry out their duties to an acceptable standard.
502
 
These principles are enshrined in both the canon law and liturgy of the Church in Wales.   
The Catechism sets out the respective ministries of bishop,
503
 priest,
504
 and deacon.
505
  The 
bishop is described as the ‘chief minister’ of Word and Sacraments, and the role of the 
priest and deacon assist him in this ministry.  Therefore, all priestly and diaconal actions are 
undertaken on behalf of the bishop.  Prior to ordination both candidates for both the 
diaconate and the priesthood are obliged to swear an oath of obedience to the bishop, as 
are clerics prior to institution, collation, licensing or appointment to ecclesiastical office.
506
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Furthermore, clergy are subject to sanction by the Disciplinary Tribunal,
507
 if the conduct of 
their ministry falls into one of the following categories: 
a) Teaching, preaching, publishing or professing doctrine or belief incompatible with 
that of the Church in Wales; 
b) Neglect of the duties of office, or persistent carelessness or gross inefficiency in the 
discharge of such duties; 
c) Conduct giving just cause for scandal or offence; 
d) Wilful disobedience to or breach of any of the provisions of the Constitution or the 
Statement of Terms of Service published pursuant to the Clergy Terms of Service 
Canon 2012; 
e) Wilful disobedience to or breach of any of the rules or regulations of the Diocesan 
Conference of the diocese in which such person holds office or resides; 
f) Disobedience to any judgement, sentence or order of the Archbishop, a Diocesan 
Bishop, the Tribunal or any Court of the Church in Wales.508 
Consequently clergy are accountable to both their bishop and the Church in Wales if they do 
not act in accordance with the law and regulations of the church, or with lawful directions 
and instructions given to them by their bishop.  The Clergy Terms of Service set out the 
duties of priests in greater detail and failure to comply with these is a disciplinary offence.
509
 
The Clergy Terms of Service lay down appropriate standards of professional competence 
and behaviour, for example in relation to providing pastoral care: 
                                                           
507
 Canon to Establish a Disciplinary Tribunal of the Church In Wales and to make amendments to Chapter IX of 
the Constitution of the Church in Wales (2000). 
508
 Const. Chapter IX, Part III ‘The Disciplinary Tribunal’. 
509
 Ibid, para(d). 
154 
 
‘Clergy should be aware of the help from accredited pastoral agencies so that it can be 
commended when appropriate.’510 
Furthermore, they provide guidance on the manner in which clergy should carry out their 
day to day work, for instance: 
‘The appropriateness of visiting and being visited alone, especially at night, needs to be 
assessed with care.’511  
They also acknowledge that clergy are representatives of the church.  For example: 
‘Clergy are called to leadership within the Church and the wider community.’512 
And: 
‘The dress of clergy should be suitable to their office; and, except for purposes of recreation 
and other justifiable reasons, should be such as to be a sign and mark of their holy calling 
and ministry.’513 
As well as being representatives of the church, clergy are also recognised as being placed in 
a position of power by virtue of their role: 
‘Clergy should be aware of the potential for abusing their privileged relationships.’514  
And: 
‘Clergy are often placed in a position of power over others, in pastoral relationships with lay 
colleagues, and sometimes with other clergy.  This power needs to be used to sustain others 
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and harness their strengths, and not to bully, manipulate or denigrate.  They should be 
aware of the  Church in Wales Bullying and Harassment policy.’515 
Clergy are tasked with undertaking pastoral care on behalf of the bishop and with this 
pastoral role comes power and the potential for its abuse. Within the Clergy Terms of 
Service the church recognises that it is giving clergy such power and seeks to make provision 
to manage the accompanying risk. 
So in summary, clergy carry out their ministry on behalf of the bishop; they are recognised 
as representing both him and the Church in Wales in carrying out their clerical functions.  
They are required to obey both his instructions and the laws and regulations of the church, 
and to act within defined standards of professional competence and behaviour.  In addition, 
the church recognises that it is placing its clerics in a position of power,
516
 in relation to 
other people, and seeks to impose duties and standards of behaviour to manage the 
inherent risk of this power being abused. 
It should also be noted that as well as imposes numerous duties on clergy, the Clergy Terms 
of Service also confer and regulate a series of rights.  The arrangement between individual 
clerics and the church is clearly reciprocal.  These rights include provision for the following: 
payment of stipend, provision of accommodation, a pension scheme, holidays, sabbatical 
leave, training, maternity leave, parental leave, compassionate and emergency leave, 
expenses of office, health and safety, sick pay, grievance procedure and protection from 
bullying and harassment.
517
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The position of clergy in relation to secular employment law is considered in Chapter 1.  
However viewed exclusively in relation to vicarious liability, it is difficult to see how in light 
of the foregoing a church could reach a different conclusion from that of the Court of 
Appeal in the JGE518 case; namely that the relationship between bishop and clergy is one to 
which vicarious liability should properly attach.  The factors which influenced the court in 
finding that the priest concerned (Fr Baldwin) was in a relationship akin to employment are 
all equally present in a Church in Wales context. 
Ward LJ regarded it as significant that Fr Baldwin had an obligation to show obedience and 
reverence to his bishop.
519
 Church in Wales clergy have a parallel obligation.
520
  He was also 
influenced by the capacity of the bishop to direct how the priest did his work, even though 
he did not exercise close, daily control; and the bishop’s right and duty to exercise a 
disciplinary function.
521
 As set out above, these factors would also apply to Church in Wales 
clergy.  Ultimately Ward LJ: 
‘distilled the essence of being an employee to be that he is paid a wage or salary to work 
under some, even if only slight, control of his employer in his employer’s business for that 
business.  Father Baldwin may not match every facet of being an employee but in my 
judgement he is very close to it indeed.’522 
In a similar way Church in Wales clergy assist the bishop in the performance of his duties 
and are subject to his control, in the language of Ward LJ they are working for the same 
business.  They also received remuneration in the form of stipend and other benefits.  For 
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the purposes of vicarious liability, distinguishing their position from that of a Roman Catholic 
priest like Father Baldwin would be extremely difficult. 
2.4 (b) Non-stipendiary clergy 
One possible category of clergy who might arguably be in a different position is non-
stipendiary clergy.  There are no reported instances of this being tested in the courts of the 
United Kingdom.  However it is submitted that they would be logical for them to be treated 
in the same way as their stipendiary counterparts.  
In JGE payment of salary was not a critical consideration, particularly as it was noted that 
the priest received an income from parish mass collections rather than out of central 
diocesan funds.
523
  The fact that he was required to live in a parochial house was also 
significant,
524
 and this would apply to non-stipendiary clergy serving on a house for duty 
basis within the Church in Wales.
525
 
But even clergy who do reside in a church-owned house, and not do receive any income 
from the church, are part of the ‘enterprise’ of the Church in Wales.  They have the same 
canonical relationship with their bishop as other priests and deacons, set out in the 
discussion above.   They wear the same clerical dress and use the same titles as stipendiary 
clergy, issues which the court considered highly significant in the Maga case.526  In relation 
to the outside world they receive the same status; members of the community who see a 
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person in a dog-collar will know that he or she is a cleric, they will not know whether or not 
he or she receives a stipend.  And in policy terms, it is difficult to see why an organisation 
which chooses to operate through a network of trained volunteers as well as trained paid 
workers, essentially performing the same tasks, should escape liability for the actions of the 
former but not the latter. 
But the all of the foregoing is only relevant to the first part of the two stage test which must 
be applied in assessing vicarious liability.  It seems that the nexus between a Church in 
Wales bishop and a priest or deacon in his diocese is sufficiently close to that of an 
employer/employee relationship to justify the imposition of vicarious liability in some 
circumstances.  But that still leaves the complex question of what those circumstances 
might be; the second part of the two stage test requires courts to consider what types of 
tortious conduct will give rise to vicarious liability by clergy? 
2.5 Conclusions - for which acts and omissions will the bishop be vicariously liable? 
 As the discussion in relation to both Maga and JGE demonstrated, this is a problematic 
question n where clergy are concerned.  In Maga the fact that an abusive priest had a 
special brief for youth work and evangelism was pertinent,
527
 but the fact that his senior 
colleague should have been alert to the risk he posed was also highly significant.  It is 
unclear whether his youth work and evangelism brief would have been enough without this 
consideration to tip the scales; and it is also unclear to whom the duty of care would have 
been owed without this.  The court dismissed a duty of care to the world at large,
528
 but 
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found a duty of care to protect boys with whom Fr Clonan was associating, after a complaint 
had been made. 
The JGE case was decided as a preliminary issue, which in part explains the absence of 
guidance or illumination on this point.  The Canadian decision in John Doe, which influenced 
both the first instance judge and the Court of Appeal, seemed like Maga to turn partly on 
the church having enabled an unusual and dangerous situation.  In Maga a potential 
paedophile was allowed to operate unmonitored, and in John Doe an individual was placed 
in a position of unchecked power over an isolated community. 
But where does this leave churches in less extreme instances?  If a cleric is clearly acting in 
the course of his or her duty and commits a tort, then it seems reasonably certainly that 
vicarious liability will ensue, in light of the finding by the Court of Appeal in JGE.529 But for 
unauthorised actions the position remains very unclear; how will the courts decide whether 
there is a sufficient nexus between the tortious conduct and the cleric’s authorised duties? 
If the enterprise risk factors set out in Bazley were to be applied, then this would at least 
provide a framework.  But the so far the UK courts have been inconsistent in their use and 
application of this authority, and as subsequent Canadian decisions have shown, the 
outcome of cases remains unpredictable.  For workers like Church in Wales clergy, who have 
no set working hours and duties, which are difficult to quantify and define, the scope of 
employer liability is currently hard to ascertain. 
Much will depend upon whether in subsequent decisions Maga is revealed to be the high 
point of church liability, and a case heavily influenced by the direct negligence of church 
authorities in allowing a potential paedophile unhindered and privileged access to 
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vulnerable children; or whether it becomes the standard, and churches are assumed to be 
liable for the actions of clerics, unless it can be clearly demonstrated that they was no link 
between their conduct and their authorised duties.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LIABILITY OF CLERGY IN TRESPASS TO THE PERSON 
 
3.1 Overview 
Having addressed the question of vicarious liability and Church in Wales clergy, and 
concluded that torts committed in the course of ministerial duties will generate vicarious 
liability for the church (as well as personal liability for the cleric), Chapters 3 and 4 explore 
some instances of potential tortious liability in the course of clerical ministry. 
This chapter considers trespass to the person and in two main contexts: firstly in relation to 
pastoral care and relationships; and secondly in relation to liturgical actions, particularly the 
administration of baptism.   It concludes that secular law in this area is extremely complex, 
and that the guidance and duties set out within the CTS do not assist clergy in safely 
navigating this field of tort.  Some alternative guidance is therefore proposed. 
3.2 Trespass to the Person - Secular Law 
The modern tort of trespass evolved from the ancient family of writs of trespass.
530
  
Touching someone without their consent constitutes the tort of battery which is actionable 
per se; in contrast with negligence there is no need for a claimant to show loss or 
damage.
531
  Causing a person to apprehend an immediate threat of such non-consensual 
touching constitutes the tort of assault.
532
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However, it would be problematic if any physical contact between human beings gave rise 
to a cause of action in the absence of consent.  In Collins v Wilcock,533 Goff LJ acknowledged: 
‘a general exception embracing all conduct which is generally acceptable in the ordinary 
conduct of daily life’.534 
The Court of Appeal later added a further gloss in Wilson v Pringle,535 by stating that a touch 
would not constitute trespass unless it was hostile, but did not propose any clear definition 
of hostility.  The case concerned an incident with two school boys in a corridor; one 
pounced on the other and grabbed his bag, causing him to fall and break a leg.  The pouncer 
claimed that his action was playful, and that he had not intended to hurt the pouncee, who 
was his friend. The appellate court found that this was a relevant consideration, on the basis 
that hostility was a necessary element of the tort.  Only one example of hostile touching was 
given in the judgement, that of a police officer restraining a person when they did not have 
legal authority to do so.
536
  In light of the decision in Colins v Wilcock,537 the Court of Appeal 
had to classify this instance of touching as ‘hostile’, but their rationale for doing so is less 
than clear.   
If a police officer was acting in good faith, mistakenly believing that the restraint was legally 
justified, and was also doing everything in his or her power to avoid injury to the claimant, in 
what sense would the action be hostile?   In the (subsequent) case of Vellino v Chief 
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Constable of Greater Manchester,538 the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that police 
officers detaining individuals ordinarily owe them duties of care in negligence.
539
 It is 
difficult to reconcile a duty to care for a person’s welfare with a presumption of hostility. 
Furthermore, the decision raises questions about actions which are not necessarily ‘hostile’ 
in the ordinary sense, but which have always been understood to constitute a trespass.  An 
unwanted kiss has always been understood to be a battery
540
 whether the giver intended it 
to be affectionate or aggressive. 
Neither the House of Lords,
541
 nor commentators,
542
 have responded well to the decision, 
criticising the concept of hostility in battery as an unnecessary and unhelpful innovation.  In 
F v West Berkshire Health Authority,543 Lord Goff went as far as to doubt expressly Wilson v 
Pringle.  In the more recent case of McMillan v Crown Prosecution Service,544 the High Court 
followed Collin v Wilcock, finding that physical contact did not amount to trespass because it 
was in conformity with generally accepted standards of conduct. 
On balance it appears unhelpful to analyse touching in relation to hostility. The more settled 
and persuasive body of case law frames the question in terms of consent and the scope of 
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ordinary social intercourse; if either of these circumstances applies, then a touch will not be 
a trespass.  
Determining where exactly the boundaries of generally acceptable behaviour lie is not 
straightforward.  A hand on the shoulder might seem entirely innocent to one person, but 
be viewed as oppressive or intrusive by another.  Furthermore as Kay LJ noted in McMillan v 
Crown Prosecution Service: 
‘it is important to place events in their context’. 545 
In that case the fact that the appellant was drunk and agitated, affected what was deemed 
to be acceptable behaviour for the police officer involved.   It is not possible to classify 
actions as socially acceptable or unacceptable without assessing the wider context.  
Touching a sleeping fellow passenger on the arm to wake them at a station is not socially 
equivalent to touching a complete stranger in a darkened cinema for no apparent reason. 
So in summary, touching another human being will amount to trespass unless: either, the 
contact is within the bounds of generally accepted behaviour; or, there is consent.  For the 
sake of completeness, it should be noted that for the purposes of criminal law, there are 
limits to the capacity of individuals to consent to a trespass.
546
 
In the case of R v Brown,547 the House of Lords considered consent in relation to 
sadomasochistic sexual practises.  The majority of the court concluded that where actual 
bodily harm
548
 is intended, the recipient of the trespass cannot give valid consent, unless 
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one of the recognised exemptions to the general rule applies.
549
  In his dissenting 
judgement, Lord Mustill expressed the opinion that ‘religious mortification’ was one of the 
recognised exemptions, although he did not regard it as being relevant to the case before 
him or usefully discussed in existing authorities.
550
   
Subsequent commentators have uncritically included acts of religious mortification as falling 
within the category of recognised exceptions.
551
  However the absence of reported judicial 
discussion makes it difficult to know where the boundaries of this exception lie; Lord Mustill 
clearly implied that not all religiously motivated actions will be covered.
552
  The other 
exceptions also have clear boundaries, for example people engaged in contact sports only 
consent to contact and injuries within the accepted ways of playing the game.
553
  Consent to 
medical procedures is only valid if the patient has been given adequate information about 
the nature of the treatment carried out and understands what is proposed.
554
 
If the ‘religious mortification’ exception exists in law, what boundaries and safeguards 
apply?  In R v Brown the House of Lords dismissed as unworkable fixing a boundary between 
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actual and grievous bodily harm in the context of sexual practices.
555
  In practical terms, 
once it is accepted that the recipient has consented to a degree of physical damage, it may 
be difficult for the person inflicting it to gauge how serious the damage will be.  Whilst it is 
long established law that no one can validly consent to their death at the hand of 
another,
556
 it is clearly possible to consent to lawful activities which carry a risk of serious 
and fatal injury.   For instance, sportspeople can consent to take part in boxing matches, 
even though boxers are sometimes killed in the ring without any negligence or malice.
557
    
On this basis, the ‘religious mortification’ exception referred to by Lord Mustill could 
theoretically cover extreme and dangerous practices such as crucifixion re-enactment or 
flagellation to the point of drawing blood.  Unless and until the matter is considered by a UK 
court, it is difficult to assess whether the ‘religious mortification’ exception would be upheld 
and if so what its limitations would be. 
It is submitted however that acts of religious mortification amounting to actual bodily harm 
are unlikely to have great relevance to the liability of contemporary Church in Wales clergy, 
at least in civil trespass claims.  There are two reasons for this: firstly such actions do not 
form part of current UK Anglican culture and practice, and secondly, the willingness of the 
victim to participate would have a different significance in a civil as opposed to a criminal 
context.  
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Although not forbidden, acts of mortification are not commended or even referred to within 
the Catechism of the Church in Wales.
558
  Neither are acts of mortification (beyond fasting) 
ordinarily included pastoral letters circulated by bishops to parishes in penitential 
seasons.
559
  Furthermore many of the non-Anglican Christian organisations operating within 
the UK, which do utilise physical mortification, would nevertheless not encourage acts of 
violence requiring assistance from a third party.
560
   The theological and cultural context of 
the Church in Wales mean that it is unlikely that its clergy would be involved in acts of 
religious mortification occasioning actual bodily harm, particularly acts which required the 
harm to be inflicted by or on third parties.   
If such acts were undertaken, however, and the religious mortification exception referred to 
Brown was found not to apply making consent irrelevant for the purposes of criminal law, 
the willingness of the recipient to receive the harm would still make volenti non fit injuria a 
logical defence in a civil court.
561
  Whilst volenti usually operates in the sphere of negligence 
rather than trespass, this is simply because people do not ordinarily submit to a deliberate 
injury; it is more common and likely for claimants to recklessly put themselves in the way of 
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accidental harm.  Nevertheless, there is no reason why it would be barred in a trespass 
claim.  Alternatively, if no exception were applicable on the facts, and R v Brown meant that 
the trespass was a criminal act in which the recipient chose to participate, ex turpi causa562  
would be a possible defence.  Again although this defence ordinarily operates in negligence, 
there is no reason to believe that it would be precluded in a trespass case, where consent 
existed in fact by not in law by reason of illegality.   (Obviously if consent did not exist in 
fact, beating the claimant would be a trespass, regardless of whether it was done for their 
perceived spiritual good). 
3.3 Trespass to the Person - Pastoral care and relationships 
3.3 (a) Pastoral Care within the Church in Wales - Definition and Duties of Clerics 
Pastoral care as understood by the Church in Wales requires clergy to form relationships 
with individuals and express care and compassion.  At times such pastoral relationships may 
permit, or in extreme circumstances even require, a cleric to make physical contact with 
another person e.g. holding a hand or putting an arm around the shoulders.  How do these 
informal, non-liturgical interactions relate to the law of trespass? 
The term ‘pastoral care’ is not defined within the Canons or Constitution of the Church in 
Wales, nor widely used within applicable legislation and case law.
563
  Nevertheless, it is used 
repeatedly in the Clergy Terms of Service,
564
 and does appear in the BCP.
565
  It is stated that 
the deacon must help the priest ‘in pastoral care’.566  Therefore, whilst the term ‘pastoral’ 
                                                           
562
 Pitts v Hunt [1990] 3 All ER 344. 
563
 The term is not used by commentators like Doe on the general law of the Church as a heading for discussion 
and analysis: see N. Doe, The Law of the Church in Wales (University of Wales: Cardiff 2002).  
564
 See particularly CTS 2.  
565
 BCP (1984) 691 para 24. 
566
 Ibid. 
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itself is not used when the ministry of the priest is set out, it must be implied in the 
statement that priests ‘care for the people.’567   Similarly although not expressly present, it is 
implied within the ministry of the bishop.  Firstly, the bishop is described as ‘chief 
minister’,
568
 and consequently must logically share in the ministry of the priests and 
deacons, the other ministers in the diocese.   
Secondly, the term ‘chief shepherd’
569
 is used specifically, and ‘shepherd’ in this context 
could reasonably be understood as a synonym for ‘pastor’.  The word pastor derives (via 
Anglo-Norman and Middle French) from the classical Latin word for shepherd ‘pastor’
570
 and 
the use of the term ‘shepherd’ for a Christian leader originates in shepherding imagery in 
the Bible. 
But for further detail about the meaning of ‘pastor’ and ‘pastoral care’ in Church in Wales 
context, it is necessary to consider the Clergy Terms of Service, especially paragraph 2, 
headed ‘You are to care for all alike, especially the poor, the sick, the needy and those in 
trouble’.571  This paragraph deals with pastoral care, and although it does not offer a 
definition, it does make a number of statements about this concept and ministry. 
‘Compassion is essential to pastoral care.’572 
The same paragraph also refers to the need to minister sensitively and effectively to the 
sick, dying and bereaved,
573
 and to recognise the difference between pastoral care and 
counselling,
574
although no explanation of the difference is offered.   
                                                           
567
 BCP (1984) para 23. 
568
 BCP (1984) para 22. 
569
 Ibid. 
570
 Oxford English Dictionary Online, ‘pastor’ noun, accessed via Cardiff University library 
https://portal.cf.ac.uk/wps/myportal/cdfPortal/library (accessed 12/2/2013). 
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It is also stated that: 
‘There is risk in all pastoral work’575 and that the appropriateness of ‘visiting and being 
visited’ alone must be assessed with care.576 
Paragraphs 2.9 to 2.11 set out the importance of maintaining ‘physical, sexual, emotional 
and psychological’ boundaries and the dangers of inappropriate behaviour within pastoral 
relationships, and note the risk of manipulation and abuse.
577
 
When help or advice is being sought, any note-taking must be mutually agreed and data 
protection legislation must be complied with.
578
   
Child Protection legislation and guidance must be obeyed,
579
 and clergy must wear dress 
appropriate to their office,
580
 and when conducting worship must wear appropriate 
liturgical dress.
581
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
573
 CTS 2.3. 
574
 CTS 2.6. 
575
 CTS 2.8. 
576
 Ibid. 
577
 CTS 2.9-2.11. 
578
 CTS 2.12:  ‘When help or advice is being sought, any note-taking should be mutually agreed and is subject to 
data protection legislation’. The CTS here do not set out which legislation is being referenced.  This approach 
avoids the need for amendment of the wording of the CTS in the event of changes to the statutory framework.  
At the present time the Data Protection Act 1998 is the most important piece of legislation in this area; this Act 
regulates the processing of data about identifiable, living individuals.  It applies (subject to certain exemptions, 
e.g. data held for domestic purposes, s36) to personal data held by private as well as public bodies.   It would 
cover, for example, a file kept in a parish of names, addresses and telephone numbers relating to Home 
Communions or requested sick visits.  Data in such a file would have to be kept and processed in accordance 
with the Act.   
579
 CTS 2.13.  In addition to the Church in Wales Child Protection Policy, relevant provisions in secular law must 
be complied with.  For example, as will be discussed below, the Children Act 1989 sets out who has parental 
responsibility for children and therefore capacity to make decisions on their behalf and to further their 
interests.  Church in Wales clergy must respect these provisions and must allow persons with parental 
responsibility to exercise it on behalf of children when decisions are being made about baptism or attendance 
at Sunday school.  Other current legislation in the realm of child protection imposes duties on specific public 
authorities (e.g. The Children Act 2004) and does not directly apply to the church; or sets out civil and criminal 
mechanisms to safeguard children in specific circumstances (e.g. The Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003).  It is 
submitted that even those these types of legislative provisions do not impose any direct duties upon Church in 
Wales clergy, the requirement to follow good child protection practise means that clergy must cooperate with 
secular authorities acting in accordance with their statutory duties.  Relevant legislation includes: Sex 
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From the foregoing, the following points can be inferred about the understanding which the 
Church in Wales has of pastoral care and the duties of its clergy in this regard.  Clergy must 
show care and compassion to all, particularly the vulnerable and suffering.  This involves 
forming relationships, visiting and being visited and giving help and advice when it is sought.  
However, pastoral care is not to be equated with counselling and clergy are to be aware of 
the limits of their own expertise. Notes of pastoral meetings may be made if the other party 
agrees, but there is no requirement to keep records.   
Although the CTS do not elucidate what is meant by ‘risk’
582
 in pastoral work, reading 
paragraph 2 as a whole, it is apparent that one risk is that of accusations of inappropriate 
behaviour by the cleric, including unwanted touching.  The factors which clergy should 
consider when arranging pastoral meetings (such as: timing, dress, furniture and lighting, as 
well as the appropriateness of visiting and being visited alone are highly relevant to such 
accusations).
583
  Furthermore, CTS 2.9 explicitly states that: 
‘Inappropriate touching or gestures of affection are to be avoided.’584 
The use of the word ‘inappropriate’ implies that not all touching will be inappropriate, and 
illustrates the complexity of a cleric’s position in regard to pastoral care.  Pastoral care is 
defined by the CTS is distinct from counselling, it does not have an identifiable therapeutic 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Offenders Act 1997; The Children’s Commissioner for Wales Act 2001; Adoption and Children Act 2002; 
Education Act 2002; Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 ; Sexual Offences Act 2003; Children Act 2004; 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004; Children and Adoption Act 2006; Safeguarding Vulnerable 
Groups Act 2006; Forced Marriage Act (Civil Protection) 2007; Children and Young Persons Act 2008; Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008;  Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009; Borders, Citizenship 
and Immigration Act 2009; Education Act 2011; Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims (Amendment) Act 2012.     
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 CTS 2.14. 
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 CTS 2.15. 
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purpose, rather it is a demonstration of ‘the justice and love of the incarnate God disclosed 
in Jesus Christ’.585  
The absence of a therapeutic or practical purpose makes it harder for a priest to 
demonstrate that any touching was required to further that purpose; his or her situation is 
very different to that of a health professional dealing with a sick person in need of medical 
treatment, or a tailor helping to fit a jacket.  A priest is seeking to bring emotional and 
spiritual comfort rather than carry out a practical task.   
But the injunctions to show compassion,
586
 and sensitivity,
587
 may mean that in some 
circumstances touching those in receipt of pastoral care is necessary.  For instance a 
frightened and dying person may want a priest to take their hand, and for a cleric to refrain 
from touching them in such circumstances would hardly be a demonstration of Christ-like 
compassion. 
Provided that clergy remain within the bounds of socially acceptable behaviour, they should 
not run the risk of justified accusations of trespass to the person in secular law.  But the 
boundaries of socially acceptable behaviour are not always clear cut, and a lot may depend 
upon context.  Taking a patient’s hand in a public hospital ward may be construed 
differently from taking someone’s hand alone in a private house at night.   
Furthermore, false accusations may be difficult to guard against; clergy can control their 
own behaviour but not that of other people.  Some of the factors listed in paragraph 2 
clearly relate to evidence as well as context.  For instance, the consideration of whether to 
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visit or being visited alone;
588
 having other people present or close by during a pastoral 
meeting might provide the cleric with a witness should he or she be falsely accused of 
inappropriate behaviour.   
But solo visits are not prohibited; clergy are ultimately left to balance the potential benefits 
against the potential dangers of any pastoral encounter.  This is arguably a matter of 
practical necessity; for example, a priest may have to make an unscheduled emergency 
pastoral visit to a person living alone, and it may simply not be possible to find another 
suitable person to accompany him or her at short notice.  The importance of comforting and 
reassuring a person in acute need and distress will sometimes outweigh the possible risk of 
false accusations of improper conduct. 
From a evidentiary perspective it is interesting that clergy are not enjoined to make a 
written record following any pastoral encounter which they feel may give rise to an issue or 
complaint,
589
 neither are they required to report such an incident to senior clergy (unless 
there are child protection implications).
590
  Inclusion of such injunctions might have been 
helpful in terms of protecting both individual clergy and the church in the event of litigation 
arising, as they would ensure that evidence was preserved and that the cleric could receive 
appropriate advice and guidance at an early stage.  
                                                           
588
 CTS 2.8. 
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 CTS 2.13 requires that clergy comply with provincial and diocesan guidelines on child protection.  These 
contain duties to report risks and incidents connected with child protection in certain circumstances.   For 
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For completeness it should be noted that not all touching which would contravene the CTS 
Guidelines would also constitute battery.  A married parishioner might choose to engage in 
sexual activity with a cleric, and such consensual activity would not be a trespass.  It would 
however breach the CTS guidelines: 
‘in their personal life clergy should set an example of integrity in relationships and 
faithfulness in marriage.’591 
And:  
‘Clergy are to be chaste in their sexual relationships.  Promiscuity is incompatible with 
ordained ministry.’592 
Therefore in some respects the CTS guidelines are more restrictive than the secular law; 
clergy acting within them should not face justified accusations of trespass to the person. 
3.4 Trespass to the person - Baptism and the administration of Sacraments 
3.4 (a) Sacraments in the Church in Wales 
A sacrament is defined as ‘the use of material things as signs and pledges of God’s grace’,593 
and it is further stated that there are two parts to a sacrament ‘an outward and visible sign’ 
and an ‘inward invisible grace’.594  In the case of baptism,595 the holy eucharist,596 
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 CTS  3.10. 
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 CTS  3.11. 
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 BCP (1984) 696, The Catechism, para 43. 
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 BCP (1984) 696, The Catechism, para 44. 
595
 The Church in Wales definition of baptism requires water to used as the outward and visible sign, BCP 
(1984) 697, The Catechism, para 47.  The BCP (1984) rubrics for the public baptism of infants require that the 
child to be taken by the hand by the priest or to be held in the priest’s arms, and that the child is either dipped 
in water three times or has water poured over him or her three times, BCP (1984) 661, and also that the priest 
make the sign of the cross on the child’s forehead, BCP (1984) 662.  The rite for the private baptism of infants 
in emergencies requires water to be poured on the child three times, BCP (1984) 664. In the case of adult 
baptism, the priest is similarly required to take the candidate by the right hand, before pouring on him or her 
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confirmation,
597
 ordination,
598
 holy matrimony,
599
  and the ministry of healing,
600
 the 
outward, visible and material element of the sacrament necessarily involves physical contact 
between the priest and the persons receiving the sacrament.
601
  With absolution,
602
 physical 
contact is not a requirement. 
Church in Wales clergy (depending upon which order or orders they are ordained to) are 
required to administer baptism,
603
 confirmation,
604
 the holy eucharist,
605
 ordination,
606
 and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
three times, or dipping him or her in water three times, BCP (1984) 677, and the sign of the cross is to be made 
on his or her forehead, BCP (1984) 678.  Parallel provisions are contained in the 2006 service.  For the public 
baptism of infants see SCI 27-33, in addition to the actions set out in the BCP (1984) anointing with oil is 
permitted but required.  For the private baptism of infants see SCI 45.  For the baptism of adults see SCI 71-77. 
596
 The outward and visible sign is the giving of bread and wine BCP (1984) 698, The Catechism, 53.  In practical 
terms this requires the bread and wine to be placed into the recipients hands or mouth, although the rubrics 
do not specify how this must be done.  See BCP (1984) 13 and HE 81. 
597
 The outward and visible sign is the laying on of hands by the bishop, BCP (1984) 698, The Catechism, 57. The 
bishop is required to lay both hands on the confirmand in the 1984 rite, BCP (1984) 707 and his right hand on 
the confirmand in the 2006 rite SCI 79. 
598
 The outward and visible sign is the laying on of hands by the bishop or bishops, BCP (1984) 699, The 
Catechism, 59.  See BCP (1984) 716, 725 and 731.  
599
 The celebrant is required to join the right hands of the couple together in the latest rite, Marriage Service 
2010, 8. The celebrant also blesses the couple BCP (1984) 746, Marriage Service 2010, 9; the rubrics do not 
specify that this blessing be accompanied by any physical action but a priest may often choose to touch a 
person or object which he or she is blessing, the laying on of hands being an ancient gesture of special 
authority and blessing (see Greg Dues, ‘Catholic Customs and Traditions: A Popular Guide’ (Twenty Third 
Publications: Mystic 2000), 178). 
600
 The outward and visible sign is either the laying on of hands or anointing with oil BCP (1984) 700, The 
Catechism, Laying on of hands, BCP (1984) 766 and anointing with oil, BCP (1984) 769. 
601
 In the case of holy matrimony, the priest or deacon officiating is not technically minister of the sacrament, 
as in Anglican theological understanding this role is fulfilled by the parties to the marriage themselves. (See for 
example John Macquarrie, A Guide to the Sacraments (SCM: London 1997) Second Edition, 220).  Nevertheless 
as detailed above, the Church in Wales rubrics require the priest or deacon to perform actions which involve 
physically touching the couple). 
602
 See BCP (1984) 699, The Catechism, 61, absolution is the confession of sin in the presence of a priest, and 
the reception of forgiveness through his or her ministry.  No physical action is required. 
603
 There is a duty to baptise infants publically in accordance with Canons Ecclesiastical 1603, Canon 68 arising 
out of the statutory contract of the Church in Wales and its quasi-established position (see Norman Doe, The 
Law of the Church in Wales (University of Wales: Cardiff 2002), 5-27 & 234-235) and to privately baptise any 
infants in danger of death in accordance with Canons Ecclesiastical 1603, Canon 69.  There appears to be no 
specific canonical duty to baptise adults, but CTS 4.1 states that ‘Mission is a primary calling’ and CTS 4.5 states 
that ‘Suitable preparation for Baptism, Confirmation and Marriage is a primary responsibility for clergy’ ; it 
would be difficult to argue that a cleric refusing to baptise an adult without good reason was complying with 
these provisions of the CTS.    
604
 The considerations set out in the previous footnote, in relation to a priest refusing adult baptism, would 
apply in the same way were a bishop refusing to confirm a candidate without good reason.  Bishops are also 
given a specific charge to confirm at their Episcopal ordination BCP (1984) 714.   
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the ministry of healing,
607
 and also to solemnize marriages,
608
 and therefore have a duty to 
touch people when doing so.  The kind of touching involved, e.g. pouring water over a 
person, laying hands on a person’s head, is not likely to come within the ambit of generally 
socially acceptable behaviour.  Therefore, it is only lawful provided that the recipient 
consents to it.   
3.4(b) Sacraments and Adults Lacking the Capacity to Consent 
The law in relation to adults whose capacity to make decisions is compromised is now 
governed by the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
609
  The statutory framework attempts to balance 
the need to ensure the vulnerable individuals are adequately protected on the one hand, 
with the desire to enable them to exercise as much autonomy as practicable on the other.  
The starting point is that individuals must be assumed to have capacity unless it is 
established that they do not.
610
 They are not to be treated as being unable to make a 
decision unless all practicable steps have been taken to help them to do so without 
success,
611
 and the making of an unwise is not in and of itself a reason to conclude that the 
person lacks capacity.
612
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 Priests are charged at their ordination to preside at the Holy Eucharist BCP (1984) 722 and have a duty to 
help every confirmed member of the church to communicate regularly after proper preparation BCP (1984) 3.  
The priestly role at the eucharist is reiterated in CTS 6. 
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 Bishops are charged at their Episcopal ordination to be ‘faithful in ordaining and sending out new ministers’ 
BCP (1984) 714.   
607
 CTS 2.2 provides that clergy are to minister ‘sensitively and effectively to those who are sick, dying and 
bereaved’.  Presumably the sacramental, liturgical provisions of the ministry of healing (see BCP (1984) 700 The 
Catechism 62-64 and BCP (1984) 755-773) are included within the charge to ‘perform the other ministrations 
entrusted to you’ at priestly ordination (see BCP (1984) 722). 
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 Anglican Marriage in the Church of England and Wales: A Guide to the Law for Clergy, issued by the Faculty 
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609
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610
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 Ibid section 1(3). 
612
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A person will be unable to make a decision for the purposes of the Act if that person is 
unable: 
‘a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
(b) to retain that information, 
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or 
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other 
means).’613 
 
It is important to note that capacity is determined in relation to specific decisions
614
 rather 
than in the general or abstract.  A person may be able to understand and weigh information 
in relation to a simple matter, but not a more complex one.  For instance, just because an 
individual does not have capacity to make decisions about their investment portfolio, it does 
not mean that they are incapable of deciding whether they wish to receive Communion at a 
particular moment in time.  In the latter case there are far fewer complicated factors to 
remember and balance than in the former. 
 Nevertheless, there will be individuals who will be incapable of making some or any 
decisions about their spiritual lives for the purposes of this Act; how does the law of 
trespass relate to them?  For instance someone in a coma will be incapable of 
understanding or responding to questions about their preferences; would anointing them 
with holy oil be a battery? 
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The case law,
615
 and commentary,
616
 on adults without capacity and consent to what would 
otherwise be acts of trespass has tended to focus almost exclusively on decision-making in a 
health and social care context.  Obviously the factual context is very different in relation to 
pastoral and spiritual care, rendering the position for clergy both more straightforward and 
more complex than for healthcare professionals. 
It is arguably more straightforward for interaction which might be said to come within the 
bounds of ordinary social interaction; such acts do not even potentially constitute 
trespasses and consent is therefore not an issue.
617
  The courts have affirmed that friendly, 
physical gestures such grabbing someone’s hand at a party or giving them a (reasonable) 
slap on the back do not constitute battery.
618
  Whilst it would be difficult to categorise even 
the most minor medical interventions as being within the bounds on ordinary social 
interaction (and indeed the case law has not explored this route), the kinds of informal 
gestures which a cleric may make in the course of a pastoral visit could and should properly 
be classified in this way.   For example, gently touching someone’s hand or arm, especially if 
they are unable to communicate easily in words, would be an ordinary and unremarkable 
social gesture from any visitor, clergy or otherwise. 
More problematic are the formal, sacramental actions such as baptising, anointing or 
administering Communion. For instance, it is not generally socially acceptable to pour water 
over other people without their consent.  Where express consent would be required to 
render an act anything other than a battery, and a person lacks capacity to give such 
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 e.g. Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; Re A (Medical Treatment: male sterilisation) [2000] 1 
F.L.R. 549. 
616
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consent, the 2005 Act states that any act or decision must be undertaken in the ‘best 
interests’
619
 of the person concerned.  Whilst determining best interests in the context of 
medical treatment is not always straightforward, there are often objective factors which can 
be considered (e.g. will the procedure reduce the person’s pain?).   It is harder to 
demonstrate objective factors in a spiritual context. 
However, as Donnelly argues,
620
 the mechanism provided within the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 for determining ‘best interests’
621
 is sufficiently sophisticated to allow for subjective 
considerations to be weighed in the balance when considering best interests.  Section 4 
(6)
622
 requires that the subjective views of the person lacking capacity, both past and 
present, to be part of the equation when balancing factors to determine best interests. 
Again as Donnelly notes,
623
 the courts have attached differing degrees of weight to the 
present wishes of a person lacking capacity.  In Re S and S (Protected Persons),624 Judge 
Marshall QC stressed the emphasis which she interpreted section 4 of the Act as placing 
upon ascertaining the person’s present views; and concluded that the purpose of this was to 
try to achieve the outcome which they preferred,
625 going as far finding that there was an 
effective presumption for deciding in favour of the person’s present wishes.
626   
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 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1(4). 
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 Mary Donnelly, ‘Determining Best Interests Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005’, Medical Law Review 19 
(2) (2011) 304. 
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622
 Ibid, s. 4 (6). 
623
 Mary Donnelly, ‘Determining Best Interests Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005’, Medical Law Review 19 
(2) (2011) 304. 
624
 Re S and S (Protected persons) EWHC B16 (Fam). 
625
 Ibid, para 55. 
626
 Ibid, para 57. 
180 
 
In contrast in Re M,627 Mumby J found that the weight to be attached to present wishes was 
‘case specific and fact specific.’
628  
Donnelly acknowledges the attraction of the clarity of a Judge Marshall QC’s proposed 
presumption, but rejects it on the basis that it is an ‘overly blunt legal instrument’ for 
dealing with persons lacking capacity, and highlights the risks of such persons being 
misunderstood or misconstrued when attempting to express their preferences.
629
    
It is submitted that this is a valid criticism, and also that wording of the statute itself lends 
more support for the approach of Mumby J and Judge Marshall.   Section 4 (3) requires the 
decision maker to consider: 
‘(a) whether it is likely that the person will at some time have capacity in relation to the 
matter in question, and 
(b) if it appears likely that he will, when that is likely to be.’630 
 
It is entirely conceivable that a person with temporarily impaired cognitive capacity might 
be expressing a preference or desire which would have deeply distressed them before their 
incapacity arose.  If such an individual is likely to regain capacity in the future they might 
struggle greatly with the consequences of their wishes whilst incapacitated having been 
honoured.  There is nothing in the wording of section 4 (4),
631
 which deals with present 
wishes specifically, or section 4 as a whole, which justifies a presumption favouring present 
wishes over probable future ones. 
                                                           
627
 Re M [2009] EWHC 163 (Ch). 
628
 Ibid, para 35. 
629
 Mary Donnelly, ‘Determining Best Interests Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005’, Medical Law Review 19 
(2) (2011) 304. 
630
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 4 (3). 
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Furthermore, the decision is being made for the person precisely because they lack the 
capacity to make it for themselves.  How valid and real are preferences if they are not based 
on a realistic understanding of the situation?  For example in a medical context, an 
incapacitated person ‘P’ may dislike pain.  P may strongly express a preference not to have 
an injection as he knows that needles are painful.  However, if P’s true desire is to have as 
little pain as possible for as little time as possible, and an injection is the best method of 
achieving this, then P’s best interests and genuine wishes would probably be most 
effectively served by having the injection he is protesting about.  P is objecting because he 
does not understand that an injection would result in less pain rather than more.  In such an 
instance elevating P’s apparent preference above other considerations, by way or 
presumption or otherwise, would not be helpful in arriving at a true determination of his 
best interests. 
Therefore, there are persuasive reasons to favour the stance of Mumby J,
632
 in relation to 
the expressed views of the person without capacity.  Such views will not be determinative, 
or even necessarily strongly indicative of best interests.  A cleric dealing with a person 
without capacity could not rely simply on their apparent views.  For instance, baptising a 
person who had been a devout follower of another faith for their entire life prior to loosing 
capacity, could arguably not be best interests, and therefore a battery in the absence of any 
valid consent.  This scenario could arise in a family of mixed religious convictions.  A 
Christian spouse, son or daughter might request a priest to baptise the person, and the 
person could appear compliant but fail to understand the significance of what was taking 
place.  Should the person recover capacity, or other family members object, the priest might 
not have a valid defence to the trespass. 
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Best interests have been held to encompass social as well as material interests.  In both Re 
M,633 and Re P (Statutory Will),634 the court found that a person lacking capacity had an 
interest in the way in which they were remembered after their death.  The same reasoning 
which was applied in that case to financial matters could apply to spiritual ones.  
Incapacitated persons could be deemed to have an interest in how they were remembered 
and regarded by their family, friends and faith community.  If receiving particular rites 
around the time of death, or being seen to remain loyal to the faith in which they lived most 
of their lives would have an impact upon the way in which they would be perceived by their 
social group, then these would presumably be relevant factors in determining best interests. 
Furthermore, there is no logical reason why the social dimension of best interests should be 
confined to the end of life.  Being treated as a individual human being with dignity and a 
member of a faith community by receiving sacraments and having contact with a cleric 
could be seen as benefits throughout the lifetime of a person lacking capacity, as could the 
comfort which this participation might provide for family members.  The definition of best 
interests set out in the Mental Capacity Act is wide enough to encompass social as well as 
physical and financial interests.
635
 
Furthermore, in practical terms, the social context of an adult lacking in decision-making 
capacity is likely to be critical to their continuing involvement with a church.  Aside from 
time spent in hospital, it is unlikely that an adult with seriously impaired mental capacity 
would have contact with a priest without the knowledge, and probably also the facilitation, 
of family members and carers.  If the individuals effectively managing the person’s affairs 
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are encouraging and enabling participation in Christian sacraments, they are hardly likely to 
bring an action for trespass in the name of the adult without capacity.   
Such an action would only be a real possibility if there was some religious conflict amongst 
those people, or if the impaired adult recovered his or her capacity and objected to what 
had taken place.  Therefore, only in very limited circumstances would a cleric face a realistic 
threat of liability in tort. 
3.4(c) Sacraments and Children 
However, the position where children are concerned is very different from that of adults 
lacking capacity, for a number of reasons: 
1) The law involving children is governed by the Children Act 1989,
636
 and the Gillick637 
line of authority, rather than the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
2) The potential for religious conflict amongst persons with parental responsibility for 
the child, and the human rights of such persons to bring up the child in accordance 
with their religious convictions.
638
   
3) The link between religious upbringing and a child’s developing sense of identity
639
.  
Adults, whatever their mental capacity, will generally have an established religious 
or non-religious identity. With children however this identity is in the process of 
development; and the impact of initiation and participation in religious rites may be 
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very different for them than adults.  Different considerations will consequently apply 
in seeking to determine best interests. 
4) The potential for conflict between the child and those with parental responsibility, 
and the potential capacity of the child to make decisions on religious matters. 
3.4 (c)(i) The legal background  
In addition to recognition of universal right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
640
 and the protection 
afforded by Article 9 of the ECHR, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) is a child focused treaty which the United Kingdom has ratified and which 
specifically protects the right of a child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
641
  
Nevertheless, as commentators like Langlaude recognise,
642
 the outworking of these rights 
in complex where children are concerned, because their individual capacity still evolving.   
By their very nature, children are still in the process of formulating their personal beliefs and 
sense of identity.  They are therefore potentially vulnerable to manipulation by parents, 
religious organisations or the State.   Yet any interference with parental freedom to pass on 
religious or ideological beliefs to the next generation may have an impact on Article 9 rights 
vested in parents.  Equally States have obligations in international law to safeguard the 
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welfare of minors
643
 and a legitimate interest in the development of future citizens.  
Therefore appropriately protecting and recognising the religious freedoms of children 
presents unique challenges for any legal system. 
The domestic statutory law in relation to decision-making on behalf of children is set out 
primarily in the Children Act 1989.   The rights, duties, powers, responsibility and authority 
to make decisions in relation to a child are conferred by parental responsibility,
644
 and the 
act sets out who shall have parental responsibility for a child.
645
  In the ordinary course of 
events, decisions about a child’s religious upbringing are made by those with parental 
responsibility. 
Where parties with parental responsibility disagree they may apply to the court for a 
decision; section 1 (1) of the Act states that where a court is required to determine any 
question in relation to a child’s upbringing, the welfare of that child shall be the paramount 
consideration.
646
   
However, the decision of the House of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area 
Health Authority,647 and the cases which have followed it, add a further layer of complexity 
to the position.  In Gillick the court ruled that the parental right to make decisions on behalf 
of a child terminates if and when the child achieves sufficient intelligence to understanding 
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to make the decision for him or herself.
648
  Whether the child has achieved such capacity 
will be a question of fact.
649
 
In relation to the law of trespass therefore, an act which would otherwise be a battery will 
be lawful if a person with parental responsibility for a child consents to it, or if a Gillick 
competent child consents to it.  This raises a number of issues which will be explored below. 
Conflict between persons with parental responsibility for a child 
Whilst most decisions relating to a child’s upbringing can be made by one party with 
parental responsibility acting unilaterally, the courts have acknowledged that there are a 
number of issues which require either universal agreement amongst the holders of parental 
responsibility or a court order.
650
  These issues include ritual circumcision,
651
 which raises 
the question of whether other religious rites might be categorised in the same way.  In the 
event of dispute, does Christian baptism of a child require a court order?  If so and one is 
not obtained, would the lack of a valid consent render the physical element of baptism a 
trespass?  
The first case to consider the issue of circumcision was Re J.652  Five year old J was the child 
of a Turkish father who was a Muslim, but who freely admitted that he did not observe 
many of the tenets of his faith.  Similarly J’s mother was nominally a member of the Church 
of England, but did not claim to be a practising Christian.
653
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 After his parents separated J lived with his mother in what the court described as an 
‘essentially secular household’.654  Although this term was not explicitly defined, the court 
set out the factual background making it clear that J’s mother did not actively practise her 
faith, so he was not exposed to Christian worship or teaching in his home environment.  
Neither did he have any contact with the local Muslim community or receive instruction in 
Islam.  Nevertheless, it was important to J’s father that his son by circumcised, and he 
applied to the court for a specific issue order.  The first instance judge refused to grant the 
specific issue order for circumcision, and the father appealed. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, and Thorpe LJ gave the following reasons for 
this:
655
 
1) Given that J would experience a secular upbringing in England, circumcision would 
not enable him to share the experiences of his peers as it would in Turkey .  If 
anything it would mark him out as different. 
2) The procedure was an irreversible surgical intervention.  It was not required for 
therapeutic reasons and carried with it small but identifiable physical and 
psychological risks.  Consequently there would have to be clear demonstrable 
benefits for the child in order to justify it as being in his best interests. 
3) J’s mother would find the operation a stressful experience.  As his primary carer she 
would struggle to explain to J why he was undergoing the procedure, or to present it 
in a positive light.  This would be very different from a Turkish, Muslim setting, 
where there would ordinarily be a family celebration.  Furthermore J’s age increased 
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the probability of him experiencing circumcision negatively; he was old enough to be 
distressed, but not to comprehend the reasons for the event associated with the 
discomfort. 
4) J’s mother, who was responsible for his to day to day care, and currently the most 
important person in his life, was opposed to the procedure and had a rational basis 
for her opposition. 
5) The trial judge was correct that the father’s right to manifest his religious beliefs 
under Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights had to be balanced 
against the welfare of J and the Article 9 rights of his mother.  Therefore denying the 
order was not an infringement of the father’s Article 9 rights. 
6) The judge had also been correct to focus on the child’s religion of upbringing rather 
than religion of birth.  A child’s perceptions were formed more by experience of 
worship and teaching than by theoretical doctrines of a faith community. 
Schiemann LJ,
656
 and Dame Butler-Sloss P,
657
  both agreed with this judgement.  Taking each 
of Thorpe LJ’s points in turn, to consider both their validity and applicability to Christian 
baptism: 
1) The question of whether undergoing a ritual would enable a child to feel 
differentiated from his peer group, or enable him to share their experiences is a 
material factor in assessing best interests.  The Children Act sets out criteria which a 
court should consider in assessing whether the welfare of a child would be promoted 
by granting an order.
658
  These include: the child’s ascertainable wishes and 
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feelings;
659
 physical, emotional and educational needs;
660
 likely effect of a change in 
his circumstances;
661
 and age, sex, background and other relevant characteristics.
662
  
Although not stated explicitly, it was clearly implicit within the judgement in this 
case that faith context was being treated as both background and a relevant 
characteristic for the purposes of the analysis.   The child’s actual context was 
contrasted with a hypothetical Turkish context. 
 
The emotional impact of undergoing the procedure would almost certainly be 
different for a boy in a community where his peers were having the same 
experience, and where his extended family saw it as a joyful occasion, and a boy 
surrounded by friends and family for whom circumcision in middle childhood was an 
uncommon experience, and whose primary carer regarded it very negatively. 
 
How these same considerations would relate to Christian baptism would depend 
upon the facts of the case.  Obviously it would not render a child physically different 
from his or her peers, or be perceived as a distressing medical procedure.  However, 
in some contexts it might be factor in social inclusion or exclusion.  If for example the 
child was part of a family in which one parent and siblings attended a church which 
permitted only baptised members to receive Communion might feel isolated on a 
regular basis. 
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2) Baptism does not involve an irreversible surgical procedure, nor does any other 
Christian sacrament.  Most Christians believe that it is spiritually irreversible,
663
 and 
this is certainly the Anglican view,
664
 but this does not equate to a permanent 
physical change of kind involved in ritual circumcision.  A child who later decides to 
renounce Christianity is not left with any observable bodily mark, or prevented from 
converting to another faith.  Neither does he or she undergo any physical or 
psychological risk akin to that inherent in circumcision. 
 
3) Essentially the same considerations would apply here as in relation to the first point.  
All of these are contextual factors which a court would need to weigh in making a 
welfare determination.
665
  A child whose primary carer was a devout follower of 
another faith or a fervent atheist might be distressed by the idea of baptism, and 
struggle to portray it in a positive light.  But this could be the case with any decision 
affecting the child’s life about which a significant adult felt strongly, and this 
therefore cannot be a reason for categorising it a decision requiring universal assent 
amongst holders of parental responsibility.
666
  If as the Court of Appeal has held 
there are only a small number of special, identifiable decisions falling into this 
category, it cannot be appropriate to categorise all or almost all decisions in this 
way. 
 
4) Regrettably the court did not make it absolutely clear why or which aspects of the 
mother’s objections were ‘rational’.  From the overall context it would appear that 
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because there were objective reasons why the procedure might be to J’s detriment 
(e.g. it would entail unnecessary pain and risk) his mother’s objections could be 
categorised as rational.  On this basis, a parent could object to Christian baptism, or 
any other matter, on the grounds that there were objectively identifiable reasons 
why it might in the circumstances have a negative impact upon the child.  Again this 
consideration cannot in itself justify treating circumcision as a matter needing the 
consent of all parties with parental responsibility. 
 
5) Thorpe LJ acknowledged that J’s father right to manifest his religion pursuant to 
Article 9 of the ECHR included the right to arrange for his son to be circumcised in 
accordance with the tenets of his faith.
667
  Therefore any limitations on that freedom 
imposed by a court had to be (1) as are prescribed by law; and (2) as are necessary in 
a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
668
    
 
Thorpe LJ identified the relevant law as being sections 1, 2, 3 and 8 of the Children 
Act 1989.  These set out: welfare principle as it emerges from section 1,
669
 the 
provisions giving both the mother and father parental responsibility and the power 
to act independently,
670
 and the power of the court to authorise or restrict the 
exercise of parental responsibility by either parent. 
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He noted that J’s father’s Article 9.1 right to manifest his religious belief was in direct 
conflict with the identical rights conferred on J’s mother.  Balancing their respective 
rights was necessary in a democratic society, as was safeguarding the welfare of the 
child J.  It is submitted that this analysis is wholly correct, and that in the event of a 
dispute over the religious upbringing of a child, there will almost always be a legal 
basis in the Children Act 1989 for limiting adult Article 9.1 rights; and also a need to 
balance the conflicting Article 9.1 rights of the parties involved and to protect 
vulnerable minors.  How this balance is achieved, and whether the proposed 
limitation to one party’s Article 9.1 rights are justified will turn on the facts of the 
particular case. 
 
The Strasburg case law on religious upbringing in relation to parental Article 9 rights 
has almost exclusively involved custody disputes where one of the parents has 
belonged to a minority religion.   In M.M. v Bulgaria,671 the applicant mother argued 
that the domestic courts effectively required her to end her involvement with the 
Warriors of Christ group if she wanted to regain her child.  The Commission found 
that she had an admissible complaint based upon infringement of her Article 9 
rights, but a full hearing did not take place as an amicable settlement was reached.    
 
In Hoffman v Austria,672 the mother was a Jehovah’s Witness and intended to bring 
the children up in accordance with the principles of this faith. The Court was not 
persuaded that the domestic courts had established that this justified treating her 
differently from the non-Jehovah’s Witness father and concluded that there was a 
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breach of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) in conjunction with 
Article 14 (freedom from discrimination in relation to Convention rights).   The court 
reached the same conclusion on very similar facts in Palau-Martinez v France;673 the 
mere fact that the mother was a Jehovah’s Witness was not sufficient evidence that 
the children would suffer harm in her care and under her influence. 
 
In contrast in FL v France,674 and Deschomets v France,675 the Court was satisfied that 
restrictions which domestic courts had placed on the applicant mothers (a member 
of the Raelian movement in FL and a Brethren lady in Deschomets) were acceptable.  
Both cases concerned mothers who were permitted to have custody of their 
children, but had their freedom to expose the children to their respective faiths and 
involve them in its practise limited.  In FL the restrictions to Articles 8 and 9 were 
justified on the basis of the children’s welfare needs, and the same conclusion was 
reached in relation to Article 8 in Deschomets (Article 9 was not addressed by the 
Court). 
 
Langlaude criticises these decisions for not focusing sufficiently, or indeed at all, 
upon the religious freedoms of the children concerned.
676
   The judgements focused 
entirely on the adult applicants.  It is submitted that whilst there is some validity in 
this appraisal, it is important to note that the welfare needs and best interests of the 
children were considered.  The overall pattern which seems to emerge is that 
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furthering the best interests of minor children will be a legitimate and sufficient 
reason to restrict parent freedoms pursuant to Article 9 and indeed Article 8.   
 
This essential position has been confirmed by both Strasburg and UK case law since 
Langlaude’s commentary was published.  In Re N Judge Clifford Bellamy endorsed 
the proposition that restricting the freedom of a parent to involve their child in the 
practise of his or her religion may be a justifiable restriction of parental Article 9 
rights, if it is a proportionate means of further the legitimate end of advancing the 
child’s best interests.
677
  The case concerned a dispute between two separated 
parents, a Jehovah’s Witness mother and a practising Anglican father. The father of 
four year old N was seeking to restrict the extent to which his mother forced N to 
live in accordance with the tenets of her faith.   
 
In considering this matter the judge carried out a detailed analysis of what this 
particular mother’s understanding of being a Jehovah’s Witness was mean for her 
son, for example in relation to attending the birthday parties of friends and 
attending church with his father.  
 
In both M and another v Romania,678 and Vojnity v Hungary,679 the European Court 
of Human Rights accepted the same fundamental point.  In M and another v 
Romania, it was noted that national authorities will have a wide margin in 
determining what is appropriate on the facts of individual cases; recognition of the 
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complexity and sensitivity of disputes which involve vulnerable children as well as 
competing human rights claims.  Nevertheless Vojnity v Hungary again demonstrated 
that mere membership of a particular group or denomination is unlikely to be 
sufficient reason to restrict the Article 9 rights of a parent; the facts must be 
carefully weighed and the restriction must be proportionate.  In that case the 
domestic court had labelled the father’s worldview as ‘irrational’ but had failed to 
demonstrate that his teaching his child about it was necessarily harmful. 
 
Ultimately, domestic courts must be able to show that any restrictions of parental 
Article 9 rights are indeed based upon genuine and demonstrable child welfare or 
other weighty issues.  In almost all cases mere membership of a particular religious 
group by one of the adult parties to a dispute will not be determinative.  This is in 
keeping with the point made earlier, that the relevant question is not and cannot be 
whether it is in the best interests of a child to be brought up in any particular faith.  
Rather it is whether it is in the best interests of a given child to receive the specific 
kind of religious upbringing offered by their parent or caregiver in their unique social 
and family context.  This is further evidence that cases will always turn on their facts. 
 
6) Nevertheless, the kind of reasoning applied by Thorpe LJ in this respect has received 
some criticism from commentators.
680
  In making a welfare determination, he 
regarded the actual impact of religious practice on the child to be far more 
significant than abstract doctrinal ideas held by parental faith groups.  This is entirely 
in keeping with the Strasburg case law and domestic legislation, but Jivraj and 
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Herman argue that a lack of focus on parental understanding and belief where 
minority cultures are concerned has resulted in an inherent prejudice in favour of 
underlying Western values.   However, it is very difficult to substantiate this criticism 
on the facts of Re J or reconcile it with the wording of the Children Act. 
 
The court approached both parental religions in the same way.  The fact that J was 
born to a Muslim father and the significance which this had to his faith community 
carried as much weight as the fact that he was born to an Anglican mother.  In 
neither case was the doctrinal status of the child in terms of parental religion treated 
with as much gravity as the child’s actual experience of that faith and its day to day 
impact upon his life.  It is difficult to see how a welfare determination could be made 
in accordance with the statute
681
 in any other way, as the text explicitly requires the 
court to consider the effect of the proposed order on the child and to make his or 
her welfare the paramount consideration.    
 
Commentators like Morris have supported the court’s method in highlighting the 
significance of family and societal context when making a welfare determination in 
religious upbringing cases.
682
  Arguably this strategy also makes sense in terms of 
recognising individual religious freedoms.  Edge
683
 argues convincingly determining 
the content of religious beliefs is deeply problematic for courts, and that the most 
appropriate approach is to simply focus on the beliefs of the parties before the 
court: 
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‘One way forward is to focus on the individual in order to determine the content of 
their beliefs. This strategy would treat the content of acknowledgedly authoritative 
texts, the statement of acknowledged members of a religious hierarchy, and even the 
beliefs of acknowledged co-religionists, as simply evidence to answer the 
fundamental question—what does the individual before the court believe?’684 
In a family law context this is especially helpful, as the question is never in reality 
‘What would it mean for this child to be brought up as a Christian or a Muslim or a 
Hindu?’  There is such a variety of practice and understanding within religions as to 
render a question couched in the above terms too general to be useful.  As argued 
above, in addressing the welfare needs of a specific child, the issue will always be, 
what would it mean to follow the relevant faith, as understood by the relevant care-
givers and the immediate faith community in which they participate?  But not only 
will this approach further the best interests of the child, it will also do full justice to 
the adults involved in any dispute, as it requires a sensitive and individual handling of 
the facts at issue.    
Exactly the same factors would be considered if the application was being made in 
respect of an order for baptism or some other Christian rite as opposed to 
circumcision.   The court would consider how it would have an impact upon the 
child’s experience in making a decision about his or her welfare, and this would be 
dependent upon the facts of the case. 
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Overall the decision in Re J says nothing which strongly indicates that baptism or other 
Christian sacraments would necessarily join circumcision in the category of decisions 
requiring unanimity amongst holders or parental responsibility, or a court order.  
The subsequent case of Re S had somewhat different facts, but supports the same 
conclusion.
685
  In this case a Muslim woman had married a Hindu of the Jain tradition.  They 
agreed during their relationship that any children were to be raised as Hindus with Islamic 
influences, and did in fact become parents to a son and a daughter.  At this stage the 
mother asked the father to convert to Islam.  He refused, but he did take part in a Muslim 
wedding ceremony whilst pretending to be a Muslim.   
When the couple separated the mother applied to the court for the children to become 
practising Muslims, and for her son to be circumcised.  She was living with her family again, 
practising her religion enthusiastically and taking part in the spiritual and social life of the 
Mosque.  She argued that if her children did not fully convert, she would be expelled from 
her religious community and her wider family would risk a similar fate.  The children’s father 
was opposed to their conversion, fearing that he would lose all contact with them, and that 
they would be denied any freedom of choice.  The issue of circumcision was particularly 
problematic, as the evidence in the case was that it was required by Islamic doctrine to 
render an adult male’s acts of prayer valid.
686
  In contrast it was strictly forbidden by 
Jainism, as a violent act which mutilated the body.
687
  Furthermore, it was submitted in 
evidence and accepted by the court that in the Jain community marriages, were usually 
arranged, and it would be almost impossible for a circumcised man to find a match. 
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Baron J rejected the mother’s application for the following reasons: 
1) The issue stemmed not from the children’s needs, but from the mother’s desire to 
portray herself as a Muslim.
688
  The court could not sanction or condone deception, 
especially when the children knew the truth.  Furthermore, the mother would be 
able to lead a perfectly satisfactory life without the order, and there was no evidence 
that she or her family would be ostracised.  There was no judicial speculation about 
what the implications would have been had the evidence in fact suggested that such 
a reaction from the relevant community was likely. 
2) The children were too old (at eight and ten) respectively to seek to favour one of 
their parental religions over the other.  During their parents marriage they had had 
exposure to both traditions as agreed.  It was in their best interests that this 
continued; for them to understand their heritage fully and to allow them the 
freedom to choose which religion, if any, they wished to follow in adult life. 
3) Circumcision was not in the boy’s best interests as it would limit his freedom of 
choice.  Islam permitted it at a later stage, at which point he would be in a position 
to make his own decision. 
4) The concern about the impact of conversion upon the children’s relationship with 
their father was genuine. 
Despite the very different factual context, Re S affirmed that circumcision was a matter 
requiring either universal consent from persons with parental responsibility or a court 
order.  The physical permanence of the procedure was emphasised, especially in a context 
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where it would permanently exclude the child from full participation in his father’s faith and 
cultural community.   
Again these particular considerations would not apply to a Christian sacrament such as 
baptism.   And in fact it was not suggested that there would be any issue with the children 
participating in Islamic or Jain rituals which did not involve the kind of physical risk and 
permanence of circumcision. Nothing in the case law indicates that any participation in the 
physical aspects of Christian worship would be likely automatically to require the consent of 
all parties with parental responsibility.  Therefore, it appears at the present time to be the 
case that a single adult can give valid consent on behalf of a child, and therefore remove the 
realistic potential for an action in trespass, at least where the child is lacking capacity. 
The child’s developing sense of religious and cultural identity 
In the case of adults lacking in capacity, it was argued that in determining best interests, it 
would be proper for a court to consider their social and cultural context, and their place and 
identity within their family and community.   There is support in case law for considering the 
way in which individuals are regarded and remembered, as well as their immediate physical, 
emotional and material needs.
689
 
With children the same case can be made; and contextual factors are explicitly referred to 
by the Children Act
690
 amongst the considerations to be weighed by a court making a 
welfare determination.  However, the courts have repeatedly acknowledged that children 
are still developing their religious and social identity, and that they have a need both to 
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understand their family heritage,
691
 and to be in a position to make independent choices 
when they reach sufficient understanding to do so.
692
  At the two polar extremes, the 
situation of a dying adult with dementia who is not expected to regain capacity and who has 
been a devout member of a particular faith for his or entire life is very different from that of 
an infant whose carers disagree about religious upbringing and rites of initiation. 
In considering best interests, a court will regard giving children an opportunity to 
understand and participate in their parental religious and cultural heritage as a benefit, and 
something to be enabled where possible.  In Re S favouring one parental religion when 
children had previously been exposed to both was expressly rejected.
693
  In Re J Thorpe LJ 
quoted passages from the judgement of Wall J with approval, including the judge’s 
acknowledgement that identifying with his Turkish father and his culture would be a benefit 
which circumcision would confer.
694
 
However, this potential benefit is not so overwhelming as to outweigh all other 
considerations.   In Re P the Court of Appeal emphasised that the welfare of the child is 
always the paramount consideration.
695  The court should not prioritise establishing or 
maintaining links with parental culture and religion above all other matters.  In this case the 
child was the daughter of Orthodox Jewish parents.  She was born with Down Syndrome, 
and during her infancy her family were unable to cope with her care.  She was fostered as a 
baby by a Roman Catholic couple, and despite several applications by her parents, she was 
still with them at the age of eight when her case came before the Court of Appeal.   It was 
                                                           
691
 Re S (Specific Issue Order: Religious Circumcision) [2004] EWHC 1282 (Fam) para 83; Re and D (Local 
Authority: Religious Upbringing) [2010] EWHC 2503 1 January 2011. 
692
Re S (Specific Issue Order: Religious Circumcision) [2004] EWHC 1282 (Fam) para 83. 
693
 Ibid. 
694
 Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child’s Religious Upbringing and Circumcision) 1 FLR per Thorpe LJ 574.  
695
 Re P (A Child) [1999] All ER (D) 449. 
202 
 
held that in the circumstances remaining resident with the people who had cared for her 
almost all life was in P’s best interests, regardless of the cultural and religious differences 
with her birth family. 
In Re D the child of a Presbyterian mother and a Roman Catholic father was being brought 
up by his paternal grandparents.
696
  His mother wished to have the child returned to her, or 
failing that for an order that he attend a Presbyterian Sunday school each week.  D himself 
was refusing to attend the Sunday School.  Again the court determined that in all the 
circumstances of the particular case, it was in the interests of D’s welfare to allow him to be 
brought up in the faith of his primary carers.  The welfare of D was the paramount 
consideration. 
Similarly, in Re T and M, the court found that participation in parental religion, at least to 
the extent desired by the adult applicant, was not in the best interests of the child.
697
  In this 
case the mother T and M converted to Islam some time after her divorce from their Roman 
Catholic father with whom they lived.  Their mother applied to have residence transferred 
to her, the children removed from collective religious education and to attend an exclusively 
Muslim school when they were old enough.   
Rejecting her application the court found that it was not in the children’s best interests for 
them to be subjected to a sudden change of life-style and environment. They had not so far 
spent their lives immersed in Islam, and it would be a traumatic for this to happen abruptly 
at this stage.  Furthermore, they were old enough to express some preference, and didn’t 
want this kind of dramatic change. 
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Both Re D698 and Re T and M699 illustrate that honouring parental wishes in respect of 
religious upbringing will come secondary to furthering the welfare of the child when courts 
are required to make a determination.  As discussed above, this is in accordance with the 
wording of the Children Act which stipulates that the welfare of the child must be the 
paramount consideration.
700
  It is also compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998,
701
 and 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  Although restricting a parent’s freedom to 
determine their child’s religious upbringing will ordinarily be a limitation of their Article 9.1 
right to manifest their belief,
702
 the need balance one individual’s Article 9 rights with 
another (e.g. the other parent) and the need to protect a vulnerable child, will often provide 
sufficient justification for such limitation.  Whether the limitation is justified in any 
particular case will of course depend upon the facts, but there is no necessary or inherent 
conflict between the present state of UK law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights in this regard. 
With children, as with adults lacking capacity, it is necessary for courts to make decisions in 
relation to religious matters on the basis of best interests.  However, because the factual 
context will very different with children, different factors will often need to be considered. 
3.4 (c)(ii) Conflict between the child and those with parental responsibility 
Where the child lacks capacity to make a decision, decision-making authority lies with those 
who have parental responsibility.
703
  If there is no conflict between holders of parental 
                                                           
698
 Re D (Care Order: Declaration of Religious Upbringing) [2005] NI Fam 10. 
699
 Re T and M (Minors) [1995] ELR 1. 
700
 Children Act s. (1). 
701
 Human Rights Act 1998.  
702
 Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child’s Religious Upbringing and Circumcision) 1 FLR 571-576 per Thorpe LJ 
paragraph headed ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
703
 Children Act ss (2) and (3). 
204 
 
responsibility, and no application to the court, the position is straightforward.   
Furthermore, on balance it appears that consent to the kind of liturgical actions undertaken 
by Christian clergy could validly be given by a single holder of parental responsibility acting 
alone.  There is no serious physical or psychological risk associated with them, nor is there a 
permanent physical change. The factors which have weighed heavily on courts deciding 
circumcision cases,
704
 especially the infliction of bodily injury and change, would not apply 
to anything which an Anglican priest would legitimately be doing.
705
 
Therefore, provided one person with parental responsibility consents, baptising a squirming 
and howling baby will not amount to a battery in law, however disgusted the child might be 
about it.  But with older children the situation is more complicated.  What level of 
understanding does a child need to have to be Gillick competent to decide whether to be 
baptised or to receive Communion?  What is the effect of the child’s capacity on the 
parent’s capacity to consent? 
The law, as set out by Lord Scarman in Gillick,706 appeared to be quite clear cut.  Once a 
child achieved capacity in relation to a certain issue, the right of those with parental 
responsibility to make decisions about that issue terminated.  However, the position was 
clouded by later judicial pronouncements in relation to consent to treatment.
707
  Lord 
Donaldson MR stated, obiter, that even where a child was capable of consenting to 
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treatment his or her refusal of treatment could be overridden by the provision of an 
alternative valid consent.
708
   At first sight this contradicts the dicta of Lord Scarman in 
Gillick, and has been much criticised by commentators.709  However, it is submitted that 
Lord Donaldson’s statement can be interpreted in a way which is consistent with Gillick, and 
which sheds some useful light on the position in relation to consent and religious issues. 
Macfarlane argues that Lord Donaldson’s analysis is incorrect.
 710
   He argues that if the 
hypothetical situation in fact arose, a court should not overrule the wishes of a competent 
young person for the following reasons: 
1) There has been a move in case law away from a paternal and protectionist approach 
towards a rights-based evaluation in respect of each child. 
2) This movement is in harmony with Articles 5 and 12 of UNCRC.
711
 
3) The individual rights-based approach draws in the flexible and sophisticated scheme 
for assessing capacity which is set out in the Mental Capacity Act.
712
  Whilst the Act is 
not directly applicable, it is a legitimate way of understanding the common law test 
for capacity. 
4) The Mental Capacity Act draws no distinction between the capacity to refuse and the 
capacity to consent. 
5) Rejecting Lord Donaldson’s approach to capacity and adopting one which mirrored 
the statutory scheme for adults would enable a court to create one standard for 
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evaluating capacity, irrespective of age.  This would be much more in tune with the 
organic development of capacity described by Lord Scarman in Gillick. 
The primary flaw with Macfarlane’s argument is his analysis of the Mental Capacity Act.
713
  
Capacity as defined by the statute is decision-specific.  To state that the Act draws no 
distinction between the capacity to consent to treatment and the capacity to refuse it, is 
ironically to underestimate the very sophistication which he praises.  It is actually entirely 
possible than an adult could be found to have capacity to consent to treatment under the 
Act, whilst at the same time be lacking consent to refuse it.   
In mounting a partial defence of Lord Donaldson, Gilmore and Herring argue in relation to 
children, that different levels of understanding are required depending upon the course of 
action contemplated.
714
  Capacity to consent to treatment requires simply an understanding 
of the treatment and its consequences, whereas refusal requires an understanding of the 
consequences of refusal.  One may be more complex than the other, allowing for the real 
possibility that a child might have capacity to consent but not refuse.  They cite the example 
of applying a plaster to a cut, understanding about having a plaster put on a graze is a 
different matter from understanding about septicaemia and infection. 
It is submitted that this is correct, and that the same reasoning applies whether dealing with 
an adult and the Mental Capacity Act or a child and the common law.  Whatever test of 
understanding is being applied, capacity will inevitably vary depending on the issues which 
must be understood in order to make an informed choice.  If a child has capacity to refuse 
treatment then his or her refusal may not be overridden, but having capacity to refuse may 
arrive later than having capacity to consent. 
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This is a helpful insight when it comes to considering decision-making in relation to religious 
matters; capacity is effectively decision-specific for children as well as adults.  Whether a 
child has capacity will turn on whether or not he or she understands and can assess the 
risks, benefits and other consequences of that decision. 
It is regrettable that there has not been more judicial guidance on children and capacity in 
the case law on religious upbringing.  In many cases the child’s preferences have been 
noted,
715
 but their lack of capacity has simply been assumed without analysis of 
explanation.   As Langlaude observes,
716
 this failure as apparent in the jurisprudence of 
Strasburg as well as national courts, at least in cases concerning disputes between adults 
over religious upbringing (as opposed to children seeking to assert their own rights in an 
educational context). However, it is submitted that the child would need to have some 
understanding of the social, cultural and emotional consequences of any proposed action, 
not merely its physical dimension.   
For example, in Re S717 it would not be enough for S to have attained capacity to decide 
about the physical risks of circumcision.  In order to decide the matter for himself, he would 
also have had to have understood the lifetime consequences of excluding himself from 
participation in his father’s religion and marriage within his community.  Although the 
absence of discussion on the point is unfortunate, it seems reasonable to assume that at 
eight S would almost certainly not have had capacity to make such a decision, especially 
when he would doubtless have been under pressure from both sides of his family.  In fact it 
is somewhat surprising that the court confidently asserted that by puberty he would be 
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Gillick competent to decide.
718
  Understanding and weighing those issues would require 
great emotional and intellectual maturity from a thirteen year old. 
Similarly, it is submitted that in the context of Christian sacraments, a child would need to 
understand more than what was physically involved.  For example, agreeing to be sprinkled 
with water and dabbed with holy oil does not carry great physical risk, but if deciding to be 
baptised would damage a child’s relationship with a parent of another faith, then 
understanding this would be a material factor in attaining capacity to make the decision. 
This is illustrated in one of the few UK cases which deal with a child in conflict with a parent 
in relation to religious upbringing, In the Matter of C.719  The case concerned C, a ten year 
old girl who wished to be baptised in the Church of England church where her father 
worshipped.  Her father supported this desire whilst her mother opposed it.  Consequently, 
a section 8 application was made in accordance with the Children Act 1989, for the matter 
to be determined by the court. 
Both of C’s parents were Jewish, but her father converted to Christianity after their marriage 
broke down. The couple divorced in 2010; prior to this time, C and her younger brother had 
been brought up in an essentially non-practising household.  The family did not observe 
Jewish festivals or Kosher dietary regulations; they attended the synagogue only if invited as 
guests to a wedding or Bar Mitzvah.  When their father began attending church both C and 
her brother wanted to accompany him, and did so with the consent of their mother.  C also 
attended a Christian event, the ‘New Wine’ festival, and it was after this that she announced 
that she wanted to be baptised. 
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As well as her mother, both sets of grandparents expressed opposition to the proposal.  The 
wider family argued that C was too immature to make such a decision, and that she had 
been unduly influenced by her father.  However, her father maintained that C knew her own 
mind, and had been consistent about the matter.  Furthermore, he had no objection to C 
attending a synagogue, receiving Jewish religious instruction or taking part in Jewish 
worship. 
Judge John Platt found that there was no binding precedent on this issue.
720
 Therefore, the 
section 8 application fell to be decided on the welfare principle set out in section 1(1) of the 
Children Act, the delay principle set out in section 1(2) and the statutory checklist set out in 
section 1(3). 
On this basis he found that it was in the C’s best interests for her to begin attending baptism 
classes.
721
 Furthermore, she should be presented for baptism as soon as the Minister of her 
church deemed her ready.
722
 He found that C’s emotional needs would be best met by her 
wishes being respected, and that further delay carried risk of her suffering further 
emotional harm.  He also concluded that C had reached ‘a sufficient degree of maturity and 
understanding to make a properly informed decision’.
723
   
In addition he found that baptism was not an ‘irrevocable’ step.
724
  It would not prevent 
reverting to the Jewish religion later in life if she so chose.  It was also only the first step 
towards full membership of the Church, which was conferred by Confirmation.  Her father 
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was forbidden to arrange for C to be confirmed until she attained the age of sixteen, 
without the written consent of her mother.
725
 
He also stated that the court had no power to order C to be baptised, as this decision was 
for the Minister of her church to take in light of his evaluation of her understanding and 
commitment.
726
  He did not discuss the implications of Canon B22, which imposes a duty on 
ministers to baptise infants presented to receive this sacrament provided that due notice 
has been given.  The Canon permits delay for the instructions or parents, guardians and 
Godparents, but makes no provision for delay so that infant baptismal candidates may be 
instructed.
727
 It appears to have been drafted with only babies and very young children in 
mind, which is problematic in cases such as this.   
The judgement could be harmonised with the Canon on the basis that the presentation for 
baptism here, by the parents on the basis of the Court order, was made contingent upon the 
minister deeming C to be spiritually, emotionally and intellectually ready to receive the 
sacrament.  So that C was effectively being presented for baptism, but not immediate 
baptism.  However, there is no internal evidence from the judgement that the judge 
intended this interpretation, or indeed that he had in any way turned his mind to the 
implications of Canon B22. 
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There are a number of worrying aspects about this decision, and the judicial reasoning 
which underpins it.  It does not appear to be either internally consistent, or in harmony with 
case law on child decision making capacity.  The judgement appears to imply that C was 
effectively Gillick competent to decide for herself about baptism, and yet the court 
nevertheless made an order and decided the matter for her.  There was no coherent 
explanation of the factors which the child or the court needed to understand or weigh in 
relation to decisions specifically of this kind (e.g. decisions about whether to receive a 
sacrament or other rite of initiation into a religious faith).  Furthermore the specific 
comment that it was for the minister responsible for baptising C to assess whether she 
understood the necessary issues is problematic.  Anglican priests do not claim any legal or 
psychological expertise which would equip them for such a task.  When an analogy with 
medical treatment is made the statement seems even less satisfactory; it is hard to imagine 
that in a case of dispute in that context a court would place ultimate responsibility for 
assessing capacity with a doctor.  And on top of all of this, there are statements in the 
judgement which suggest that the judge had not adequately understood and considered the 
doctrinal and cultural issues at play within C’s family context. 
 Taking the last of these issues first, it should be emphasised that this was a case of parental 
conflict as well as conflict between a child and a party with parental responsibility.  Trust 
had broken down between the parents; the mother feared that preparations were being 
made behind her back for C to be baptised, and made an ex parte application to prevent 
this.
728
  The judge was extremely critical of the mother for making an application in this way; 
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he argued that after having gained the impression from C that such preparations were 
under way she should have taken steps to ascertain from the father and his minister 
whether this was true, rather than rushing to apply to the court.
729
 
It is far from clear that such direct and harsh criticism would be helpful in encouraging C’s 
mother to accept the terms of the Order and seek to work more collaboratively with her ex-
husband in future.  But the more fundamental point is that regardless of where the balance 
of culpability lay, the reality was that C was caught between two feuding adults who neither 
trusted nor respected one another.  Very little consideration is given in the judgement to 
the potential which this situation would have had to reduce C’s chances of attaining capacity 
to make decisions about her religious path, when this was so intimately bound up with 
questions of identity and conflicting loyalties.  Her context was very different from one in 
which both of her parents agreed about religious matters. 
Importantly, the judge attached very little significance to the complex romantic life of C’s 
father after his divorce, despite the mother’s concerns that this had placed considerable 
stress on C.
730
  In less than two years he had been engaged to one woman and had 
subsequently married another.  This degree of domestic turbulence must inevitably have 
had the potential to affect C’s decision making in relation to religious matters.   
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Was sharing her father’s religion a way of attempting to attach herself to him more closely, 
possibly at an unconscious level, following the trauma of no longer sharing a family home 
and subsequently being introduced to first one stepmother and then another?  C would 
have been an exceptionally emotionally mature ten year-old if she was able to consider this 
possibility and assess its impact on her decision-making.  But if she could not consider this, 
then it is difficult to conclude that she could understand the possible social and emotional 
consequences of being baptised, effectively publically allying herself with her father against 
the wishes of her mother and both sets of grandparents. 
As a child at the centre of a bitter parental and familial dispute, C was particularly 
emotionally vulnerable.  And regrettably, cases in which a court is asked to adjudicate on 
matters of religious upbringing will frequently involve minors caught in such a situation.  
This emotional vulnerability is likely to have an adverse impact on decision-making capacity, 
and it is important that courts take cognisance of it.   It should also be a factor which clergy 
consider in cases where courts are not involved, and they are making decisions about 
whether minors have capacity to consent to baptism.  If relatives later wish to assert that 
the child lacked capacity, and that a trespass took place, it may well be relevant that the 
young person’s judgement would have been likely to be impaired by emotion or coercion.  
It is also important that courts fully understand the religious and cultural context within 
which the case is set, otherwise it is impossible for them to assess the impact of decisions 
on a child’s future.  There are a number of statements within the judgement which suggest 
that Judge Platt did not have adequate knowledge of either Judaism or Christianity.  For 
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instance, in paragraph 6 there is a reference to an order that neither child be baptised nor 
celebrate a bar mitzvah without the consent of both parents or a final hearing.
731
 
The coupling and apparent equation of bar mitzvah and baptism suggests a worrying lack of 
understanding of both Christianity and Judaism.  The term ‘Bar Mitzvah’ means literally son 
of the commandments, and refers to a boy coming of age for religious purposes at thirteen.  
Technically under Jewish law, children are not obliged to observe the commandments, 
although they are of course encouraged to do so as preparation for their adult life.  When 
boys reach the age of maturity, a Bar Mitzvah ceremony is a public demonstration and 
celebration of attaining this status and responsibility.  However, the ceremony is not a 
requirement, does not fulfil a commandment and does not confer Jewish status (that is 
conferred by birth or conversion).
732
 
Strictly speaking from a Jewish perspective, it is not possible to prevent a boy becoming a 
Bar Mitzvah, as it happens automatically when he reaches the relevant age.  In fairness the 
court order in this case was worded so as to prevent the celebration of a Bar Mitzvah, which 
does make logical sense.  However, C’s younger brother was many years away from his 
thirteenth birthday, and the term Bar Mitzvah does not apply to girls.   
In relation to C, the relevant term would be Bat Mitzvah, or daughter of the 
commandments.  A girl becomes a Bat Mitzvah when she turns twelve, and in the modern 
world this event is marked with a ceremony and party which in many branches of Judaism is 
parallel to that at a boy’s Bar Mitzvah, and is always a celebration.
733
  It is not really exactly 
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analogous to Anglican confirmation, because it is generally linked to the spiritual 
consequences of attaining a fixed age (although older persons can and do sometimes have a 
Bar or Bat Mitzvah
734
), rather than a personal decision to make a mature profession of faith, 
which may appropriately occur at any time after the candidate has reached the age of 
discretion, and the timing of which will depend upon individual circumstances.
735
  
 It is disturbing that the judge did not even use the correct term for the child at the centre of 
the case, and said nothing which displayed any understanding about the religious or social 
context from which the terms Bar and Bat Mitzah are drawn.  Specifically the point was 
entirely overlooked that from a Jewish perspective prior to attaining the age laid down in 
the commandments, a boy or girl cannot be a Bar or Bat Mitzvah, and is not understood to 
be obliged or capable of assuming adult obligations or decisions in a religious context.  Any 
relevance which this may have had for C’s mother or grandparents, and possible consequent 
impact upon C, was excluded from judicial consideration.   
It might be argued that C’s mother should have obtained more careful expert evidence, but 
it should be remembered that this was a case in the Family Division and not a commercial 
dispute; the primary obligation of the court was to base its decision on the best interests of 
the child at the centre of the case. 
Regrettably the judge displayed an equally distorted and superficial understanding of 
baptism from an Anglican perspective.  He correctly acknowledged that there are multiple 
and sometimes mutually inconsistent doctrines and practices relating to baptism within 
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contemporary Christianity.
736
  However, the interpretation of Anglican baptismal theology 
which he went on to put forward is problematic in a number of respects: 
‘However it is clear from the evidence that the father belongs to the Anglican Church and I 
accept his evidence and understanding of mainstream Anglican belief, which is the view of 
his church, that baptism is a ceremony in which the child is welcomed into the community of 
the church and starts his or her journey in faith. Through a process of instruction and the test 
of time that journey may, but does not inevitably, lead to a moment when the child, usually 
not before the child reaches the age of 16, has attained sufficient maturity and 
understanding of the Christian faith and chooses to become a full communicant member of 
the church by the ceremony of confirmation. 
I am also satisfied on the evidence that C understands that in order to be baptised she must 
declare her belief in God, which she has done to both her father and her mother, and having 
made that declaration she can then be welcomed into the fellowship of her church through 
the ceremony of baptism.’737 
To classify baptism as a first step in an individual journey of faith is not necessarily 
inaccurate, but this description does not reflect the fundamental belief that it is the rite by 
which an individual becomes a Christian and a member of the Church Universal.
738
  The 
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which those who receive it are incorporated into the Church of Christ’ and 61:3 ‘All baptised persons belong to 
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sacrament of baptism is not the beginning of a process by which a person becomes a 
Christian, but the sacrament which makes a person a Christian.   
In talking about becoming a ‘full communicant member’ of the church, Judge Platt 
demonstrates no understanding of the distinction in Anglican theology of being a member 
of the Church Universal and being a member of an institutional church.
739
  In spiritual terms 
to Anglicans, the capacity to take a full, adult part in the polity of their particular church is 
less significant than the Christian status conferred by baptism.  The rite of Confirmation is a 
reaffirmation of the commitment to Christ made at baptism.
740
  Confirmation is not absolute 
requirement for admission to Communion within Anglican theology.
741
  Some Anglican 
churches, including the Church of England permit baptised children who are not confirmed 
to receive Communion.
742
  In essence being baptised was a far more serious step than the 
judge in this case appeared to acknowledge. 
In separating baptism from confirmation in C’s case, the judge was also treating her as an 
infant for the purposes of Church of England Canon Law, and therefore the law of the 
State.
743
 
Furthermore, Judge Platt underplayed the significant differences between Christianity and 
Judaism.  For instance, he stated that in order to be baptised C must ‘declare her belief in 
God’.744  This statement misses that point that as a member of the Jewish religion C would 
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have a belief in God; in order to be baptised she would need to declare her faith in the 
distinctively Christian, Trinitarian understanding of God.
745
 
All of these points of doctrine mattered, because they affected how C, her family members 
and the Jewish and Christian communities of which was a part understood and interpreted 
her baptism.  They had an impact on the way in which the step moulded her personal, social 
and religious identity. Without an adequate knowledge of this, it is impossible for a court to 
assess the impact of the decision on C, her wellbeing and future life. 
It is also a matter of concern that the judge adopted an inconsistent approach to C’s own 
capacity to make this decision.  The following statement appears to imply that C was already 
Gillick competent to decide for herself about baptism: 
‘I am satisfied that C has already reached a sufficient degree of maturity and understanding 
to make a properly informed decision.’746 
If this was truly the case, then why was there a need, or indeed justification, for the court to 
make any order beyond declaring C competent to decide the matter for herself?  If Judge 
Platt did not intend to suggest that C was Gillick competent, then his choice of words is both 
puzzling and problematic, as it is hard to find a plausible alternative interpretation for them.  
Even if he was making the statement for the avoidance of doubt, he would have needed to 
clarify that C was simply exercising her own autonomy.  And if this was the case, how could 
the condition about the minister assessing her readiness be justified? 
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It is also interesting that he differed from the Cafcass
747
 recommendation in this matter, 
which was that the decision should be delayed for several years.
748
  The reasons given for 
this departure were that the Cafcass officer who actually interviewed C, as opposed to the 
line manager who recommended the delay, raised no specific concerns about C’s maturity.  
She presented as a bright, articulate child who had expressed a consistent desire over a 
matter of months and supported it with age appropriate reasons.
749
 
With all due respect to the judge, none of these matters are directly relevant in answering 
the question of whether C had attained Gillick competence to make an informed and 
autonomous choice.  There was no dispute that C was intelligent or that she lacked 
maturity, for a ten year old girl.  But that does not equate to asserting that she was in a 
position to understand and balance the issues which baptism raised, in her particular 
circumstances, including its long term impact upon her family relationships and developing 
religious and social identity.  A bright ten year old girl might well express a consistent desire 
for some months to marry a favourite pop star or Formula 1 driver, and give wholly age 
appropriate reasons for this, but that would hardly suggest that she was Gillick competent 
to enter into an adult relationship. 
At no point in the judgement did Judge Platt clearly outline why it was in C’s best interests 
to be baptised as soon as a minister at her church felt this appropriate, but that 
confirmation should be delayed until she was sixteen and had attained a greater degree of 
                                                           
747
 The Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service set up under the provisions of the Criminal 
Justice and Court Services Act 2000, with a remit to: safeguard and promote the welfare of children; give 
advice to the family courts; make provision for children to be represented; and to provide information, advice 
and support to children and their families.  It operates independently of the courts, social services, education 
and health authorities and all similar agencies. 
748
 In the Matter of C-Between A Mother (Applicant) and A Father (Respondent) Before his Honour Judge Platt, 
May 2012 para 61. 
749
 Ibid, para 63. 
220 
 
maturity.
750
  The inference appears to be that confirmation entailed full and formal 
membership of the church, whereas he expressly stated that baptism would create no 
irrevocable consequences.
751
  The difficulty with this is that baptism would have irrevocable 
consequences.  As discussed above, Judge Platt did not have a sufficiently nuanced 
understanding of the doctrinal significance of Baptism and Confirmation.  In reality from an 
Anglican perspective, and therefore in the eyes of C’s father and presumably C herself, 
baptism did have an irrevocable effect.
752
  It is difficult to argue plausibly that C’s father did 
not attach very great significance to C’s baptism, as he chose to contest C’s mother’s 
application to the court rather than settling and making a formal undertaking not to allow C 
to be baptised.  Otherwise, why not take the line of encouraging C to wait a few more years 
until she proved her maturity, reassuring her that God would understand and still look after 
her? 
Furthermore, the New Wine festival to which C’s father had chosen to take her as a 
responsible adult is an event with a strong proselytising emphasis.
753
  C would have been 
likely to have witnessed Charismatic Evangelical Christians speaking in tongues, being ‘slain 
by the spirit’ and urging others to join the faithful.  Exposing an emotionally vulnerable child 
to that environment, he must surely have known that there was a strong possibility that she 
                                                           
750
 Ibid, para 64. 
751
 Ibid, para 53: ‘Clearly, given her background and heritage, taking the first step along the road to full 
commitment to the Christian faith is a significant change of circumstances for C. However there is nothing to 
suggest that she will be any less loved by her mother in consequence nor to their credit is their any suggestion 
by either grandparents that she will not continue to be welcomed by them as a much loved granddaughter. 
There is no suggestion that she will not be able to attend the synagogue or to lean more about the Jewish faith 
if she wishes. There are no irrevocable consequences which will flow from her baptism.’ 
752
 PCL Principle 61:10: ‘Valid baptism is indelible and cannot be repeated’. 
753
 See for example reports in the secular press, The Independent, Thursday 6 August 2009, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/evangelical-christianity-its-glastonbury-for-god-
1767917.html: ‘It is powerfully spiritual experiences like these that the evangelical movement is keen to export. 
and the importance of proselytising plays a prominent role in many of the daily seminars on offer to the faithful 
at New Wine.’  Advertisements by the New Wine organisation make statements like ‘Join us for an 
unforgettable week to get inspired, empowered and fired up to change lives, communities and the nation!’ 
www.new-wine.org (accessed 6/01/2013). 
221 
 
would be drawn in and wish to accept what was being forcefully and enthusiastically 
offered.   
The judge noted that it was neither suggested nor likely that C’s mother and grandparents 
would cease to love her if she was baptised.
754
  Neither would undergoing a Christian 
baptismal rite prevent her from reverting to Judaism if she later so chose.  But neither of 
these considerations means that there would not be long term consequences for her 
relationships with the adults in her life.  It is even plausible that C could end up ultimately 
resenting her father, if she later decided to renounce Christianity and felt that she had been 
unduly influenced.   
The dispute had ended up and remained before a court precisely because both sides felt 
passionately about it.  Realistically C was a child caught in a very complex situation, and 
there were potentially long term emotional and social consequences of publically allying 
herself to the cultural and religious world of her father rather than that of her mother.  
Whether or not the act of being baptised had irrevocable spiritual consequences for her 
Jewish relatives, it certainly risked having irrevocable emotional ones for them and 
therefore also for C. 
The final anomalous aspect of the judgement is that the judge emphasised that he did not 
have power to order a Church of England minister to baptise C.
755
  However it is far from 
clear that this is the case.  Priests within the Church of England have a duty to baptise any 
child brought to them, provided that ‘convenient warning’ is given beforehand.
756
  No 
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maximum age is specified for such children, so if the court order gave C’s father power to 
bring her for baptism, then the minister would have a duty to administer it and a court could 
properly order him or her to comply with that duty. 
Ultimately the case demonstrates how critical the factual context is in respect of disputes 
about religious upbringing, and how courts can only make an adequate welfare 
determination if they have a sufficient understanding of this context.  It is to be hoped that 
at some stage a higher court will provide more coherent and nuanced guidance in respect of 
the issues which may arise in relation to Christian baptism.  Clearly however the 
consequences for the children at the centre of such disputes are more far reaching than the 
immediate physical effect of being sprinkled with or immersed in water.  In order to give 
valid consent they must have some understanding of the impact of the decision on their 
religious and social context and growing individual identity. 
As with other matters, a child’s capacity to consent or refuse participation in Christian 
worship with be case and fact specific.  The consequences of the decision will vary, and 
therefore the issues which a child must be able to assess to make the decision will also vary.  
However once a child has attained capacity, it is submitted that despite the ambiguous 
judicial statements in Re C which are discussed above, no-one else can validly give or refuse 
consent on his or her behalf.  It is difficult to conceive of many circumstances in which 
overriding the wishes of an individual with decision making capacity in relation to baptism 
would be compatible with Article 9 of the ECHR. 
 
3.4 (c) (iii) Trespass to the person and the rights of the child 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
matters of doctrine, ritual or ceremonial.  It is therefore difficult to argue that the judge in this could not have 
ordered C to be baptised if she were properly presented for baptism. 
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The law of tort is a useful mechanism for protecting the rights of the child in this respect, 
because battery is concerned with the corporeal integrity of the individual involved.  
Infringement of a child’s corporeal integrity is as much a battery as the infringement of an 
adult’s corporeal integrity; in either case the action will be a trespass unless there is lawful 
justification.
757
  In relation to tort the critical question is whether there was valid consent in 
relation to the action given by or on behalf of the child.  The rights and priorities of third 
parties are not directly relevant. 
In the case law on religious upbringing, the capacity of children to make independent 
decisions has been almost entirely overlooked.  In the one case in which it was brought to 
the forefront, Re C, the child arguably suffered potential harm because her capacity to make 
decisions was inadequately assessed.   The question of whether she properly understood 
the potential risks and benefits of the proposed course of action was never tackled head on 
or in an adequate manner.  The court itself struggled to present and assess the issues in the 
case coherently, and consequently was utterly unable to assess whether the child involved 
was in a position to do so. 
Had the courts focused on trespass as the most obvious form of redress for physical rites 
undertaken without valid consent, the general judicial focus could not have moved so far 
away from the children at the centre of these cases.  The questions of who did, who can and 
who must consent would have had to have been addressed. 
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The absence of higher judicial consideration of children’s capacity is now regrettably 
reflected in the Church in Wales’ guidance on parental consent for the baptism of a child.
758
   
When an individual applies to have a child baptised, the consent of all persons with parental 
responsibility must be sought (save in an emergency).  If one such person cannot be located, 
it is ‘recommended’ but not required that the diocesan bishop should be consulted before 
the baptism goes ahead.  Furthermore if it appears that a person having parental 
responsibility for a child has applied for a court order to prohibit that baptism, the baptism 
cannot proceed without prior consultation with the diocesan bishop. 
This raises a number of questions with regard to the meaning of the guidance: 
a) What is the purpose of a recommendation as opposed to a requirement for 
consultation? 
b) Does the requirement for ‘consultation’ only mean that consent of the bishop is not 
required? 
c) What definition of emergency is to be adopted for the purposes of this guidance? 
But however these questions are answered, the liability of the individual cleric in secular law 
will remain unaffected.
759
  Having been instructed by a third party to commit a trespass is no 
defence to that trespass; prior consultation with the bishop would be in no way be 
protective if the cleric were to proceed without valid consent. 
And at no point does the guidance deal with the child’s own capacity to consent or withhold 
consent.  A cleric following the guidance would be obliged to seek parental consent for a 
teenager requesting baptism.  Whilst doing so would not render them liable to an action in 
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tort, it does mean that the Church in Wales is less prepared to recognise the capacity of 
children for self-determination than the current secular law.  
3.5 Conclusions - Trespass to the person and liability of Church in Wales clergy 
Overall, as stated at the outset of this chapter, the secular law in this area is complex and 
the guidance currently issued by the Church in Wales is unhelpful.  It is almost equally 
complicated and as discussed above, at times contradictory.  If the CTS were amended to 
reflect the following basic principles, clergy would have a better framework for both 
avoiding potential claims and also for ensuring that they respected the autonomy and rights 
of those to whom they minister. 
1) When dealing with adults who have capacity to make decisions for themselves, the 
wishes of such adults in relation to physical contact should be appropriately 
ascertained.  Their wishes in declining physical contact should always be respected 
(provided that they are not posing an immediate physical threat to a third party).  
2) When dealing with adults whose capacity to make decisions is impaired, clergy 
should act in a way which furthers their best interests and respects their dignity.   In 
determining best interests, the wishes of both the adults in question and families 
and carers should be taken into account. 
3) When dealing with children, their capacity to make decisions should be carefully 
assessed.  If a child has capacity to make a decision then their wishes should be 
respected in the same way as an adult.  However, in the event of there being any 
doubt about the child’s capacity to consent to any action which would otherwise 
constitute a trespass, the permission of those with parental responsibility should be 
sought.  If there is a dispute between those with parental responsibility, clergy 
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should refrain from acting until the dispute is resolved (either by the parties or a 
court).  An exception may be made with regard to infant baptism if there is 
immediate danger of death, but the bishop should be informed as soon as 
reasonably practicable after this has taken place.   
4) The duty to baptise should be expressly amended in both CTS and Canon law to 
allow for an exception where the baptismal candidate is under eighteen years of age 
and there is a dispute between persons with parental responsibility.  (This would not 
prevent a cleric baptising a seventeen year old if he or she was convinced that the 
young person was Gillick competent to decide to be baptised.  But it would remove 
any question of there being a duty to baptise a minor presented by one person with 
parental responsibility contrary to the wishes of others.) 
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CHAPTER 4 
LIABILITY OF CLERGY IN NEGILGENCE 
 
4.1 Overview 
 
Having considered the position in relation to trespass, the discussion now turns to individual 
clergy and negligence.  In Maga v Trustees of the Birmingham Archdiocese of the Roman 
Catholic Church the Court of Appeal not only found a church to be vicariously liable for the 
trespasses of a paedophile priest, but also held that it was vicariously liable in negligence for 
failings on the part of other clergy, who failed to adequately address the situation when it 
came to their attention.
760
 
To date most commentators have focused on the significance of the case in relation to the 
development and application of vicarious liability for trespass.
761
  Whilst this aspect of the 
decision is undoubtedly of great consequence (and is dealt with at length in Chapter 2 of 
this study), it is submitted that Maga also has important implications for the application of 
the tort of negligence and direct liability in a church context. 
Concentrating on vicarious liability, commentators like Scorer have regarded the decision 
exclusively in negative terms for those seeking to limit the exposure of clergy and churches 
to civil liability.
762
  However, viewed from the perspective of direct liability, the case actually 
provides confirmation that there are clear limits to the reach of negligence.  When read in 
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light of other recent case law on the duty of care in negligence,
763
 Maga can be seen as 
conforming to a general pattern.  The appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed that there 
remains a sharp distinction between causing harm to third parties and failing to prevent it.  
In the case of the latter, liability will only arise in restricted circumstances, as there is no 
general duty in UK law to protect others from harm.
764
  The defendant must have either 
owed a duty of care to the claimant, or acted in such a way as to assume one.  As Lord 
Hoffman expressed it: 
‘This argument is based upon the sound intuition that there is a difference between 
protecting people against harm caused to them by third parties and protecting them against 
harm which they inflict upon themselves. It reflects the individualist philosophy of the 
common law. People of full age and sound understanding must look after themselves and 
take responsibility for their actions. This philosophy expresses itself in the fact that duties to 
safeguard from harm deliberately caused by others are unusual and a duty to protect a 
person of full understanding from causing harm to himself is very rare indeed.’765 
On the facts of Maga, a clergy colleague of the paedophile priest was found to have 
assumed a duty of care to the Claimant.
766
  Despite having received serious complaints 
about the priest’s behaviour, he failed to properly monitor him, or to take appropriate steps 
on the basis of what he either observed or should have observed.
767
  Consequently he 
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knowingly perpetuated a dangerous situation of which (the then juvenile) claimant was 
unaware, allowing the claimant and other young boys to be exposed to serious risk.   
In such circumstances it is unsurprising that the courts would find that the defendant had 
assumed a duty of care.  In permitting a man accused of sexual abuse to continue to occupy 
a position of trust, the cleric and the church concerned could reasonably be said to be 
assuming a responsibility to ensure that that trust was not abused. 
However, it is submitted that the tragic circumstances in Maga were quite extreme; beyond 
the realm of sexual abuse cases, the instances in which clergy could be said to owe or 
assume a duty of care are comparatively few and far between.  Priests do not provide advice 
or services of a therapeutic or quantifiable nature; they are not held out as possessing 
expertise which would enable them to assess and safeguard the mental or physical health of 
those to whom they minister.
768
  Furthermore they are neither expected nor permitted to 
control people in pastoral situations.
769
 
It is therefore hard to see what the nature and scope of a duty of care to protect third 
parties would be in a clergy context.  Without any therapeutic expertise or power to control 
others, it is debatable whether clergy even really have the capacity to protect them from 
harm, much less a demonstrable duty to do so.  Potential claimants would struggle to 
establish what the nature and ambit of any duty of care might be. 
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Properly understood, Maga is part of a body of case law which renders actions against 
clergy for failing to protect others from harm unlikely in all but very restricted 
circumstances.  It does of course affirm that liability in negligence will often ensue for 
conduct which places third parties in danger, but that proposition was never really in doubt.  
It is to be hoped that instances of clergy causing personal injury or property damage in the 
course of their work would be comparatively rare.    Read in its proper context, the Maga 
decision should be more reassuring than disturbing for those concerned about clergy 
liability in tort. 
4.2 Background - Actions in negligence for causing personal injury and property damage 
As Ogilvie notes in considering the Canadian context,
770
 the general principles of civil and 
criminal law operate for clergy and religious institutions, as they do for legal persons in the 
secular world.  The tort of negligence, as it has evolved from the legendary Donoghue v 
Stevenson,771 applies to clergy as to anyone else.  If clergy succeed in injuring their 
neighbour in the course of their duty, they will be liable provided that the claimant can 
establish: 
a) that the defendant owed him or her a duty of care 
b) that there was a breach of that duty; 
c) damage occurred as a result of that breach; and 
d) the damage was not too remote. 
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In Donoghue v Stevenson Lord Atkin defined a ‘neighbour’ as: 
‘persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have 
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or 
omissions which are called in question.’772 
Consequently, if a priest does something which may foreseeably injure someone of whom 
he or she should be aware, a potential claim in negligence may arise.  This could be a direct, 
personal action, such as placing a Communion wafer into the mouth of someone known to 
be unable to swallow and allowing them to choke. Or it could involve creating a dangerous 
situation which gave rise to an injury or property damage.  In the United States, a plaintiff 
attempted to sue his former church for injuries sustained when he fell over ‘consumed by 
the Spirit’ and nobody caught him.
773
  He argued that the pastor had placed him in danger 
by allowing him to expect that ‘catchers’ would prevent him from hitting the floor, as they 
had always been present on previous occasions.
774
 
 
Had the case been brought in the United Kingdom, the claimant would have needed to 
demonstrate that the pastor responsible owed him a duty of care, presumably on the basis 
that he or she had permitted and even encouraged people to collapse backwards on the 
understanding that they would be safely caught.  If successful in this he would then have 
had to prove that the pastor breached the duty by withdrawing the catching service without 
adequate warning, and that his injuries were a foreseeable consequence of that breach. 
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Whether or not he would have succeeded in England and Wales would depend upon the 
facts of the case.  (Some further consideration is given to the issue within the case studies in 
Chapter 5.) 
It is also settled law that personal injury includes mental as well as physical harm.
775
  
Therefore if a cleric were to behave in a manner which foreseeably caused psychiatric harm 
to a third party, liability could ensue.  However, such conduct would have to be fairly 
extreme, and it is unsurprising that there are no reported UK cases of a cleric causing such 
harm. More likely, as two instances from the United States demonstrate, are claims for 
negligently failing to prevent either physical or mental injury. 
4.3 The contrasting cases of Nally and Tarasoff 
In Nally v Grace Community Church,776 the defendants were pastors of a Protestant church 
which was sued for failing to prevent the suicide of the twenty year old Nally.  His parents 
argued that these pastors encouraged him to take control of his own life, rather than 
seeking psychiatric care.   
In response the defendants presented evidence that they had made every effort to 
persuade Nally to see and cooperate with his doctors; during a crisis they had even 
contacted both a psychiatric hospital, and Nally’s parents, in an effort to get him admitted 
there.  The record showed that the plaintiff’s mother had actually been very obstructive 
when attempts were made to hospitalise her son, responding that ‘no, that’s a crazy 
hospital.  He’s not crazy.’777 
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But the conduct of the respective parties in relation to causation was ultimately not 
material, as the court refused to impose a duty of care on the defendants or other non-
therapist counsellors.
778
  Lucas CJ
779
 observed that this was a case where the plaintiffs were 
seeking to make the defendants liable for the actions of another (i.e. Nally himself in 
committing suicide), and failing to prevent harm.  He regarded such actions as succeeding 
only if there was some special relationship of custody or control between the parties.    
On the facts Nally was not in any sense in the custody of the pastors; he was not in a 
hospital, prison or other institution for which they were responsible.  Neither was the 
relationship between spiritual advisor and the recipient of pastoral care one which gave rise 
to a duty to prevent harm.  There were two principal reasons against finding such a duty 
arising from this relationship:  1) such a duty would have a detrimental effect on voluntary 
counselling services;
780
 and 2) it would be difficult to establish a workable standard of care 
for people claiming spiritual rather than medical expertise.
781
 
Although there were also issues which concerned the US Constitution,
782
 and which would 
not apply in an English or Welsh context, most factors in the ratio in Nally would carry 
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similar weight if considered by a UK court.  The public policy considerations raised by Lucas 
CJ,
783
 about placing undue burdens on voluntary organisations seeking to assist individuals 
which in need, would be equally relevant in Britain.  But more compellingly UK courts will 
only impose a duty of care when it would be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to do so.
784
  The 
difficulty of applying objective standards to people without clinical expertise would make it 
almost impossible for the duty to operate in a consistent, and therefore ‘fair, just and 
reasonable’ way.   
Constructing something like the Bolam test785 for clergy and other non-therapist counsellors 
would be extremely problematic.  What would a reasonably competent clergy person be 
expected to know and to do when faced with someone suffering a mental health crisis, 
given that they have no professed clinical expertise?  Even asserting that they have a duty to 
alert a third party or agency with such expertise would be difficult to justify, as this still 
requires ministers to differentiate between somebody whose behaviour is emotional, 
unreasonable or eccentric and somebody who is ill and in danger.  For persons without 
specialist knowledge and training, this judgement is a testing one. 
Following Bolam a doctor or other professional will not be negligent if their conduct 
conforms to that of a reasonable body of expert opinion within their profession,
786
 and 
meets the standard expected of a reasonable professional with their level of training and 
expertise.  But it is difficult to see how this could be made to operate in a context where 
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neither the defendant nor his or her fellow ‘professionals’ were claiming any expertise in 
diagnosing or treating mental illness.  If no objective standard could be established, the 
defendant could hardly be shown to have negligently fallen short of it.  For these reasons it 
is hard to imagine that the Nally case would have had a different outcome if it had been 
brought in the UK. 
 
But what about situations which do not necessarily turn on professional expertise?  In 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,787 a student at Berkley named Poder 
developed an unhealthy attachment to Tarasoff, a fellow student.  He disclosed having had 
violent thoughts about her to the university therapist, who was concerned enough to alert 
the campus police.  The campus police interviewed Poder, but took no action when he 
denied any wish to do her harm.  Three weeks later he shot and killed Ms Tarasoff, and her 
family successfully sued in negligence.  The court found that where there was an identifiable 
third party at risk, and that the therapist had a duty to warn that third party and not simply 
to alert other authorities.  The principle in the Tarasoff case was subsequently taken up and 
applied in other US states.
788
 
Could the Maga decision be used to argue for the implementation of a similar principle in 
UK law?  At a superficial level there are some similarities.  In both Tarasoff and Maga, the 
defendants were found liable for failing to adequately protect someone at risk from the 
criminal acts of a third party, when the third party in question was known to be a potential 
danger.   
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However, despite this seeming similarity it is submitted that the cases are in fact very 
different, and that properly understood Maga sits comfortably within a body of case law 
discussed below, which makes it unlikely that anything like the Tarasoff principle could 
apply in current UK law. 
4.4 UK law and a duty to protect others from harm 
The starting point of judicial discussions on protecting others from harm is almost always 
that there is no general duty in the UK to act as a Good Samaritan.
789
  Cases where such a 
positive duty to safeguard is recognised, generally involve defendants who are in a position 
of significant control over a vulnerable person. Examples include: a parent with a minor 
child,
790
 a hospital with a person detained under mental health legislation,
791
 or a prison or 
police force with prisoner.
792
   
It is submitted that even though clergy are frequently in a position to exercise considerable 
influence over emotionally vulnerable people, as the CTS of the Church in Wales expressly 
acknowledge.
793
 Clergy do not wield power and control over parishioners and others 
receiving pastoral care which is analogous to that exercised by the persons in the three 
examples cited above.  In the case of a child, patient or prisoner, those with a duty of care 
are in a position to determine almost every aspect of the environment and daily life of the 
person to whom the duty is owed.  There are therefore pressing public policy reasons for 
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ensuring that this power is properly exercised and not abused.
794
 Infants, prisoners and 
patients are vulnerable and extremely dependent on those entrusted with their care.  
In cases where there is not such a huge imbalance of power, the courts appear to be far 
more reluctant to find that a positive duty to protect is owed.
795
  Partly this may be because 
there is not the same public policy need to protect the vulnerable from an abuse of power. 
Furthermore it is less obviously ‘fair, just and reasonable’796 to hold claimants responsible 
for harm when they are in a much weaker position to guard against it. 
 
In recent judgements where there this kind of control absent, courts have been far more 
reluctant to find a duty of care.  In Mitchell v Glasgow City Council,797 an abusive tenant was 
called to a meeting by the Council, and threatened with eviction if he did not improve his 
behaviour.  After the meeting he murdered his next door neighbour, whom he blamed for 
his troubles with the Council and towards whom he had been abusive and occasionally 
violent for years.  The neighbour’s estate sued the Council, arguing that they had owed him 
a duty of care.  The House of Lords disagreed. 
It was held that there was no duty of care owed by the Council as landlord to protect one 
tenant from assault by another by warning him or her of the potential risk; and that a duty 
to safeguard a third party from harm generally only arises where the defendant has 
assumed responsibility for that third party’s safety.
798
  Neither was the Council’s action in 
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calling the meeting in any way wrongful or negligent.
799
 In other cases where liability had 
been imposed for damage flowing from the criminal action of someone other than the 
defendant, the defendant’s negligence had in some way enabled that criminal act.  This 
enabling may not necessarily amount to causation, but is nevertheless an important factor 
in the case.  The case of Stansbie v Trotman was cited, in which a painter carelessly left a 
house which he was painting unlocked, and was held to be liable for a burglary which took 
place.   
In all of the circumstances in Mitchell there was no basis for asserting that a duty of care to 
protect the deceased arose either from his relationship with the Council, or from the 
Council’s conduct.  They owed no duty and had not acted so as to assume one. 
The Court of Appeal took a similar view in X and another v London Borough of Hounslow.800  
In this case a couple with learning difficulties living in the community with their two minor 
children had been exploited by a group of local youths, who used their home as a place to 
indulge in various species of anti-social and criminal behaviour.  Their social worker was 
aware of this, and after certain incidents wrote to the Council housing department 
requesting a transfer.  However, she judged that it was in the family’s best interests to wait 
for a house rather than be moved as an emergency.  It was accepted that this was an 
appropriate professional decision, and that there was no negligence on her part.
801
  
Unfortunately before they were moved, some of the local youths subjected the couple to an 
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appalling and degrading assault in front of their two children.  The couple subsequently 
brought proceedings against the Council. 
Despite the vulnerability of the couple, the Court of Appeal found that there was no duty of 
care because the Council had done nothing to assume one.
802
  The authority did not have a 
responsibility to protect the couple from deliberate wrong-doing behaviour of other people.  
Furthermore, it had limited power to do so; it was not in a position to regulate whom the 
claimants chose to admit to their home. 
The same conclusion was again reached in Webster v The Ridgeway Foundation.803  After 
quarrelling two school boys arranged to fight on the tennis court after school; despite 
having agreed that this would be one to one, the younger boy called his friends and family 
on his mobile ‘phone.  A group of adults turned up to the appointed place, and one of them 
attacked the older boy with a claw-hammer causing brain damage.   
The judge found that the school did not owe the claimant a duty of care in respect of the 
incident, the duty to keep the pupil reasonably safe during school hours and for a 
reasonable time afterwards whilst he remained on school premises, did not extend to 
protecting him from criminal act by third parties.  The school was not in a position to 
prevent adults coming on to the property and behaving as they did; whatever discipline 
policy was in place, it would not have prevented the attack.
804
 
All of these cases demonstrate how difficult it is for claimants to establish that defendants 
assumed a duty to protect them from harm caused third parties, especially when this harm 
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is the consequence of deliberate wrong-doing.  The facts of the Maga case fit with this 
general pattern. 
4.5 The Decision in Maga 
The claimant met Fr Clonan when he was admiring his sports car, was befriended by him, 
invited to church discos and given various odd jobs to do in return for payment.  He was also 
sexually abused by Fr Clonan.  A more senior priest in the same parish, Fr McTernan, had 
received serious complaints and allegations about Fr McTernan.  Although it was accepted 
that it was inappropriate to judge his response by contemporary standards, the court found 
that the action which he took was woefully inadequate even by the standards of the 
1970s.
805
  He failed to observe Fr Clonan to see whether there was any substance in the 
allegations; had be done so, he would certainly have discovered that there was. 
 
The House of Lords found that after he was on notice of a potential risk, he had a duty of 
care towards young boys who came into contact with Fr Clonan, and to be vigilant in 
observing the Fr Clonan’s conduct.
806
  In failing to do so, he was in breach of that duty.  It is 
submitted that this finding is consistent with the case law discussed above, and that it 
affirms the general reluctance to hold defendants liable for a failure to protect claimants 
from harm, for the following reasons: 
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1) In reality Fr McTernan’s conduct was an infliction of harm rather than a failure to act.  
He chose to continue to place Fr Clonan in a position of trust, and to give him the 
privileged access to young people which his clerical status afforded.   He was also 
directly responsible for Fr Clonan’s day to day work and conduct, and chose to leave 
this unchecked.  In allowing Fr Clonan into the community, Fr McTernan was 
effectively releasing something dangerous into the local environment.   (He would, of 
course, have been personally liable for this as well rendering the church vicariously 
liable.)  This is a very different situation from a landlord or a school being faced with 
unexpected criminal action from a third party over of whom they had no control or 
knowledge. 
2) Even in these circumstances, the court carefully considered the scope of the duty 
which was owed.  It was made clear that liability would only ensue from matters 
within the ambit of that duty.
807
  Fr McTernan’s duty was towards boys who came 
into contact with Fr Clonan, not to the world in general.   
Had the facts occurred in the twenty-first century rather than the 1970s, it would be 
reasonable to assert for example that the Fr McTernan’s would not necessarily owe a 
duty to any boys Fr Clonan contacted anonymously via the internet at a cybercafé on 
his day off.  If they were unaware of his clerical status and Fr Clonan was not using 
church equipment or premises for his activities, liability would presumably not 
attach.   
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This is in keeping with Calvert v William Hill,808 in which the Court of Appeal held that 
a bookmaker did owe a duty of care to a compulsive gambler with whom they had 
entered into an agreement, expressly to prevent him placing telephone bets and 
suffering harm from his losses.  But that duty only extended to the responsibility 
which they had assumed. They did not have a duty to prevent him from gambling in 
other ways or with other bookmakers. 
Following Maga and in light of the other case law in this area, Church in Wales clergy will 
only be liable for : a) negligent acts which cause harm to others; and b) failure to protect 
those for whom they have assumed a duty of care, for harm within the scope of that duty.  
The situations in which b) is likely to apply are strictly limited.  It would be wrong to 
characterise Maga as a case which in any way widened the liability of clergy in direct 
negligence.  The implications of the case for direct negligence have to date been largely 
overlooked amidst the commentary on vicarious liability. 
4.6 Scope of responsibility assumed by Church in Wales clergy 
On the basis that Church in Wales clergy will only be liable in negligence in so far as they 
assume responsibility for the safety of others, it is necessary to examine the scope of 
responsibility which they do assume. 
4.6 (1) Qualifications and training 
What qualifications and training are Church in Wales required to have, and what expertise 
do they therefore hold themselves out as possessing?  Modern canon law in the Church in 
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Wales does not explicitly address preliminaries to ordination.
809
  Therefore, the matter is 
governed by the principles of pre-1920 ecclesiastical law (which continues to apply to the 
Church in Wales unless and until it is modified by the Church in Wales).
810
 
No minimum period of study is required, and no specific academic or vocational 
qualification is demanded before an individual can be ordained.
811
  Ordination is in the 
discretion of the bishop, and this discretion is wide in relation to suitability.
812
  The 
Provincial Selection Panel is responsible to the Bench of Bishops for advising the diocesan 
bishops as to the suitability of candidates for training for ordination.   But the training and 
course of study to be undertaken will vary from candidate to candidate,
813
 and the decision 
whether to ordain them at the end of it resides with the bishop.
814
 
This flexibility and diversity is unsurprising, given that the Church in Wales explicitly 
acknowledges that the ministry of individual priests and deacons varies widely depending 
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upon the context into which they are to be deployed.
815
  It is a defensible proposition that 
different types of priestly and diaconal ministry will require different skills, knowledge and 
aptitudes, and that therefore specifying uniform and universal training is unnecessary and 
potentially even unhelpful.  Although conversely, it might be argued that there are some 
core skills and capabilities which will be needed by all ordained persons regardless of 
context. 
 But regardless of the rationale, the current bottom line is that Church in Wales clergy are 
not required to have any training or qualification in mental health, pastoral care, first aid or 
counselling.   
They are not held out as necessarily possessing any specialist expertise in these areas.  In 
assessing a candidate for ordination a bishop is formally required to be satisfied that they 
are of good life and conversation;
816
 he is not required to satisfy himself that they meet any 
standard of competence in academic or technical disciplines. 
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This position is reflected in the CTS; clergy are to be aware of the limits of their personal 
competence and skill and to recognise the distinction between pastoral care and 
counselling.
817
   
Ordination within the Church in Wales is not automatically indicative of any particular 
training or skill which would enable a cleric to provide practical support or protection to an 
individual in need above and beyond that which any concerned lay friend could give. 
 
4.6 (2) Institutional representations 
What representations does the Church in Wales make about the care and assistance it 
provides, either partially or entirely through the work of its clergy, and to what extent may 
these representations give rise to a duty of care?  
Again modern canon law does not make explicit statements about specific forms of 
assistance to be provided by clergy in carrying out their pastoral duties, nor does the 
guidance contained within the Clergy Terms of Service.
818
   The representations which are 
made are very general, for example: 
‘Pastoral care will seek to bring about Christ-like wholeness, both personal and corporate’819 
The statement requires clergy to promote the welfare of individuals for whom they are 
pastorally responsible, but it is too general to conveniently crystallise into tangible 
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promises.  For instance, the drafting of the CTS clearly implies that the exercise of pastoral 
care requires clergy to meet with individuals and to visit them.
820
  But, for example, there is 
nothing to indicate how frequently persons on the electoral roll of a parish can expect to 
receive pastoral visits from clergy or within what time frame clergy can be expected to 
respond to a request for urgent pastoral attention.  Therefore, even if a person suffered 
harm which might have been prevented had their received more or swifter pastoral care 
from a cleric it would not be possible for a claimant to identify a specific representation 
which had not been met. 
Furthermore, there may be circumstances in which preventing harm to an individual would 
actually conflict with the understanding of pastoral care set out in the Clergy Terms of 
Service.  Paragraph 3.7 states that: 
‘Pastoral care should never seek to remove the autonomy of the individual.  In pastoral 
situations the other party should be allowed the freedom to make decisions even if clergy 
consider that decision to be incorrect’821 
Therefore, if a mentally competent adult is intent upon making choices which will have 
negative consequences, Church in Wales clergy are not permitted to interfere with their 
freedom to make such choices.  Any attempt at coercion or control in pastoral settings is 
expressly forbidden,
822
 and failure to comply with the CTS constitutes grounds for 
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disciplinary proceedings.
823
  Therefore, in this regard the representation being made by the 
Church in Wales is explicitly that they will not seek to protect individuals from themselves by 
infringing their autonomy.   
It would therefore be difficult for a potential claimant to argue that the Church in Wales as 
an institution was making any representation that its clergy would protect them from self-
inflicted harm or the consequences of their own actions.  Furthermore, the church is not 
asserting that all of its clergy are training to diagnose mental illness and impairment, or 
assess whether an individual is in fact mentally competent. 
The position is however more complicated in the case of children and vulnerable adults.  
With regard to children, the Church in Wales has adopted a Provincial Child Protection 
Policy.
824
 This requires individual dioceses and parishes to adopt child protection policies
825
.  
The main aim of child protection policies at all levels is to prevent abuse, particularly sexual 
abuse, of children.
826
  
Whilst the ambit is theoretically wider, in that the Church in Wales expressly accepts the 
principle that the welfare of the child is to be the paramount consideration in all 
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circumstances,
827
 almost all of the specific duties and requirements relate to the prevention, 
detection and reporting of abuse.   
The Provincial policy is available on the Church in Wales website,
828
 and is therefore very 
much in the public domain.  The church is representing itself as an organisation which 
follows guidance from the Home Office on good practice in relation to safeguarding 
children.
829
  On this basis it could be argued that the church was undertaking a duty of care 
towards children entering its premises and taking part in its activities, in accordance with 
the policy e.g. to ensure that volunteers working with such children had been subject to 
appropriate criminal record checks.
830
   
Whilst the responsibility for ensuring compliance with child protection policies does not lie 
exclusively with clergy,
831
 compliance with child protection policies and legislation is a 
specific duty under the Clergy Terms of Service.
832
 
However, as with adults, it is not possible to say that the Church in Wales is undertaking 
specific obligations above and beyond this.   Obviously the general provisions of civil law will 
apply to the church in this context; for example, any voluntary organisation taking group of 
children on a trip will potentially be liable if they are injured because they were not properly 
supervised.  But there is nothing in the public declarations made by the church to suggest 
any intention to take on specific responsibilities towards children in addition to this.  (For 
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instance, a priest would be no more able than anyone else with child protection training but 
without clinical expertise to notice signs of mental illness in a troubled member of the Youth 
Group.)  
 Very similar factors apply to vulnerable adults.  The Church in Wales has adopted guidance 
on ministry with vulnerable adults,
833
 and PCCs are required to adopt parish policies.
834
  The 
emphasis on the guidance is on protecting vulnerable adults from harm and abuse,
835
 and it 
could be argued that the Church in Wales is representing that its cleric will carry out their 
duties in accordance with these guidelines.   
There might therefore be scope for claims arising from vulnerable adults who suffered 
preventable abuse because clergy failed to comply with the guidelines.  This would be 
particularly likely if their carers had placed reliance on the representations made by the 
church in its guidance.  For instance, if carers had left a vulnerable person alone with a Lay 
Eucharistic Minister bringing Communion to the home, because they believed that the 
individual was subject to a criminal record check and supervision.  If the cleric had in fact 
failed to ensure that proper checks were carried out, and these would have revealed a past 
history of abuse or exploitation, then there might well be a case to answer if abuse or 
exploitation took place. 
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However, there are no representations within the guidance that imply that Church in Wales 
clergy have the capacity or duty to protect vulnerable adults or promote their welfare in 
specific, identifiable ways other than the prevention of abuse.  It would be almost 
impossible for potential claimants to identify other representations made by the Church in 
Wales, upon which they might have relied to their detriment, and which could therefore 
generate a duty of care.  Without such representations, a court would be very unlikely to 
find a duty of care. 
In summary, the Church in Wales is not holding out its clergy as having special knowledge or 
expertise which would enable them to protect those for whom they are pastorally 
responsible from physical or mental harm, inflicted by third parties (or by the claimants 
themselves); or for that matter property damage or economic loss.  As an organisation the 
only representations which the church makes in respect of preventing such harm are 
contained within the provincial Child Protection Policy and Guidelines for Ministry with 
Vulnerable Adults.   
Clergy may well be found to have a duty of care to comply with these policies, as they are 
held out as doing so and third parties may place reliance on this assertion.  Parents of 
children and those who care for vulnerable adults may rely on the church’s representations 
that criminal record checks have taken place, and trust that both paid and unpaid church 
workers are monitored and complying with good practice.   If the church fails to carry out 
the checks and monitoring it has undertaken to perform, and children or vulnerable adults 
suffer harm as a result, the reliance which their parents or carer’s placed upon the church’s 
representations may form the basis of a duty of care. 
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However, the Church in Wales does not hold out its clergy as being able to provide support, 
assistance and protection in specialist ways above and beyond the scope of these 
guidelines. 
4.6 (3) Duties of Care Assumed by Individual Clergy - Sacramental Confession 
The specific duties of care undertaken by the Church in Wales (as opposed to those imposed 
by the State through case law or legislation) are limited to the guidance on child protection 
and vulnerable adults, but what of duties of care undertaken by individual clerics?  Once 
again the general law of tort will applicable, and whether or not a minister has undertaken a 
duty of care will depend upon the facts of the case.   
However, there is one area in which the duties of priests do raise particular issues; and that 
is in respect of information received in confidence received in the context of sacramental 
confession.  If a person makes a disclosure which suggests that they may present a risk to 
themselves, or to third parties, does the priest have a duty of care to safeguard that 
individual and/or the people who may be at risk from him or her?   
Is receiving such information in and of itself sufficient to generate a duty of care?  Does the 
law of the Church in Wales permit or require such information to be disclosed, and is there 
any conflict between duties imposed by church and secular law? 
Priests in the Church in Wales have a duty to instruct the people in the use of private 
confession;
836
 private confession being available for those who ‘cannot otherwise find 
assurance of God’s forgiveness’.837  Confession is stated to operate ‘under the seal of 
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secrecy’.838  It is unclear how absolute this secrecy is in the contemporary church.  Doe cites 
the applicable pre-1920 ecclesiastical law, which states that ministers may not disclose 
matters confessed except in cases where secular law ‘call into question the life’  of the 
minister for concealing the same.
839
  He argues on this basis that the prohibition against 
disclosure is probably not absolute within the Church in Wales. 
His hesitancy in reaching a firm conclusion was justified in light of the ambiguity of the 
existing provisions at the time of writing, and subsequent developments have done more to 
cloud the issue than to clear it.  The early seventeenth century canon referenced by Doe 
appears to apply only to instances where concealing a crime or planned crime would put the 
minister at risk of capital punishment.
840
  However, it also appears to be couched (in 
modern terminology) as guidance rather than command, as the canon prefaces the 
injunction about secrecy with the words: ‘we do not any way bind the said Minister by this 
our Constitution, but do straitly charge and admonish him’.841  
So although the secrecy may not be absolute, the circumstances when it may be broken are 
very tightly circumscribed, and are not directly connected with potential harm to the 
penitent or third parties.  Rather the provision makes it clear that ministers are not required 
to choose between laying down their life and facing ecclesiastical discipline.     
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Since the publication of Doe’s book, the CTS have been produced, which also reference the 
1603 canon.
842
  They do so however as a ‘note’ at the end of paragraph 7 on the ministry of 
reconciliation.  There is no explanation about the purpose or status or this note; however 
this statutory provision does remain part of the law of the Church in Wales as it is pre-1920 
canon law which the Church in Wales has not repealed.   
The guidance within the CTS on confidentiality and disclosure is internally inconsistent and 
therefore confusing.  In CTS 7.2 the guidance states that subject to paragraphs 7.3 and 7.4 
the seal of the confessional must be maintained, even after the death of the penitent.
843
   
CTS 7.3 deals with admission of abuse of children or vulnerable adults, although 
interestingly not explicitly with individuals who confession to an urge to do these things.  
The priest is enjoined to urge the person to report his or her behaviour to the appropriate 
secular authority, and to make compliance with this a condition of absolution, or withhold 
absolution until this has been done.
844
   
Implicit in this guidance must be the idea that the penitent can consent to disclosure of the 
confidential information; if he or she is free to disclose matters discussed in the confessional 
to third parties, then presumably he or she can elect to do this through or with the 
confessor rather than alone.    
However nothing in CTS 7.3 requires or even permits the priest to make any disclosure, this 
is dealt with in CTS 7.4.  This clause states that: 
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‘If a penitent’s behaviour gravely threatens his or her own well-being or that of others, 
particularly children or vulnerable adults, the priest should insist on action on the penitent’s 
part. 
It should be noted that there is no absolute duty of confidentiality 
A Court or the police may require disclosure.  In exceptional circumstances there may also be 
an overriding duty to break confidence, especially where the safety of children or vulnerable 
adults is involved, or more rarely, where the well-being of the person who is sharing 
confidence is at risk. 
Should a priest believe that there is a possibility that such information will be disclosed, it 
should be made clear to the penitent in advance, that disclosure may be necessary.’845 
 
There are a number of issues with the drafting of this clause.  The first paragraph appears to 
instruct the priest to ‘insist’ on action on the penitent’s part.  The priest has no legal power 
to force a penitent to act, neither is it clear how this clause can be reconciled in all 
circumstances with CTS 3.7 which expressly states that pastoral care should ‘never’ seek to 
remove the autonomy of the individual.
846
   
 
If an adult penitent who is not vulnerable wishes to do something which is going to gravely 
threaten his or her well-being (without the complicating factor of a threat to a third party) 
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how can a priest ‘insist’ upon a different course of action without undermining his or her 
autonomy? How can this be reconciled with the emphasis in CTS 3 on allowing individuals 
freedom to make choices, even if they are dangerous or destructive ones in the eyes of the 
priest?  
 Furthermore, what constitutes a ‘grave threat’ to well being, and how can a priest with no 
technical clinical knowledge be expected to assess this in relation to physical or mental 
health?   Is it what a reasonable person on the top of a Clapham omnibus would consider a 
grave threat?  If so, is this an appropriate standard?  As discussed above, the law of 
negligence does not impose obligations to advance the welfare of third parties on random, 
reasonable people doing no more than sitting on the top of metaphorical buses.   
The statement that there is ‘no absolute duty’ of confidentiality is made confusing by the 
inclusion of the 1603 Canon as a note.  This does indeed confirm that the duty is not 
absolute, but it also restricts disclosure far more tightly than CTS 7 appears to do. 
The observation that the police and courts may require disclosure is a reflection of secular 
law, which does not treat discussion between priests and penitents as privileged,
847
 
although in criminal cases courts do have discretion to exclude evidence obtained from 
confession to a priest.
848
 
The statement that in some circumstances there ‘may’ be an overriding duty to break 
confidence is also deeply problematic.    Firstly, it is a novel introduction: the 1603 canon 
does not oblige ministers to break the seal of the confessional, it merely gives them the 
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freedom to do so in certain circumstances if they so wish.  Secondly, and more seriously, it is 
confusing in the extreme to state that an overriding duty ‘may’ exist in certain 
circumstances.  If clergy are to comply with the guidance they need to know whether an 
overriding duty to disclose does or does not exist; a potential duty hovering around the 
ether in a quantum state is not practically helpful.   Furthermore, if it does exist, then clergy 
need to know whether it is a legal or a moral duty, and if it is a legal one, what type of legal 
duty?   They also need to know when it arises in order to carry it out at the appropriate 
time. 
Having noted the confusion of the CTS provisions in this area, what guidance can be gained 
from them in relation to negligence and a potential duty of care?  It seems clear that clergy 
do have the permission to disclose confidential information under CTS if there is a risk to the 
penitent or third parties, especially if they are children or vulnerable adults.  Although it is 
not clear whether and under what circumstances a duty to disclose will arise under the CTS, 
if a secular law duty exists to protect the penitent or third parties, then the permission given 
by CTS 7 should allow clerics to comply with this duty without fear of ecclesiastical sanction. 
It would arguably be preferable if the CTS unambiguously imposed a duty to disclose where 
there a cleric had reasonable cause to believe that there was a risk to third parties, 
particularly children or vulnerable adults.  This would mean that the confessional would not 
be inviolate, but this is already the case; having a semi-inviolate confessional is a very 
Anglican but not very logical concept.  Either an absolute duty of secrecy exists or it does 
not; as clergy have freedom to disclose in some circumstances, the seal of the confessional 
is clearly not absolute.   
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Therefore, this clarification would not require any doctrinal sacrifice.  It would enable 
innocent and vulnerable parties to be safeguarded, and would save individual clergy anxiety 
and soul searching about whether to disclose if faced with a penitent who could not be 
persuaded to cooperate in disclosure but nevertheless posed a threat to others.  If the 
policy was universally adopted then penitents would know the basis upon which they were 
making their confession, and would receive consistent treatment. 
One negative aspect of this approach would be removing the discretion of clergy to keep the 
seal of the confessional absolute.  (Assuming, that is, that this currently exists.  Given the 
possible ‘duty’ discussed above, it is less than clear that it does).  This is an inevitable 
sacrifice with taking this line, but the cost of removing individual discretion must be 
balanced against the benefits set out above.   
Another drawback would be the potential of a court finding that this policy gave risk to a 
duty of care towards those at risk, if a cleric failed to make a required disclosure and harm 
ensued.  Obviously the outcome of such a case would depend upon the facts at issue.  
Arguably however, it would still be appropriate for the church to adopt a policy which might 
in certain narrowly defined circumstances increase its possible exposure to claims, if this 
policy provided greater clarity for clerics and more effective protection for the vulnerable. 
 At the same time it could also be made clear that there was a discretion but not a duty to 
disclose where there was reasonable cause to believe that the penitent was a risk.  
Furthermore, it would provide an added layer of protection if the CTS were to state 
unambiguously and directly that clergy do not have expertise in mental health or 
counselling, and cannot diagnose or assess whether a person needs medical treatment or 
poses a risk to themselves or others. 
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These proposed amendments to the CTS would be compatible with secular law in this area.  
In W v Egdell,849 the court considered an application for (inter alia) an injunction restraining 
the defendant psychiatrist from communicating the contents of his report on the applicant 
W.  W was a paranoid schizophrenic who shot five people and killed two others; he had 
been convicted of manslaughter and was sentenced to be detained indefinitely in a secure 
hospital.  In the course of seeking transfer to a different secure unit, which could 
theoretically have been a stepping stone to release and reintegration into the community, 
he sought a report from the defendant as an independent psychiatrist supporting the 
transfer.  In fact the defendant’s report disclosed serious concerns about W’s obsession with 
homemade bombs, and did not accept that he was no longer a danger to the public. 
The court found that although W had a personal interest in ensuring that his confidence was 
kept, the maintenance of doctor patient confidentiality was in fact a matter of public rather 
than private interest.  The public interest in protection the plaintiff’s confidence was 
outweighed by the public interest in giving the authorities making decisions about his future 
full access to the available information.  The disclosure of the report was therefore 
appropriate and proper.  Commentators have supported this case, as being helpful to 
psychiatrists faced with difficult ethical decisions, and the judicial balancing of individual and 
public interests.
850
 
Following this case, it seems likely that professionals who receive confidential information 
about an individual are permitted to disclose it if there a demonstrable public interest in 
doing so.  The Court of Appeal noted the vulnerability of the plaintiff in this particular case, 
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and stressed that there had to be compelling circumstances to justify the disclosure.
851
  
Whilst clergy do make decisions about the confinement and legal freedoms of others, they 
nevertheless deal with vulnerable people and accordingly must have good reason in both 
secular and church law if they are to reveal confidential information given to them in the 
course of their duties. 
But permission to disclose is different from a duty to disclose.  There has been surprisingly 
little UK case law on a duty to disclose confidential information, for the protection of third 
parties, in the absence of statutory requirements.  Is merely receiving such information 
enough to generate a duty of care in civil law towards third parties at risk? 
Whilst the proposition has not been tested, it is submitted that it is unlikely that the 
reception of information alone will be enough to generate a duty of disclosure.  It is well 
established that there is no duty to be a Good Samaritan and guard neighbours from harm 
in general.
852
  A defendant has no duty in negligence to take action if he or she sees a 
claimant drowning in a shallow pond.  If a defendant has no duty where he or she sees an 
actual and present risk, it is difficult to assert that a defendant has a duty when he or she 
simply hears about a possible risk from a third party.  The capacity and opportunity to 
protect a third party does not translate into a positive duty in tort so to do.   
If a court were to find that clergy owed a duty to care by virtue of their office which 
compelled them to take action when an ordinary citizen would not be required to do so, 
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then a tort of clergy professional negligence would effectively be being created, with all of 
the attendant problems discussed in relation to Nally.   
When exactly would clerics be obliged to intervene?  What standard of care, knowledge and 
expertise would be expected of a reasonable clergy person?  How would this test apply to 
different denominations?  What would be the implications for the Human Rights Act 1998?   
Imposing a duty to break the seal of the confessional would involve interfering with the 
Article 9.1 rights of both priests and penitents, could such interference be justified by the 
State as necessary and proportionate under Article 9.2? 
The complexity in answering any one of these questions demonstrates how difficult it would 
be to impose a professional duty of care of this sort upon Church in Wales clergy.  
Furthermore, there is no UK case law which currently suggests that the courts would regard 
imposing such a duty as appropriate.  In the absence of this duty in secular law, there is no 
conflict between the current CTS and the demands of negligence.  Under both regimes 
clergy are permitted to disclose information received in the confessional if they perceive 
there to be a risk of serious harm, but there is no evidence of a duty obliging them so to do 
unless children or vulnerable adults are involved.   
As acknowledged previously, the proposed introduction of a duty in the CTS above might 
slightly strengthen the argument that a corresponding duty arose in negligence.  But the 
difficulty of assessing its scope and enforcing it would remain for courts.  Given the lack of 
reported cases on psychiatrists, who as a professional group frequently have to assess the 
safety of potentially dangerous individuals for both courts and health care bodies, it is 
unlikely that the church would ever face a deluge of claims for non-disclosure by priests.   
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Furthermore, the existence of a duty to disclose in the CTS would of course only increase 
the risk of claims if clerics failed to comply with it.  If an individual cleric carried out his or 
her duty and alerted the police or other appropriate agency of a risk posed, there would be 
less chance of a successful claim than where a cleric exercised his or her discretion not to 
disclose and harm ensued to a third party. 
Of course all of the foregoing applies only in situations where the penitent’s disclosure is the 
only link between the priest and the potential harm or the third parties at risk.  There may 
well be other factors present which would change the scenario. For example, if a volunteer 
working with children in the priest’s parish were to confess a temptation to abuse them, the 
situation would be different and far more akin to Maga in relation to negligence.  The priest 
would be in control of a situation, and if he or she allowed that individual continued access 
to children he or she would be choosing to place them in danger, and a duty of care almost 
certainly would arise.  
 But such additional factors would again take the scenario out of the realm of a general 
clerical duty, and into the territory of a specific and individual duty assumed by a particular 
cleric. 
4.7 Conclusion 
There was never any doubt that clergy would be liable for causing harm to third parties, in 
the same way any other legal person.  However, properly read and understood, the Maga 
case provides reassurance that Church in Wales clergy are not subject to any special duty to 
take steps to protect third parties from harm.  Such duties generally only arise if they are 
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well established in law by virtue of a relationship of responsibility and control (e.g parent 
and child, prison and prisoner etc), or if they are assumed by the defendant. 
The Church in Wales as an institution does not hold out its clergy as possessing technical 
knowledge or expertise which would give third parties reason to believe that its priests are 
more capable than anyone else of safeguarding interests protected by the tort of negligence 
(i.e. physical and mental health and integrity, property and economic interest).  Neither 
does it make promises that its clergy will provide a measurable standard or frequency of 
pastoral attention, allowing third parties to rely on such promises to their detriment. 
Therefore (aside from the context of the confessional dealt with at length in 4.6(3)), the only 
duties of care which individual clergy are likely to assume are those arising out of specific 
factual contexts in which they find themselves, putting them in the same position as the 
general population, and subject to the general law of tort. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Overview 
This study began with an examination of the relationship between Church in Wales clergy 
and their church; firstly with regard to employment law, and then in the related context of 
vicarious liability.  The conclusion of this analysis was that the Church in Wales would almost 
certainly be vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of individual clergy acting in their 
ministerial capacity.  On the basis of this, the study then went on to examine the scope for 
liability in tort to arise out of the performance of clerical duties, firstly in connection with 
trespass to the person and secondly in connection with negligence. 
As the chapters unfolded a common and consistent theme emerged: namely that 
determining the scope of ministerial duties is deeply problematic, but also an unavoidable 
necessity in establishing the potential and limits of civil liability for the wider church.   
The Church in Wales will be liable for the actions of its priests, deacons and bishops when 
they are functioning as priests, deacons and bishops and therefore furthering its 
organisational aims.  This is challenging as the Anglican theology of Holy Orders does not 
allow for individuals who are ordained to divide their time into sacred and secular moments; 
priesthood is about being rather than doing, and being is a constant state.  Therefore in 
some sense Anglican clergy can never be said to be acting in a purely personal and private 
capacity.   
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Nevertheless, if some alternative way of analysing the situation is not found, courts will be 
faced with a stark choice between:  
1) finding that the church is liable for the torts of its clergy in all circumstances; 
2) finding that the church is never liable for the torts of its clergy; and 
3) finding that they church is liable for the torts of its clergy in some circumstances but 
not others, and drawing arbitrary distinctions between cases. 
Clearly none of the options above can be described as satisfactory.  The first would be 
placing an unduly onerous burden on the church.  It would be impossible to justify in 
relation to enterprise risk and the other theoretical explanations for vicarious liability 
discussed at length in Chapter 3 above.  How would it be fair, just and reasonable or serving 
the public interest to render the church in its capacity of quasi-employer liable for torts 
committed by clergy in their leisure time against claimants utterly unaware of their clerical 
status?   
Furthermore potential ECHR Article 9 based objections could be raised against state courts 
imposing blanket liability on an organisation in this way; the Church in Wales would be 
being subject to exceptional and disadvantageous treatment on the basis of the religious 
convictions of its membership.  Secular employers and quasi-employers are not vicariously 
liable for the torts of their paid workforce unless the tortious conduct is related to the 
working relationship.   
If paid workers of the Church in Wales were treated differently because of their religious 
convictions, then an action based on Article 9 could be brought, possibly in conjunction with 
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Article 14.  The church and its members would be being subjected to burdens by the state 
courts, not imposed on other citizens, by virtue of their faith. 
The second option is no more acceptable; it would simply give rise to an opposite and equal 
injustice.  There is no reason why the Church in Wales should be granted complete 
immunity, or why potential claimants should suffer the accompanying hardship of being 
denied any remedy for injury and harm suffered. 
Neither is the third option any better.  It is not in the interests of justice for the process of 
litigation to function in an arbitrary or inconsistent fashion.  Neither is it easy for parties to 
reach satisfactory pre-trial settlements when they do not have a clear legal framework 
within which to conduct negotiations. 
 Therefore, an alternative approach to the situation is required.  It is proposed that if courts 
consider clerical ministry in terms of tasks, expertise and undertakings, rather than in terms 
of the all encompassing priestly role, it is possible to draw meaningful and helpful 
distinctions.  On this basis, courts will be able to distinguish cases in a way which is logical 
and justifiable.  Inevitably borderline cases will always arise and certain grey areas will 
always remain, but at least consistent principles can be applied to the chaotic problems 
generated by human life and litigation. 
It is submitted that this approach dovetails well with the way in which both employment 
and tort law operate.  With regard to employment law, courts have for sometime been 
prepared to adopt a flexible approach.  The same individual may be an employee for some 
legislative purposes but not for others, and contractual intent to create legal relations may 
be found to exist for some aspects of a working relationship but not for others.  In the 
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complex world of contemporary labour law, a black and white, all or nothing approach has 
long since given way to something more toned and nuanced.  If courts are capable of 
making distinctions in this arena, then they should equally be capable of doing so in relation 
to the law of tort. 
With regard to tort, an approach with focuses on tasks, expertise and undertakings is useful 
in relation to both trespass to the person and negligence.  This emphasis poses the joint 
questions: 
i) what was the cleric required to do in the relevant situation?; and  
ii) what did the cleric bring or purport to bring to the relevant situation in terms of 
professional expertise and undertakings upon which third parties reasonably 
relied? 
These questions are helpful in relation to trespass to the person, because they give a clear 
indication as to whether or not the physical contact was necessary and within the scope of 
the particular task he or she was engaged in.  Was consent required and obtained?  Did the 
touching exceed the bounds of the consent given?   
Equally, the same questions are useful where negligence is concerned, because they reveal 
what the cleric was attempting and promising to do, and what reliance third parties may 
have placed upon this.  What were the reasonably foreseeable risks of the activity?  What 
duties of care was the cleric undertaking in embarking on this activity? 
This approach would provide greater clarity for a court attempting to look, in a very general 
way, at the role of a priest within the denomination in question (in this instance the Church 
in Wales) in order to extrapolate whether or not li
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dangers of this all encompassing approach can be seen in dicta from recent cases in the UK 
and wider Common Law world, which have appeared to points towards almost open ended 
liability for the church in its capacity as quasi-employer. 
Furthermore, it would also help to avoid the worrying tendency of certain judges and 
commentators to confuse vicarious liability and ordinary claims in negligence.  If a church is 
negligent in placing a person in a position of trust amongst vulnerable people, giving him or 
her status and opportunity to abuse that status, when they were or should have been aware 
that they posed a danger, then direct rather than vicarious liability is the appropriate claim 
to be made and addressed.   Stretching and distorting vicarious liability, which is a form of 
tortious strict liability, is not an appropriate response to perceived culpability on the part of 
an employer or quasi employer in a particular set of circumstances. 
The discussion in this chapter therefore considers first the proposal of analysing the working 
pattern of Church in Wales clergy in relation to tasks, expertise and undertakings, rather 
than in terms of the all encompassing priestly role, at least when questions of tortious and 
vicarious liability are being addressed.   
It then looks at how the alternative more general approach, which courts have lent towards 
in recent litigation concerning the Roman Catholic church, presents graves difficulties, 
particularly in relation to insurance. 
Finally it uses the proposed tasks, expertise and undertakings (TEU) orientated approach to 
examine three hypothetical case studies, demonstrating how this would work in practice, 
before reaching some general conclusions.   
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5.2 Analysing the working arrangements of Church in Wales clergy for the purposes of 
tort: the all-encompassing priestly state versus TEU 
It is uncontroversial that Anglican doctrine and law understands Holy Orders to be indelible; 
an ordination cannot be repeated and the ontological change is permanent.
853
  In discussing 
the nature of ordination and ordained life from a spiritual perspective, many Anglican 
writers are keen to emphasise that the essence of priesthood is about being rather than 
doing.
854
  Ordained ministers cannot and do not step in and out of their ministerial role.  But 
it is neither necessary, nor, appropriate, nor desirable to challenge this spiritual belief in 
order to analyse the clerical role differently in relation to tort. 
Just because it is not possible to reduce the essence of priesthood as it is understood within 
the Anglican tradition down to a list of tasks, does not mean that it is impossible to compile 
a list of the tasks which are performed by Anglican priests fulfilling their ministerial 
functions.  In fact, the  spiritual and theological authors addressing this topic often make 
such lists, precisely to illustrate that it is easier to describe what a priest does than what a 
priest is.
855
 
Furthermore, the reality that it is possible to analyse the role and work of clergy in these 
terms has been reflected in the growing body of case law on clergy contracts of 
                                                           
853
 PCL Principle 32:16: ‘An ordination cannot be repeated; orders are indelible’. 
854
 See for example, George Guiver CR, The Fire and the Clay (SPCK: London 1999) Third edition, 44-45: ‘More 
than just doing things..........But at the same time the caricature does suggest that there is a certain 
inappropriateness in tackling the question ‘What is priesthood today?’ using only the tools that would be used 
to analyse much secular employment.  The same sense of unease is generated even by a simple list of what a 
priest does.  The priest baptizes, presides at the communion, absolves; visits the sick and the dying; perhaps 
does assemblies or a little teaching in the local schools; preaches and so on.  But how much has that actually 
told us?...a simple list of what a priest does (or even of what only a priest can do) seems somehow to miss the 
essence of priesthood’. 
855
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employment.
856
  Intent to create legal relations within secular contract and employment law 
does not preclude a religious group from having an understanding of ministry which goes 
beyond the civil law obligations enshrined in such contracts; this point was effectively 
acknowledged in the Percy case when the court declared it uncontroversial that there was 
intent to create legal relations with regard to payment for services, even though there was 
scope for debate about intent to create legal relations with regard to other aspects of Ms 
Percy’s working life.
857
   The possibility of having some but not all elements of the 
relationship articulated and enforced by a secular contract was acknowledged, and in order 
to be valid terms of secular contracts must be sufficiently certain.
858
  Consequently, for 
clergy contracts of service to exist for any purposes, it must be possible to outline what 
services clergy are to perform pursuant to those contracts. 
A similar pragmatic approach is taken with the CTS produced by the Church in Wales itself.  
This is illustrated well in a theological statement annexed to the CTS, which expressly 
contrasts the open-ended, and ‘unrestricted’ duty placed on clergy by ordination, with their 
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exercise of a professional role, defined in terms of duties and relationships and requiring 
standards of accountability.
859
  The general, spiritual duty to love and care which clergy have 
is carefully acknowledged and honoured.  The darker side and dangers of such a boundless 
duty are also noted: 
‘In this area of tension between the demands of duty and the claims of love clergy are 
especially vulnerable.  Their ordination vows lay upon them grave and apparently 
unrestricted responsibilities to care for all alike, young and old, strong and weak, rich and 
poor.  There are no clear limits to the duty of care with which they are charged, and because 
they fall short of what they take to be their God given pastoral duty, they are peculiarly 
vulnerable to self-condemnation and self-deception.  In striving to carry out their ministerial 
duty, they may neglect the duties which their more immediate commitments, such as those 
of family and friends, lay on them.’860   
This statement recognises that the struggle of integrating their priestly duties within a 
human life and network of human commitments is an ongoing personal and spiritual 
challenge which all clergy face.  It also prepares the way for differentiating between these 
overarching spiritual duties, and the professional duties and standards which documents like 
the CTS seek to set out: 
‘The Church is also an institution.  It has its own organisation and structures of authority, its 
own constitution and rules of procedure, its own statements of intent and practice, all of 
which are directed towards the Church’s worship, ministry and mission.  Within this 
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institution the clergy exercise a professional role, defined in terms of special duties and 
relationships, calling for special competence and care’.861 
Effectively, two parallel and complementary understandings of the clerical role co-exist 
within the Church in Wales.  One is the spiritual and theological vision of priesthood (as well 
as the diaconate and episcopate) enshrined in the doctrinal and liturgical life of the church, 
whilst the other is a professional function which can, and should, be subject to objective 
standards of practice, contractual terms, review and accountability.  For example, the 
generic job description for an incumbent sets out the principal tasks and duties which go 
with that job.
862
    
Furthermore, in the Statement of Terms of Service for clergy appointments the impossibility 
of defining the ministry of a bishop, priest or deacon as one defines work is recognised, but 
it is none the less stated that a cleric’s ministry has to be ‘worked out in the everyday world 
of employment practices and directives’.863  Clergy are required to take adequate time off, 
and it is stated that in a normal week must include a ‘stated regular free day of twenty-four 
hours’.864 
 Ultimately, it is possible to analyse the agreed working arrangements of Church in Wales 
clergy in a similar matter to that of other professionals with a high degree of autonomy and 
discretion in managing their workload.  This requires differentiating between the church’s 
spiritual understanding of the ordained life and vocation from the church’s self-stated 
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professional standards and expectations required of clergy.   Given that the latter has been 
generated by the Church in Wales, applying it in the secular courts cannot be construed as 
infringing the religious freedom of the members of that church.  Furthermore, it does not 
conflict with the spiritual understanding of priesthood as a state of being rather than a job; 
it is parallel understanding which operates in a different forum for a different purpose. 
 If secular courts focus on the tasks which clergy are required to perform by the CTS, and 
also the expertise which the same document requires them to have and maintain, they will 
be upholding rather than disregarding the church’s own understanding of the role of its 
ministers.  This will also avoid the dangers of the open-ended approach to liability which 
flows from the more general understanding of priestly ministry adopted by courts in recent 
Roman Catholic cases. 
For example, consider the statement of Lord Neuberger MR in the Maga case, that a priest 
is ‘never off duty’.865  The factors which he cited to support this assertion could apply to a 
Church in Wales priest as much as to a Roman Catholic one.  The wearing of clerical 
‘uniform’ when in public and not merely when in church,
866
 and the adoption of a special 
title and mode of address,
867
 were flagged up as factors and apply equally in an Anglican 
context. 
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Taking this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the church to which the priest belonged could 
therefore be held accountable for any tortious actions on his or her part, on the basis that 
there was never a moment when he or she was not effectively acting as an agent of the 
church.   This logic leads to the problems outlined above, leaving courts to choose between 
making a stark all or nothing choice about vicarious liability, or drawing arbitrary distinctions 
between cases.   
For this reason it is submitted that asking ‘Was a cleric on duty?’ or ‘Was a cleric being a 
priest?’ at the time when the tort occurred is unhelpful.   It is far more constructive to ask 
‘Was the cleric performing one of his or her identifiable clerical duties when the tort 
occurred?’  This is not to say that there will not still be borderline cases or grey areas, but 
the fundamental approach is very different. 
A good illustration of this is to be found in relation to driving and riding bicycles.  In the case 
JGE the Court of Appeal used as an example the case of a priest injuring a third party in a 
road traffic accident, submitting that this was an uncontroversial example of a tort for which 
the relevant church authority should properly be vicariously liable.
868
  Admittedly in this 
hypothetical case Ward LJ did specify that the priest was riding to minister to a dying 
parishioner, but the impression was more that this detail was added to give colour to the 
scene than because it was a necessary element in establishing liability.  If the holistic, 
general view of the priestly role is adopted in the context of tort, then logically the church 
should equally be liable if the priest had been travelling to meet his sister for tea. 
That conclusion is what follows from the analysis adopted in Maga above.  A priest visiting 
his sister might well still be wearing clerical dress, and would certainly still be known in the 
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community, potentially greeted with his title by anyone who saw him and seen as an agent 
of the church out and about in his parish. 
A similar approach was adopted in relation to members of a brotherhood in the Various 
Claimants case.869  In this case it was made explicit that the brother in question would have 
to be acting for the common purpose of the order at the time that the accident took place.  
However, this analysis presents real difficulties where priests are concerned, if priesthood is 
understood for the purposes of tort in terms of being rather than doing.  Just how 
problematic this would be can be seen if the question of insurance is briefly considered. 
5.3 Insurance 
The Church in Wales is insured by the Ecclesiastical Insurance Group (EIG) for all matters 
including employers’ liability insurance.
870
  If all torts committed by clerics, and all injuries 
suffered by clerics were construed as being ‘in the course of employment’, then EIG would 
be exposed to enormous risk. 
Ordinarily, in determining whether an incident has occurred in the course of employment 
for insurance purposes relating to employers’ liability insurance, courts consider whether 
activity in which the employee was engaged at the relevant time was reasonably incidental 
to his or her contract of employment.
871
  If the position of clergy was considered in global 
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terms in relation to clerical status rather than duties and tasks being performed, then the 
church and consequently its insurers would potentially be liable for any incident which 
occurred during the life of a serving cleric.  It is submitted that if this position were accepted 
the EIG, and any other commercial insurer, would be unlikely to consider this level of 
exposure and acceptable business risk. 
By contrast if reference is made to the tasks and duties outlined in the CTS, then the ‘course 
of employment’ for clerics becomes far more comparable to that of other professionals, and 
the risks for their employing church and its insurers far easier to manage and access. 
5.4 Case Studies 
It is submitted that not only does analysing the position of Church in Wales clergy in terms 
of tasks, duties and expertise make sense in relation to assessing and managing exposure to 
liability, it is a useful approach to considering potential claims.  Two questions which are 
likely to be key in claims of both trespass and negligence are: 
i) What was the tortfeasor doing?   
ii) And what was the tortfeasor undertaking or purporting to do? 
 Consequently, examining the cleric’s role in relation to TEU is a helpful and appropriate way 
of analysing the situation.  This point is addressed by considering the legal issues raised in 
the hypothetical case studies set out below.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
[1966] 2 QB 31 and R v National Insurance Commissioners ex p Michael [1976] 1 All ER 566; affirmed [1977] 1 
WLR 109 CA. 
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The given incidents described are fictional. However, as the relevant footnotes 
demonstrate, the circumstances described do reflect issues and situations which occur for 
clergy ministering in the contemporary United Kingdom. 
5.4 (1) Trespass to the person 
Fr Algernon is currently working as an incumbent in a parish within the Church in Wales.  
One of his parishioners, a lively middle-aged lady named Bonnie, asked him to visit her at 
home for a chat.  He arranged to call round one summer afternoon; as it was a sunny day 
they sat in the garden, along with Bonnie’s eighteen month old granddaughter Celia.  
Bonnie persuaded Algernon to drink several large glasses of Pimms, and consumed a similar 
amount of alcohol herself.   
Bonnie explained that she was very anxious because little Celia had not been baptised.  Her 
daughter Deborah had wanted to have her baby christened, but her husband Ellis was an 
outspoken atheist, and was adamant that no child of his was going to be subjected to the 
indignity of a religious ritual which was the official beginning of the indoctrination process.  
Bonnie found herself worrying about what would happen if Celia were to suddenly die un-
baptised.   
Algernon attempted to reassure her that God would not reject a helpless child on the basis 
of her parents’ choices.  But Celia refused to be comforted, arguing that for hundreds of 
years lots of Christians had believed that un-baptised children were not allowed into 
Heaven, and what if they were right?   Even if it was a very small risk, the idea of taking any 
risk with Celia’s immortal soul was too horrible to contemplate.  Bonnie begged Algernon to 
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baptise Celia quickly and quietly right there in the garden, then it would be done and 
nobody could do anything about it.
872
   
Worn down by her persistence and with his judgement clouded by Pimms, Algernon 
capitulated.  Bonnie fetched a basin of water from the kitchen, and Algernon baptised a 
happy and cooperative Celia, who sat on Algernon’s knee and chuckled with delight each 
time some water was dropped onto her hair.   
Not long after this was done, Deborah and Ellis arrived.  Bonnie announced what had 
happened, and a heated argument ensued.  Deborah defended her mother and said that 
she was actually quite glad to have Celia baptised, but Ellis was livid.   He hurled various 
personal insults at Algernon, who eventually decided that he had had enough and tipped 
the remainder of the jug of Pimms all over the screaming Ellis. 
Clergy Terms of Service 
In visiting Bonnie at her request it is clear that Algernon was carrying out the pastoral duties 
of a priest in accordance with the CTS, responding to a parishioner who was asking for 
contact and support.
873
  There is nothing in the guidance which suggests that meeting her in 
her home was necessarily inappropriate.  Ministers are instructed to consider carefully the 
arrangement of the furniture and lighting during pastoral visits.
874
  However, a garden on a 
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summer afternoon appears to be a relatively low risk setting for a domestic pastoral visit.  
The venue is well lit, likely to be comparatively easily overlooked by neighbours, not 
claustrophobic for either party and not sexually suggestive in any way. 
Similarly, the fact that Algernon visited Bonnie alone (or alone except for Celia, a witness far 
too young to give any coherent version of events) is not automatically an issue; the CTS 
require clerics to carefully assess the appropriateness of visiting or being visited alone.
875
  
This injunction clearly implies that although ministers should proceed with caution, there 
will be times when making a visit alone will be the appropriate course of action.   
However, the decision to drink several large glasses of Pimms is more problematic.  The CTS 
state that clergy should not undertake any professional duties ‘when under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs’.876  The drafting here is somewhat ambiguous; clergy are of course obliged 
to drink alcohol when they celebrate the Eucharist.
877
  Even a small amount of alcohol can 
have an unpredictable short term effect, so clergy may find themselves conscious of the 
effects of alcohol whilst performing their sacramental duties and engaging in pastoral 
discussions immediately following the Eucharist.   Therefore, ‘under the influence’ in this 
term cannot be understood to mean having some alcohol in the bloodstream, or even being 
aware of its effects.   
The clause in the CTS following 10.8 expressly forbids ‘alcohol abuse or drunkenness’.
878
  
This however appears to be different from 10.8 in that it is seems to cover the behaviour of 
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clergy at all times, and not simply when undertaking professional duties.
879
  Nevertheless 
the fact that in this instance Algernon consumed enough alcohol to ‘cloud this judgement’, 
and therefore presumably to impair his ability to carry out his professional duties, would 
appear to be a problem in relation to the CTS and therefore a possible basis for disciplinary 
sanctions by the Church in Wales. 
Arguably more serious, however, is Algernon’s decision to capitulate and baptise Celia in the 
garden without consulting either of her parents first.  The CTS reiterate that clergy must 
carry out their duties in accordance with the law and also with the Constitution of the 
Church in Wales.
880
  Canon law expressly forbids the private baptism of infants except in the 
case of emergency.
881
  In this case despite her grandmother’s fears little Celia was evidently 
healthy and safe; it would not be open for Algernon even to argue that the emergency 
exception to the general rule should be applied. 
Furthermore, in baptising the child without making effort to ascertain the views, much less 
obtain the consent of those with parental responsibility, Algernon is clearly in breach of the 
Church in Wales’ guidance on baptism and parental consent with which the CTS requires 
him to comply.
882
  The guidance requires that except in emergency circumstances a cleric 
should respond to a request for baptism initially by asking who has parental responsibility 
for the child in question.
883
  Furthermore, if possible the cleric should contact all such 
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persons and explain to them the nature of baptism.
884
  In the event that any of the 
individuals with parental responsibility cannot be contacted, the baptism should be 
postponed in all but emergency circumstances and it is recommended that the bishop be 
consulted.
885
  In the event that any person with parental responsibility does not consent to 
the baptism, the service should not go ahead until the bishop has been consulted.
886
 
In this instance, assuming that Deborah and Ellis were married at the time of Celia’s birth, 
they would both have parental responsibility for her.
887
  Not only did Algernon baptise their 
daughter without discussing the matter with them first he did so knowing that it was likely 
that at least one of them had a strong objection to this course of action.  Not only was this 
in breach of the Church in Wales Guidance on Baptism, it was also in breach of various other 
terms of the CTS.  In particular the requirement that baptism be carried out in the context of 
suitable preparation was completely disregarded.
888
   Celia’s parents and primary carers 
received no instruction or preparation, and even Bonnie only had the benefit of an ad hoc 
discussion whilst she was under the influence of alcohol. 
Furthermore, in baptising a child irrespective of parental wishes, Algernon was failing to 
honour the injunction in the CTS to respect individual autonomy, and to allow other parties 
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281 
 
to make free choices, whether or not he personally regarded these are correct.
889
  He was 
also arguably using his power inappropriately in presiding at Celia’s baptism, knowing as he 
did that baptism was indelible and what he did could not be undone, regardless of its 
irregularity.
890
 
In addition to the baptism, Algernon’s action in physically responding to Ellis’ verbal abuse 
was also a breach of CTS.  It is likely that throwing the Pimms at Ellis would constitute 
‘violent or indecent’ and therefore prohibited behaviour.
891
  It is also difficult to reconcile 
this behaviour with the requirement to act as an agent of ‘healing and reconciliation’.
892
  
The only possible defence in any church disciplinary process would be that Algernon 
genuinely feared an imminent physical attack, and was attempting to defend himself or 
somewhat clumsily diffuse the situation. 
Secular law 
Baptism of Celia 
As discussed at length in Chapter 4 above, touching of a minor with not constitute a trespass 
to the person if a party with parental responsibility gives consent, or the child is Gillick 
competent to decide about the matter in question and gives his or her own informed 
consent.
893
   
                                                           
889
 CTS 3.7: ‘Pastoral care should never seek to remove the autonomy of the individual.  In pastoral situations 
the other party should be allowed the freedom to make decisions even if clergy consider that decision to be 
incorrect.’ 
890
 CTS 3.8: ‘In leadership, teaching, preaching and presiding at worship, clergy should resist all temptation to 
exercise power inappropriately’.   For in the indelibility of baptism PCL Principle 61:10. 
891
 CTS 10.9. 
892
 CTS 11.3. 
893
 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
 
282 
 
In this case although Celia was happy enough with the physical element of her baptism, she 
was in no position to have any understanding of the wider social and religious implications 
of the act.  As a baby of eighteen months she could not comprehend the impact which it 
might have on family relationships or her own developing sense of identity.  Consequently, 
Celia was manifestly not Gillick competent to decide whether or not to be baptised and to 
give or withhold her consent.  Neither party with parental responsibility gave consent on her 
behalf; in fact they were not even approached to do so.  Therefore the act of baptism was a 
trespass to the person, and in theory a claim could be brought in Celia’s name.  Pecuniary 
damages could be awarded to a successful claimant in an action for trespass against Fr 
Algernon.  Would the church also be liable were this to happen? 
The lengthy discussion of vicarious liability and the Church in Wales in Chapter 2 concluded 
that the nexus between a Church in Wales bishop and a priest or deacon in his diocese is 
sufficiently close to that of an employer/employee relationship to justify the imposition of 
vicarious liability in some circumstances.  This does however leave open the question of 
which circumstances and when?  And it is submitted that examining the CTS is key to 
answering this question.   
These help to determine when a cleric is carrying out tasks and duties which are part of his 
or her professional responsibilities, arising from a contractual (or quasi-contractual) 
relationship with the church.  Or put slightly differently, when is a priest engaged in carrying 
out the functions of the Church in Wales? 
As was discussed in relation to the clergy sexual assault cases, the fact that an act is a gross 
breach of an employer’s trust, contrary to an employee’s instructions and even the very 
opposite of what his or her role requires, does not mean that vicarious liability will not 
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attach.
894
  In relation to the baptism it is highly likely that the Church in Wales would be 
vicariously liable,
895
 despite the numerous provisions above which demonstrate that 
Algernon was acting in breach of both the CTS and the law of the church.   
In visiting Bonnie, Algernon was performing his duty to provide pastoral care.
896
  In baptising 
Celia he was engaged in the task providing sacramental ministry, and arguably also 
promoting the Church in Wales’ understanding of God’s mission including evangelism.
897
  
When he committed the trespass he was acting in his professional capacity.  Although the 
law of vicarious liability has evolved a great deal since the classic case of Rose v Plenty it has 
effectively been settled law since at least that time that the mere fact that an employee is 
doing his or her job in a delinquent and improper manner will not absolve an employer from 
vicarious liability for his or her conduct.
898
 
However, the position as to the assault with the Pimms is more complex and nuanced. 
Assault of Ellis 
Self defence can be a defence to trespass to the person.
899
  Therefore, if Algernon could 
demonstrate that he believed that he was in imminent danger of being struck by Ellis, he 
might be able to escape liability.   In the event that this was unsuccessful however, and 
Algernon was found to have committed a trespass, would the Church in Wales be vicariously 
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liable?  It is submitted that despite the willingness of courts to find churches liable for 
deliberate and criminal trespasses in the context of sexual abuse, this case is by no means 
clear cut.   
Furthermore, in this regard, the way in which the court elected to interpret the ministry and 
status of the cleric would be key to the outcome of the case.  If a very general, global 
approach was taken, then vicarious liability would be far more likely to ensue than if an 
analysis focuses on tasks and duties was adopted.  It is submitted that the latter approach is 
legally more correct, and also preferable in practical terms. 
The starting point for this conclusion comes with Aldred v Nacanco.900  The decision was 
handed down by the Court of Appeal in 1987, and obviously considerably predates the Lister 
v Hesley Hall line of authority on deliberate acts of trespass in an employment setting.901  
Nevertheless, the case remains good law, and it is argued that some of the dicta within it 
are extremely instructive. 
The facts concerned some unfortunate horseplay which took place in the ladies washroom 
in the defendant’s factory.  The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant.  She had 
problems with her back, and at the time when the critical incident took place, she had been 
back at work for only six weeks after a prolonged period of sick leave for this very reason.
902
 
The defendant and her female colleagues had use of a washroom with unusual basins 
shaped like miniature fountains and positioned down the centre of the room, rather than 
against a wall in a more conventional way.  All but one of the basins was held in place by 
clips attached to the floor. Although it was unclear from the evidence exactly how long the 
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one clip-less basin had been in that state, it was apparently a matter of at least some 
months.   The lack of clips made the basin unstable, but only slightly.
903
 
One afternoon whilst the plaintiff was in the washroom in deep conversation with a 
colleague, another fellow worker came in and decided that it would be funny to make her 
jump.  She therefore pushed the wobbly basin so that it struck the plaintiff’s thigh.  
Although the knock was so gentle that it did not even leave a bruise, it did have the 
intended effect of startling the plaintiff.  She spun round to find out what was going on, and 
in doing so twisted and injured her back.
904
 
The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge was correct to reject any direct liability in 
negligence on the facts as he found them.  It was not reasonably foreseeable that a slightly 
wobbly but basically secure basin would cause any injury; or that a reasonable employer 
would anticipate somebody pushing it in the way that the prankster employee chose to 
do.
905
  The Court of Appeal also agreed that the trial judge, Mr Justice Turner was right to 
find that there no vicarious liability either. 
Sir Frederick Lawton found that the judge could have placed more emphasis on the point 
that the fact that the employee’s delinquent action had nothing whatever to do with her 
employer’s business was only one of many factors to be taken into account when 
considering whether the action was outside the scope of her employment.
906
  Nevertheless 
his conclusion was correct.
907
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Glidewell LJ and Donaldson MR agreed, and the latter shed some further light on the 
question of vicarious liability.   Counsel for the plaintiff argued that because the employee 
who pushed the basin was in the washroom in the ordinary context of her employment, her 
employer was inevitably vicariously liable for her action.
908
  Lord Donaldson firmly rejected 
this assertion, and gave very persuasive reasons for doing so: 
‘Mr Sedley [counsel for the plaintiff] is driven to say that arguably, on his interpretation of 
that test, if instead of rocking the basin she had knifed the plaintiff that would have given 
rise to vicarious liability.  With all respect to Mr Sedley, I regard that as so extreme a 
proposition as to betray that there must be something wrong in the test if it is correctly 
applied’ 
It is submitted that this reasoning is correct, and still holds good.  Otherwise an employer 
will be vicariously liable for any tortious action of an employee which takes place during 
working time.  This would lead to arbitrary conclusions even with regard to workers in 
conventional and uncomplicated employment relationships.   Suppose for instance one 
factory worker discovered during his shift that his boyfriend or girlfriend had had an affair 
with a colleague, sought out said colleague on the factory floor and punched him.  If the line 
proposed by counsel for the plaintiff in Aldred v Nancanco  had been taken, then their 
employer would be vicariously liable for an assault stemming from a private grudge.  If the 
aggrieved lover had made the same discovery and responded in the same way after the shift 
had ended, there would be no possibility of liability ensuing. 
Given the elastic and complex understanding of working time in relation to clergy, such an 
interpretation could again give rise to effectively open-ended liability. But as was discussed 
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at length in Chapter 2, there must be a nexus between the working relationship and the 
tort.  In light of the highly complex working relationship where clergy are concerned, it is 
critical to address the connection between the working relationship and tort in terms of 
duties and tasks.  Otherwise almost any activity could be found to have some connection 
with the cleric’s working relationship, because if this is understood in relation to ministry in 
general terms, then it relates to the cleric’s entire existence. 
In the example under consideration, a reasonable argument can be made that there is a 
proper and legitimate connection.  Algernon was actively engaged in the task of providing 
pastoral care and administering sacraments.
909
  As is discussed above, the fact that he was 
going about this in an improper and unauthorised manner is not directly relevant.  The 
argument and the trespass which ensued in the course of it could be interpreted as part of 
the necessary dialogue which a priest would have with relatives of a baptismal candidate 
and also individuals posing challenging questions about the faith. 
But the matter is certainly not clear cut.  In the old but relevant Australian case of Deaton v 
Flew910 an employer was found not to be vicariously liable for the action of a barmaid who 
responded to an allegedly rude and aggressive customer by throwing beer in his face and 
then aiming the glass at him.  Her action was interpreted by the court as one of personal 
vindictiveness.   
Similarly, it is submitted that if Algernon happened to have an altercation with Ellis in 
Bonnie’s garden over a manner unrelated to some specific task which he was performing in 
relation to his professional, ministerial duties enshrined in the CTS, the mere fact that he 
was wearing clerical dress and in the presence of a parishioner would be insufficient for a 
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finding of vicarious liability.  If Ellis had happened to call him fat, or ugly or stupid for 
reasons unconnected with his dog-collar, and Algernon had responded with violence, there 
is no justifiable reason in law to automatically fasten the Church in Wales with vicarious 
liability, even if the incident took place in Bonnie’s garden, any more than an employing 
bank would be liable if one bank clerk failed to see the funny side of a joke at his expense 
and assaulted a colleague for it.  
5.4 (2) Negligence - Case Study A 
The unfortunate Algernon receives a call from Brian, another parishioner who is very 
concerned about his son Charlie.  Charlie has recently moved out of the parental home, to a 
different address but still in Algernon’s parish.  According to Brian, Charlie has reported 
hearing voices telling him to kill himself.  Brian’s wife Dora is concerned that their son might 
be mentally ill, but Brian rejects this possibility and says that he believes Charlie has a 
demon.
911
   
Algernon assures Brian that he need not worry, and that he will take care of things.  He visits 
Charlie, has a long talk and concludes that Brian is correct.  Without consulting any clergy 
colleagues Algernon attempts to exorcise Charlie, before departing and promising to call 
later in the week.  If in the meantime Charlie harms himself or a third party, is Algernon 
potentially liable in negligence and is the Church in Wales potentially vicarious liable for 
this? 
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Clergy Terms of Service 
In taking Brian’s call and visiting Charlie, Algernon was carrying out his duty to provide 
appropriate pastoral care in accordance with the CTS.
912
  However, the way in which he 
chose to do this was problematic in several respects.  Firstly his assurance to Brian that 
there was no need to worry and that he could take care of things presents a number of 
issues.    
Without having seen or spoken to Charlie about the matter in question, Algernon was in no 
position to ascertain what the problem with him actually was, much less to judge whether it 
was in fact something which he could deal with himself.  Church in Wales clergy are required 
to know the limitations of the competence and knowledge base.
913
   They also have a duty 
to communicate this to the people with whom they are dealing in pastoral situations.
914
  
Algernon should have been aware that Charlie’s symptoms might have been the result of a 
medical condition, and should have explained to Brian that the situation might be one which 
required assistance from a doctor or other appropriate expert.  Promising to take care of it 
all was rash and in breach of the CTS. 
Algernon’s promise also overlooked Charlie’s own right to make choices in the situation; as 
an adult he might well not have wished to have had any dealings with Algernon, and if this 
was the case his view should have been respected.
915
  Although not absolutely necessary at 
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this stage, it might have been sensible for Algernon to have mentioned to Brian that he 
would have to respect any confidences which Charlie chose to share with him, unless there 
was a grave threat to his wellbeing or that of third parties.
916
  Making the situation clear at 
this point would potentially have saved any danger of conflict with Brian at a later stage 
should he wish to know what had passed between Charlie and Algernon. 
Worse, however, was his unilateral diagnosis of possession and decision to attempt to 
exorcise Charlie.  The CTS do not expressly deal with the ministry of deliverance, but they do 
expressly reiterate the duty of Church in Wales clergy to comply with the law of the 
Church.
917
  The Book of Common Prayer states that clergy should undertake the ministry of 
deliverance (including exorcism) only with the knowledge and authority of the diocesan 
bishop.
918
  Clergy should not undertake this type of ministry unless they have appropriate 
training and supervision.
919
  In attempting an exorcism without consultation or receiving 
authority, Algernon was acting in breach of the guidance and therefore the CTS. 
Furthermore, it is also at least arguable that Algernon was in breach of the CTS in not 
encouraging Charlie to seek medical attention; he should have been aware that he lacked 
the training and expertise to diagnose whether Charlie was ill, or to assess whether he 
posed a risk to himself or others.
920
  In order to comply with the CTS requirement of 
understanding the limits of their own professional competence, clergy do need to be aware 
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of symptoms which may indicate mental illness or disturbance, and which ideally need 
further investigation.  Hearing voices would be one such symptom.
921
 
In noting that it was likely that Charlie was suffering from some mental illness or 
impairment, Algernon should also have realised that he was therefore at least potentially 
dealing with a vulnerable adult, and been aware that he may have had particular needs as 
such.
922
  Clergy cannot hope to comply with the Church in Wales policy on Vulnerable 
Adults, which the CTS requires them to adhere to, if they are unable to recognise when they 
are potentially confronted with a vulnerable adult.
923
 
Secular Law 
Was Algernon liable in negligence, and was the Church in Wales therefore potentially 
vicariously liable?   There are three (not necessarily mutually exclusive) ways in which 
Algernon’s conduct might give rise to liability in negligence: 
1) If his attempted exorcism of Charlie caused demonstrable physical or mental harm, 
or; 
2) If he owed Charlie a duty of care, and in failing to seek medical attention for him he 
failed in this duty to prevent him from suffering harm, or; 
3) If he owed third parties who might be at risk from Charlie a duty of care, and in 
failing to seek medical attention for Charlie, warn such third parties or take other 
steps to safeguard them, he failed in this duty to prevent them from suffering harm. 
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Causing harm to Charlie 
If the exorcism did anything to exacerbate Charlie’s condition and caused harm which could 
be medically diagnosed and assessed, Algernon would be liable for this if: it could be proven 
that the harm was reasonably foreseeable; and the causal relationship between the 
exorcism and the harm could also be proven. 
Anglican writers on deliverance do acknowledge the potential for ill advised or 
inappropriate efforts in this area to damage individuals.
924
  However, there is a difference 
between emotional and even spiritual harm, and the kind of harm required to bring an 
action for personal injury.  Commentators acknowledge that proving causation and 
actionable damage is much harder with psychological than with physical injuries.
925
  Given 
that it in this case it is probable that Charlie was already suffering from some form of mental 
illness, proving that Algernon’s exorcism actually caused any further harm suffered would 
be extremely difficult.  Therefore, liability for causing harm in this case is remote. 
Failing to protect Charlie from harm 
In this context, the importance of the questions ‘what was the tortfeasor doing’ and ‘what 
was the tortfeasor purporting to do’ can be seen.  Algernon was making a pastoral visit to 
Charlie in his capacity as a priest, pursuant to the CTS.
926
  He was not purporting to have any 
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specialist knowledge to diagnose and treat mental illness.  Neither did he make any 
promises directly to Charlie to safeguard his welfare.  The only undertaking given was to 
Brian, who himself had no legal duty to protect his now adult son.   
And it would be difficult to argue on the facts that Algernon’s remarks to Brian were what 
prevented Brian from seeking any medical attention for Charlie, given that Charlie was 
extremely resistant to the idea that his son’s problems might have a clinical rather than a 
spiritual explanation.  Therefore, it would be difficult to construe Algernon’s actions as 
having placed Charlie in danger, or having foreseeably deprived him of a chance of rescue.  
Algernon simply failed to help an individual whom he had no duty in secular law to help in 
the first place. 
It is submitted that Algernon’s words and actions were not sufficient to give rise to a duty of 
care between himself and Charlie.  And it is further submitted that nothing in the CTS 
provides the foundation for such a duty.  It is true that, on the basis of the discussion above, 
Algernon spectacularly failed to comply with his duties as outlined by the CTS.  But that is 
different from asserting that those same duties were meant to generate any secular legal 
duties towards or secular legal rights vested in third parties like Charlie. 
Consider the analogy of a secular business operating in a service industry.  A company 
operating restaurants, hotels or theme parks might well have terms in its employment 
contracts requiring its employees to behave in a friendly, welcoming and courteous way 
towards customers, and to attempt to ensure that they had everything which they needed 
to ensure that they had a pleasant and enjoyable experience.  Employees of the company 
who failed in these requirements and were rude, indifferent or unhelpful towards 
customers might well be properly subject to discipline and ultimately dismissal. 
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However, that position as between the employer and employee would not automatically 
give rise to any potential claims in contract or tort from third party customers.  For instance, 
if someone checking into a hotel arrived appearing ill or uncomfortable, it might well be 
good practice and company policy for the person at the reception desk to ask if they needed 
anything, including the number of a doctor or room service.  But this does not mean that a 
duty of care was owed and that the customer would have a right of action if the offer was 
not made, and the unfortunate person had a heart attack or slips into a diabetic coma. 
Similarly the very general, spiritual relationship which priests in the Church in Wales have 
with the church requires them to demonstrate love and care to the people around them.  
The specific professional duties which they have outlined in the CTS generate obligations 
and standards which apply between them and the church.  But neither of these factors 
provides the foundation for claims in negligence by third parties if priests fail to give the 
level of care required. 
Clearly it follows that if Algernon is not liable in negligence, there is no possibility of the 
Church in Wales being vicariously liable. 
Failing to protect third parties from harm 
All of the above arguments apply with even more force to third parties who may suffer 
harm through Charlie’s actions.  As was discussed at length in Chapter 5, Anglican priests do 
not have the technical ability to assess when a person may be a danger to the wider 
community, neither do they have any special powers to detain or restrain individuals, so it 
would be difficult to assert that any duty of care can be owed to the world at large. 
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Furthermore, in Maga the court reject the idea of finding that unbounded a duty of care 
could be owed to the world in general, even though it was prepared to find a duty of care 
towards the young boys with whom the potentially abusive priest came into contact.
927
  But 
in this scenario, even a duty of care towards the individuals with whom Charlie came into 
contact would be a bridge too far.  On the facts of Maga, the defendant diocese was 
vicariously liable for the trespasses committed by the errant priest.  It was not controversial 
that he had committed the torts in question. 
In this instance, there is no question of the church being vicariously liable for Charlie as an 
employee or quasi employee.  It could only be vicariously liable if Algernon was negligent.  If 
Algernon was not negligent, then there could be no question of vicarious liability, and 
therefore no need to explore any possible nexus between Charlie’s victims and Algernon’s 
church.  This seems morally as well as legally justifiable, given that the church had no power 
to monitor or control Charlie in any way. 
 
5.4 (3) Negligence - Case Study B 
Algernon’s parish holds a regular charismatic healing service, which has given rise to two 
unfortunate incidents.  It was common for individuals receiving prayer ministry to collapse 
backwards; according to Algernon and the people in question this was the work of the Holy 
Spirit.  However, in order to ensure that nobody was injured, the church ensured that 
people were staying by to catch and support the recipients of prayer ministry should this 
become necessary.  Regrettably the system broke down when a tall and somewhat obese 
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gentleman name Bob tipped over.  The appointed catchers did not feel able to cope with 
Bob’s falling bulk, and jumped out of the way, leaving Bob to hit his head on the floor.
928
 
Furthermore, Cerys asked for prayer in respect of her epilepsy.  She returned home 
believing that she was healed and decided to stop taking her medication.
929
  The following 
week she was hospitalised after having a serious fit while in the passenger seat of her 
husband Dave’s car.  This caused Dave to veer off the road, injuring Edgar who was walking 
along the payment at the time. 
Bob 
Clergy Terms of Service 
In conducting a healing service Algernon was carrying out his duty to lead worship.
930
  He 
was also carrying out his pastoral duty to care for all with particular concern for the sick.
931
  
The Church in Wales makes liturgical provision for prayers of healing.
932
  This includes the 
laying on of hands
933
 and anointing.
934
  The Church in Wales has also issued a public 
statement on the ministry of healing via its website, and directs anyone seeking this ministry 
to contact their parish priest to find out what is available in their locality.
935
  Therefore, the 
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healing service itself appears to have been clearly within Algernon’s proper duties according 
to the CTS and the wider law of the Church in Wales. 
There is scope for arguing that the manner in which the service was arranged may have 
failed to comply with the terms of the CTS however.   The failure of the helpers to catch Bob 
may have been the result of a lack of proper training and preparation, and therefore be 
indicative of the service not having been ‘thoughtfully prepared’.
936
  There is also an express 
requirement that lay people involved in worship be provided with the training and 
preparation necessary to support them.
937
  Furthermore, individuals should not be excluded 
from worship by reason of ‘disability or disadvantage’.938 Consequently it could be argued 
that it should have been ensured that there were sufficient numbers of appropriately strong 
people on catching duty to allow larger members of the congregation to fall to the floor as 
safely as their more sleek brethren. 
However, the unfortunate response to the people appointed to catch Bob does not in itself 
prove that Algernon did not comply with these duties; sometimes well-prepared and 
ordinarily responsible individuals make mistakes, especially in a moment of crisis.  The 
volunteers may have been quite capable of catching Bob had they not panicked for some 
reason.  (This of course raises interesting questions about the potential vicarious liability of 
the wider church if the volunteer catchers were negligent but Algernon was not, however 
such issues are beyond the scope of this study.) 
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Secular Law 
The ordinary principles of the law of negligence, as it has developed from Donoghue v 
Stevenson, would apply to this situation.939  A defendant will only be liable in negligence if it 
can be established that he, she or it owed the claimant a duty of care.
940
  In this case it 
might be argued that Algernon did not owe Bob a duty of care to prevent him from choosing 
to fall backwards.  He was an adult, presumably of full mental capacity and not obviously 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  Nobody physically pushed him or caused him to 
trip, his action was autonomous.    
However, given that Bob presumably collapsed into empty space believing that there were 
people poised to catch him, it seems reasonable to assert that if Algernon’s words or 
conduct had induced this belief, then he had a duty of care towards third parties like Bob, 
who were foreseeably going to put themselves in danger were the belief to prove to be 
misguided. 
Again, whether or not there was a breach of that duty of care is a question of fact, but it 
appears likely that there was.  If the catchers were uncertain of their ability to cope with 
Bob’s size and weight, then he should have been warned of this before he placed himself in 
jeopardy.  Whether any negligence on their part was a result of failings by Algernon to be 
rigorous enough in selecting, training and supervising others would again be a matter of fact 
to be determined.  Certainly this part of the scenario is potentially capable of giving rise to a 
successful claim in negligence. 
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Cerys 
Clergy Terms of Service 
As detailed above, in arranging and conducting a healing service Algernon could be properly 
shown to be performing his duties pursuant to the CTS and law of the Church in Wales.  
However, there is again scope to question whether the manner in which he performed 
these tasks was in keeping with the terms of the CTS.  In determining this, the critical 
questions must be: what message did Algernon actually attempt to convey in his teaching; 
and was the manner in which he did so clear and responsible in view of his audience and 
context? 
Clergy are enjoined to administer pastoral care in a way which is sensitive and effective, and 
the sick are one group whose needs should receive particular attention.
941
  Given the 
context of a healing service, it is particularly likely that some people present would be have 
mental and physical health issues which might make them especially vulnerable to 
perceived promises of healing and release from pain.  The injunction to be ‘sensitive’ could 
be read as requiring clerics to be aware of the potential vulnerabilities of those present.   
This point is emphasised again by CTS 3.3, which requires clergy to be remain aware of the 
needs of the people to whom they are ministering and the situation in which they are 
placed at all times; vulnerable adults are highlighted as one category of persons towards 
whom the clergy should be especially vigilant in this regard.
942
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The dangers of exploitation and manipulation are referred to in CTS 3.5.
943
  Individuals with 
medical problems causing them distress or anxiety are arguably at particular risk of 
exploitation and manipulation, as their ability to critically question what is being presented 
to them may be impaired by their temporary or ongoing vulnerability.  Therefore, the CTS 
effectively require clergy to exercise caution in the messages which are conveyed to such 
people. 
Clergy also have a duty to preach and teach, and to keep their professional skills updated, 
including those related to effective communication.
944
  Failing to find ways of 
communicating which are clear, unambiguous and suitable to the probable recipients is also 
therefore a potential breach of the CTS requirements. 
It is not apparent from the scenario whether or not Algernon deliberately gave Cerys the 
message that she should stop taking her medication.  If he did, it is submitted that this is 
problematic in relation to the CTS and the wider law of the Church.  The CTS require clergy 
to comply with the Constitution of the Church in Wales.
945
  The Constitution provides that 
the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Church in Wales shall have power to hear complaints against 
clerics: 
‘teaching, preaching, publishing or professing doctrine or belief incompatible with that of the 
Church in Wales’.946 
or guilty of conduct: 
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 CTS 1.3. 
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 Const Chapter IX, Part III 9 (a): ‘There shall be a Disciplinary Tribunal of the Church in Wales which shall have 
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Diocesan Bishop of: a) ‘teaching, preaching, publishing or professing doctrine or belief incompatible with that 
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‘giving just cause for scandal or offence.’947  
Promising miraculous healing and encouraging people to stop taking prescribed medication 
is not unambiguously contrary to the doctrine of the Church in Wales (although a case could 
be made that harming the weak and vulnerable is contrary to the fundamental principles of 
love and compassion which are at the heart of Christian doctrine).
948
  However, it is clearly 
contrary to the belief of the Church as expressed in its public statement the ministry of 
healing; this states that: 
We believe that God loves us and wills the very best for us in his kingdom. But we also know 
that suffering and death are conditions which we cannot escape from in this life. God is not 
distant from us in that. In Jesus Christ he shared in this life’s suffering and death on the 
cross, and he can draw close to us in times such as these. 
However, his resurrection in the power of the Holy Spirit gives us hope that we might have a 
foretaste of his kingdom here and now and that through the Church’s ministry we shall 
receive his love, strength and healing touch. 
What form that healing will take we cannot tell. It may be: 
• Help to carry us through a prolonged illness or disability 
• A recovery more rapid than expected 
• Experiencing our fear of death being driven out by God’s love 
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 Const. Chapter IX, Part III 9 (c). 
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 N Doe, The Law of the Church in Wales (University of Wales Press: Cardiff 2002), 211: ‘Anglican churches are 
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• A healing which is so unexpected that we want to call it a “miracle” 
• A growing awareness of inner peace and wholeness.949 
 
This teaching expressly provides that it is impossible to know what form the healing power 
of God may take in any given situation; promises of healing and assurances that it is safe 
and appropriate to cease taking medication are incompatible with this stance.  It also 
overtly makes the point that healing may involve providing help to bear an ongoing illness or 
disability, an acceptance of death and an increasing, spiritual awareness of peace and 
wholeness which transcends bodily failings and weaknesses.  Again a view point not 
compatible with guarantees of miracle cures.  Therefore if Algernon gave such guarantees, 
he is clearly in breach of the CTS and the Church in Wales Constitution. 
The situation would be more complicated however if Algernon did not intend to promise 
any sort of miracle cure, but Cerys misinterpreted his words.  If this was the case, then it is 
submitted that whether he was in breach of the terms of the CTS would depend upon 
whether what he had said was objectively reasonable and responsible given the context in 
which he was operating.  As discussed above, it was likely that there would be emotionally 
vulnerable people present at the healing service, and Algernon had a duty to be aware of 
this and alive to the possible dangers of misinterpretation.   
Making claims that could easily be misunderstood in such a setting could be sufficiently 
careless and insensitive to constitute a breach of the CTS.  At the other end of the spectrum 
of possibilities, however, is that nothing which Algernon said or did could have been 
predicted to provoke the response which it did in Cerys.  Cerys might even have decided for 
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her own reasons that she was going to stop taking the drugs which she had been prescribed, 
and only afterwards attributed it to the healing service.  The circumstances would have to 
be investigated to determine whether Algernon in fact make any unwise or irresponsible 
representations. 
Secular Law 
Cases have been reported in the secular press of UK churches allegedly encouraging people 
with serious illnesses to believe that divine intervention had made conventional medicine 
unnecessary, and of individuals suffering from serious medical complications and even 
death as a result.  One of the most notorious was that of the Synagogue Church of All 
Nations in London.
950
  Following advice from an Evangelical pastor various HIV positive 
patients discontinued their drug regime, at a least three people died prematurely in 
consequence of this. 
No civil legal actions have been reported following these events, and the church continues 
to make dramatic but ambiguous promises about healing: 
‘Divine healing is the supernatural power of God bringing health to the human flesh. 
Thousands who come oppressed with sickness and disease receive their healing at The 
SCOAN as the very life of God changes their situations and moves their impossible 
mountains. Truly, there is never a sickness Jesus cannot heal.’951 
Stating that God can heal any disease is subtly but significantly different from stating that he 
necessarily will perform a healing miracle in any given case.  The reported response of the 
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church to press criticism was an affirmation of a belief that God could cure HIV, but a denial 
that individuals were told to stop taking their medication.
952
 
Although there are no reported domestic cases dealing with tortious liability arising from 
such claims, there is case law which indicates that making public claims about supernatural 
healing is not an unlawful activity, even if done in a context which is commercial as well as 
religious.  In Creflo Dollar Ministries,953 the VAT and Duties Tribunal considered the activities 
of (the somewhat ironically named) Pastor Dollar, who ran a church based in Atlanta, 
Georgia.  The appellant organisation, Creflo Dollar Ministries, was a registered charity and a 
company limited by guarantee operating from premises in Birmingham. It served as the 
regional distribution centre for Pastor Dollar, sending his audio and video tapes and books 
all over the Europe and the Middle East. 
The office manager of Creflo Dollar Ministries organised religious convention in the UK with 
Pastor Dollar, with the stated intention of boosting sales.  In the publicity for this 
convention, some dramatic claims were made about what attendees to could expect to 
experience.  For example: 
‘The boy never walked a day in his life. Hoping for a miracle, the man pushed his wheelchair-
bound son to the altar. They lined up and patiently waited for prayer. As Dr Creflo A Dollar Jr 
began singing, something happened to the young boy’s legs. They received strength and he 
stood on his own for the very first time. The crowd loudly praised God as they witnessed a 
move of His Spirit in their midst. 
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Healing and deliverance are commonplace at Changing Your World conventions. From 
Oakland to New York to London and stops in between, burdens are being removed and yokes 
destroyed. The continual stream of testimonies demonstrate the God’s power is making a 
mark that cannot be erased. This year, Creflo Dollar Ministries will further its life-changing 
course as it brings the good news to Australia and New Zealand. Its April convention in South 
Africa was a remarkable success. Tens of thousands were in attendance nightly and many 
souls were saved.’954 
 
The legal issues in the case concerned whether the convention had been held for business 
purposes, as this was critical for tax purposes.  The tribunal found that the purpose of the 
convention was partly to provide a forum for Pastor Dollar to preach the gospel, partly to 
allow a professional-quality video of his preaching to be produced so that he could reach a 
wider audience and partly so that the UK based company could increase its sales.
955
  
Consequently the input tax which was at the centre of the case fell to be apportioned.   
Because the tax issues required the tribunal to establish the purpose of the convention, the 
activities of Pastor Dollar were considered in detail.  At no point was there any suggestion 
that there were potential legal or public policy concerns about the pastor and his 
organisation making statements to potentially vulnerable people about healing miracles or 
encouraging and expectation of the same.  In fact the tribunal made positive comments 
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about the likely experience of individuals attending the convention.
956
  Whilst the case was 
not concerned with tortious liability for harm caused to attendees, it is evidence that UK 
courts have treated charismatic, healing gatherings as acceptable and unproblematic 
activities, even where the motivation has in part been to generate income.  The adults 
choosing to attend were not regarded as placing themselves at risk, or being placed at risk 
by the organisers of the event.   They were free to buy videos and tapes or not as they 
chose, in much the same way as people attending a concert, lecture or non-religious 
campaigning event. 
Another case which demonstrates the UK courts inclination to treat mentally competent 
adults as responsible for their own welfare in religious matters is R (on the application of 
Jenkins) v H M Coroner for Portsmouth and South East Hampshire.957 This decision also 
indicates that the fact than an individual may be emotionally vulnerable due to the pain, 
fear and stress of illness will not in and of itself generate any additional duty of care on the 
part of the individuals surrounding them.  It is important to consider the facts in detail, 
because there is significance in the similarities and the differences between this case and 
the circumstances of the case study. 
The case concerned a challenge to the finding of a coroner; the claimant argued that his 
narrative verdict had been perverse, and that the only rational verdict would have been one 
of unlawful killing.  The claimant maintained that the foundation of a verdict of unlawful 
killing arose from gross negligence manslaughter by the deceased’s partner, who failed to 
seek appropriate medical attention for him. 
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 The deceased, Russell Jenkins, had developed a distrust for conventional medicine and a 
strong interest in alternative therapies and what a variety of what might loosely be termed 
‘New Age’ practices.  In 1996 Mr Jenkins had been diagnosed with diabetes, and attended 
his GP practice from time to time to receive check-ups and advice.
958
  Mr Jenkins did not tell 
his family about his diabetes, either then or at later stage.  Furthermore, from 2001 he 
ceased to make use of conventional NHS services, and failed to attend the surgery despite 
being sent reminders.   
Nevertheless, in the course of 2001 he had been warned by his GP (Dr Dale) of the dangers 
of diabetic neuropathy (damage to the nerves resulting from high blood sugar levels), 
especially as in the feet. He also was explicitly told that ulcers and any breaking of the skin 
could be dangerous if ignored, but would be effectively dealt with by antibiotics. He was 
advised that any break in the skin should therefore be treated promptly.  
The GP practice was aware of Mr Jenkins' interest in alternative medicine, and Dr Dale had 
visited Mr Jenkins at his clinic at The Quiet Mind Centre. The deceased had offered 
treatments of Reiki, aromatherapy and reflexology, as well as teaching meditation at other 
venues.  During the inquest, various individuals who were friends of Mr Jenkins and who 
had been involved with his alternative therapies and spiritualities gave evidence about his 
state of mind. 
One, Mr Cooter, testified that Mr Jenkins believed that bodily ailments were the result of 
emotional turmoil, and therapies attempted healing by addressing this root cause; 
furthermore he believed that it was important to consult his inner spiritual being before 
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taking important decisions, and could sometimes be seen moving his fingers as he engaged 
in this inner communion.
959
 
Mr Jenkins partner Ms Cameron had worked as nurse for twelve years before abandoning 
conventional medicine in 2004 to concentrate on alternative therapies.
960
  She believed Mr 
Jenkins to be a clairvoyant and a psychic, and confirmed his belief in ‘checking’ decisions 
with his inner being. 
Mr Jenkins disclosed to Ms Cameron that he was a ‘borderline diabetic’.961  He injured his 
foot digging a pet’s grave in 2005; when it became numb and infected Ms Cameron 
recognised what appeared to be diabetic neuropathy.
962
  He refused all convention 
medicine, treated the infection with magnesium sulphate, and despite becoming black and 
ulcerated it did eventually heal.  From this time onwards Mr Jenkins continued to suffer 
from ulcers on his feet but still adamantly refused to see a doctor. 
In December 2006 Mr Jenkins stepped on a plug, and sustained an injury to his foot which 
became infected.  Over several months he consistently declined to seek conventional 
medical treatment, including during a period when Ms Cameron was out of the country for 
several weeks.
963
  By April he was in considerable pain and displaying what Ms Cameron 
                                                           
959
 Ibid, para 8: ‘Mr Jenkins believed in personal development by concentrating upon the inner self. He believed 
that physical ailments were symptomatic of emotional turmoil. His treatments were intended to address 
spiritual well being. His spiritual life was very important to him. He developed a technique which witnesses 
described at 'checking' or 'dousing'. This was a state of mind induced in order to receive answers or approval 
from his inner being to a proposal or a course of action. A signal that he was engaged in this process was a 
movement of his fingers’. 
960
 Ibid, para 11. 
961
 Ibid. 
962
 Ibid, par 12. 
963
 Ibid, para 14: ’In late February 2007 Ms Cameron went to the United States for two weeks. When she 
returned in March she went with Mrs Finn to India where Jeannette's daughter was getting married. 
Mr Jenkins was alone at the Quiet Mind Centre. He had a telephone in his bedroom. It is a matter of some 
significance to the Coroner's assessment of the evidence that during Ms Cameron's absence for a period of 
some two to three weeks he chose to seek no medical help.’ 
309 
 
believed at the time to be the symptoms of a cold, being unwell in that way herself.  By the 
middle of the month he took to his bed to rest his foot.
964
  
Mr Jenkins did not wish his family to know about the state of his foot, and Ms Cameron told 
them over the ‘phone that he had a cold.  He continued to refuse all medical assistance, 
even though Ms Cameron told him that his foot was turning gangrenous, and the smell, 
colour and discharge must have made the situation obvious even to a lay person.  On April 
17
th
 Mr Jenkins succumbed to the infection and died; Ms Cameron called a friend and they 
summoned a GP who pronounced Mr Jenkins dead. 
The coroner concluded that although there was some evidence that Ms Cameron had 
assumed a duty of care for the deceased, dressing his wound and looking after him, it was 
not open to him to find that she had a duty of care to call for medical assistance against his 
wishes when he was mentally competent.
965
  The coroner also concluded that based on 
expert evidence, it was likely that Mr Jenkins remained lucid in his final hours; and in any 
case if he had lost consciousness in the hours immediately prior to his dying the chances of 
his being successfully treated were by that stage small enough to question whether any 
failure to summon help materially contributed to his demise.
966
 
The court emphasised that in reaching the conclusion which he did, the coroner was not 
considering whether there might be an arguable case for unlawful killing, but whether he 
could be sure that an unlawful killing had taken place.
967
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Mr Jenkins was an intelligent man with strong, if idiosyncratic views, and must have been 
aware of the dangers which he faced in rejected medical treatment.  There was no evidence 
that he was dominated by Ms Cameron, the pair appeared to be well matched.
968
  It was 
probable that Mr Jenkins was mentally competent until the time of his death, but even if he 
was not, and at that stage Ms Cameron did have a duty to summon help, the coroner was 
correct to conclude that it would have had only a marginal affect upon his survival chances.  
Ultimately the coroner’s conclusions did not fall outside of what was reasonable on the 
basis of the evidence, and the claimant had therefore not succeeding in proving that his 
verdict was perverse.
969
 
It should be stressed that this was a judicial review case on whether a coroner was entitled 
to reject a finding of unlawful killing.  Furthermore, a verdict of unlawful killing based on 
gross negligence manslaughter would relate to a criminal standard of negligence and a 
criminal burden of proof.  Therefore, the outcome of this case does not have a direct 
bearing upon possible liability in tort.  However, it is still extremely relevant. 
Firstly, it affirms that the courts will always respect the autonomy of a mentally competent 
adult in making decision about medical treatment, even if those decisions are irrational and 
damaging
970
.  In light of this, third parties cannot be said to have a duty to override or 
attempt to override such wishes.   If a state court has no power to deny an individual the 
right to self determination, a private party certainly has no such right or power. 
Secondly, the family of the deceased raised a number of arguments in an effort to 
demonstrate that his partner had been criminally instrumental in his death, and both the 
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coroner and the court reviewing his verdict considered the legal position very thoroughly.  
At no stage was it ever suggested that Ms Cameron was legally culpable for sharing and 
encouraging his spiritual and ideological beliefs.  In the contemporary legal landscape such 
claims would be problematic in relation to the Article 9 right to freedom of conscience, 
belief and religion.  Freedom to manifest this may only be subject to such limitations are as 
in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society.
971
   
But even prior to the Human Rights Act, the UK courts accepted that religious groups like 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses were entitled to exist and promote their doctrines, even these 
might encourage individuals to make decisions which were detrimental to their physical 
health and wellbeing.
972
 
If courts considering negligence claims in facts similar to the case study, or those quoted 
about in relation to the Synagogue Church of All Nations in London were too ready to find a 
duty of care and liability, it would conflict with the general respect for the autonomy of 
individuals in both religious and medical affairs.  Neither groups nor individuals would be 
able to express views which might encourage others to act in ways which undermined their 
safety or even material interests, without justifiable fear of litigation.  Furthermore, the law 
of negligence would be moving away from its traditional territory of redress against those  
who harm their neighbour,
973
 towards imposing wide ranging duties on private parties to 
guard against inciting their neighbours to harm themselves. 
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If a church might be liable for personal injury for having encouraged a mentally competent 
adult to choose to cease taking medication, why should an environmental campaign group 
not be liable for property damage for encouraging a mentally competent adult to take his 
tumble-dryer to the scrap-yard?   
This is not to say that there are no conceivable circumstances in which it might be 
appropriate for a court to find one party liable in negligence for inciting an adult to make a 
detrimental decision.    If there was an established duty of care and the individual being 
incited was unable to make a truly free choice because of their circumstances, then it is 
quite possible that liability might ensue.  The recent case law on prison self harm and suicide 
provides a helpful analogy.
974
  Police or prison authorities may be liable in negligence for a 
prisoner of sound mind committing suicide, because of their unique and vulnerable 
circumstances.  On this basis it would seem probable that negligence would be found if a 
prison or police officer were to taunt a person in custody and encourage them to harm 
themselves. 
However, such a circumstance is a long way removed from an adult choosing to attend a 
religious service, listening to the teaching there and making choices which may or may not 
have been based on what was said.  A further difficulty with imposing liability in a case like 
Algernon’s would be determining causation; individuals like Cerys make self destructive 
decisions for a wide variety of reasons, she might have been thinking about the possibility of 
miracle cures for some time before going to the healing service in question.  Causation 
would be even more problematic if Algernon had not in fact directly urged anyone to stop 
taking conventional drugs, but had had his words misconstrued by Cerys.  
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Ultimately Algernon had a duty to provide spiritual teaching, and was claiming expertise in 
the Christian religion, not in medicine.  He had not undertaken to be specially responsible 
for the welfare of Cerys as an individual, and had no legal power to prevent her from making 
choices which might harm her health, or even of monitoring her behaviour outside of 
church.  Considering what he was claiming to be able to do, and what he was in fact able to 
do, imposing a duty of care on him to promote Cerys’ physical welfare appears 
unreasonable and unduly onerous. 
It is true that as discussed above, the CTS require him to be aware of the needs of 
individuals like Cerys, and to act in a responsible way which will not put them at 
unnecessary risk.  However, once again this standard of best professional practice set by the 
Church in Wales does not readily translate into any duty owed in secular law. 
5.5 Overall Conclusions 
The Church in Wales introduced the CTS primarily to address concerns about the working 
arrangements of clergy, and in response to state pressure to ensure that they were afforded 
employment rights and protection akin to those available to workers in a secular sphere.   
This has resulted in Church in Wales clergy being employees for many purposes in secular 
law.  Employment law in the modern world is flexible and complicated, a given individual 
and a particular set of working arrangements being categorised differently for different 
purposes.   For instance, whether that individual is covered by anti-discrimination in the 
labour market is a wholly separate question from whether or not that same individual may 
claim redundancy or unfair dismissal.    
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If Church in Wales clergy meet the criteria for being classified as employees or workers for a 
specified legal purpose, then they will be so classified. Naturally the more closely the church 
models its working arrangements on the secular world, the more likely it is that its clergy 
will be categorised in the same way the secular workers whose employment arrangements 
have moulded the church pattern.   
In light of all of this, and the recent case law on vicarious liability and the Roman Catholic 
church, it seems highly likely that in most circumstances the tortious actions of clergy when 
carrying out their ministerial functions will give rise to vicarious liability for the Church in 
Wales.  This however raises significant intellectual and practical challenges, due to the 
unique nature of the clergy role and the Anglican understanding of priesthood.  Given that 
Church in Wales clergy are in some sense fulfilling their ministerial functions simply by 
existing, how can courts rationally determine which torts are committed in the course of 
their working lives and which are simply private matters?   
How can courts steer a course between opting for an all or nothing approach to liability on 
the one hand, and making arbitrary distinctions on the other? Rendering the Church in 
Wales liable for every tort which its ministers commit is unsatisfactory, as is freeing it from 
vicarious liability altogether.  So how can meaningful and rational distinctions be made? 
It is submitted that the CTS provide a useful basis for making such distinctions.  Rather than 
considering the position of priests, bishops and deacons in spiritual terms in relation to 
Anglican theology, the CTS gives a framework for considering their role in terms of 
professional TEU.   This is appropriate and helpful when dealing with issues of vicarious 
liability, and the church is effectively being placed in an analogous position to a secular 
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employer being made responsible for the actions of a professional employee furthering its 
aims and interests.  
The spiritual and professional ways of understanding Church in Wales clergy are not in 
competition, rather they coexist but in different contexts.  To treat the clergy as 
professionals for many purposes within secular law does not prevent the church from 
understanding them as far more than trained professionals fulfilling a role.  It need in no 
way interfere with the spiritual life of the church, but it gives the church a way of interacting 
with the secular world, and in particular with tortious liability, which is both logical and 
consistent.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Guidance Issued by the Church in Wales on Parental Consent for the Baptism of a Child 
(Undated) 
 
Numbering has been added to the document for ease of reference 
 
             PARENTAL CONSENT FOR THE BAPTISM OF A CHILD. 
        ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
1) The purpose of this guidance:  
------------------------------------ 
 
a) This guidance is to help in deciding what parental consent may be required in 
relation to the baptism of a child. The guidance covers two separate aspects. 
 
2) The necessity for parental consent: 
------------------------------------------ 
 
a) It is possible for a person to apply to a court to stop the baptism of a person under 
the age of 16 for whom he/she has parental responsibility. This is because, although 
each person having parental responsibility can usually act independently, any other 
person having such responsibility can disagree with the decision and apply to a court 
asking the court to make the final decision.  
 
b) Unless there is a need for an emergency baptism, the person who applies for the 
baptism of a child, should be asked who has the parental responsibility for the child . 
The Diocesan Registrar is always available to assist in advising who may have 
parental responsibility. 
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c) As far as possible, the applicant for the child’s baptism should contact the person(s) 
having the parental responsibility for the child. The nature of baptism should be 
explained to those having such parental responsibility, if they can be ascertained. 
 
d) If necessary it is advisable to postpone the baptism (except in an emergency) while 
all reasonable enquiries are made as to the whereabouts of such person(s). If, after 
such enquiry, any person having parental responsibility cannot be located, while the 
baptism can proceed, it is recommended that the Diocesan Bishop should be first be 
consulted. 
 
e) If any other person who has parental responsibility does not agree to the baptism, 
the Bishop should be consulted and, in the meantime, the baptism should not 
proceed. 
 
f) Other than in consultation with the Bishop, no baptism can proceed if it appears that 
a person having parental responsibility for the child is seeking or has applied for a 
court order to prohibit the baptism. 
 
3) Who has parental responsibility for the purpose of giving consent? 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
a) State law determines who has parental responsibility for the child. There are a 
considerable variety of possibilities. 
 
(1) Parental responsibility can arise where the child has a mother and a father in the 
following circumstances
975
: 
 
: the child’s mother and father both have parental responsibility if they are married at the 
time of the child’s birth. Such parental responsibility does not change if the couple have 
separated or, since the child’s birth have been divorced; 
 
: if a couple are not married at the time of the birth, the mother alone has parental 
responsibility. However a father also has parental responsibility if: 
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i) the name of the child’s father appears on the child’s birth certificate where the birth has 
been registered after 1
st
 December 2003, or where, after that date, the registration is 
subsequently amended to include the father’s name; or 
 
ii) the child’s father subsequently marries the mother; or  
 
iii) the child’s father has been given a parental responsibility order by a civil court (which has 
not been subsequently revoked); or 
 
iii) the child’s father has entered into a parental responsibility agreement with the mother 
(which has not been subsequently revoked); or  
 
iv) if the child’s father obtains a residence order from a court for the child to live with him. 
 
(2) Persons other than the child’s mother and father can have parental responsibility as 
follows: 
 
a) if a local authority obtains a care order for a child. In this case, it shares parental 
responsibility with the mother, and, if he also has parental responsibility, the father; 
 
b)  if a person adopts the child by court order
976
. In this case, the mother, and if applicable, 
the father, lose parental responsibility; 
 
c)  if a person is appointed as the child’s guardian by court order on the death of the person 
having parental responsibility ( a father who does not have parental responsibility can 
become a guardian); 
 
 d)  if a person is appointed  as a special guardian by court order while the parents are alive. 
The parents then lose parental responsibility; 
                                                           
976
 This can include adoption by persons of the same sex. 
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 e) if a residence order is obtained from the court for the child to live with the person named 
in the order; 
 
 f)  if, in the case of the child who has a stepfather or has parents who are civil partners, a 
parental responsibility agreement  is entered into or a parental responsibility court order is 
made; 
 
 g) if a residence order is  granted by the court. The person(s) named in the order has 
parental responsibility. The order lasts until the child is 16, but can be extended to the 
child’s 18
th
 birthday; 
 
 h) if a person is appointed a guardian under a will. Such a person automatically has parental 
responsibility for the child named in the will.  
 
i) if, after the 6
th
 of April, 2010, two persons of the same sex appear on the birth certificate 
by court order.  
 
 
A list of current Parental Responsibility Orders is available on line. 
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